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Abstract
This dissertation ties together three papers on mechanism design with boundedly
rational agents. These papers explore theoretically whether, and to what extent,
limitations on agents' ability to strategically misrepresent their preferences can help
a mechanism designer achieve outcomes that she could not achieve with perfectly
rational agents.
The first chapter investigates whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to
logically imply full incentive-compatibility, in a variety of mechanism design settings.
This can be motivated by a boundedly rational model in which agents cannot contem-
plate all possible misrepresentations, but can consider those that are close to their
true preferences. This chapter offers a unified approach that covers both continu-
ous and discrete type spaces, showing that in many commonly studied cases, local
incentive-compatibility (suitably defined) implies full incentive-compatibility.
The second chapter advances the methodology of looking quantitatively at incen-
tives for strategic behavior, motivated by the premise that agents will be truthful
if the incentive to be strategic is small enough. This chapter defines a mechanism's
susceptibility to manipulation as the maximum amount of expected utility any agent
can ever gain from strategic misrepresntation. This measure of susceptibility is then
applied to anonymous voting rules. One set of results estimates the susceptibility of
specific voting rules; an important finding is that several voting systems previously
identified as resistant to manipulation are actually more susceptible than simple plu-
rality rule, by the measure proposed here. A second set of results gives asymptotic
lower bounds on susceptibility for any possible voting rule, under various combina-
tions of efficiency, regularity, and informational conditions. These results illustrate
how one can quantitatively explore the tradeoffs between susceptibility and other
properties of the voting rule.
The third chapter carries the methodology of the second chapter to a market en-
vironment: unit-demand, private-value double auction markets. This chapter quanti-
3
tatively studies the tradeoff between inefficiency and susceptibility to manipulation,
among all possible mechanisms for such markets. The main result approximately
locates the possibility frontier, pinning it down within a factor that is logarithmic in
the size of the market.
Thesis Supervisor: Parag A. Pathak
Title: Associate Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: K. Daron Acemoglu
Title: Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics
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Introduction
This dissertation ties together three papers on mechanism design with boundedly
rational agents.
Economic theory is often criticized for relying on the unrealistic assumption that
agents are perfectly rational. Mechanism design is an area of theory that should
be especially sensitive to this criticism, because it is intimately tied to practical ap-
plications - witness the recent surge of interest in theoretically-informed design of
complex auctions, and applications of matching theory to areas from school choice to
organ transplantation. My hope is that this dissertation will represent the beginning
of a much longer project to address this criticism systematically, by importing spe-
cific models of bounded rationality into mechanism design problems, and studying
what changes and what stays the same, relative to the traditional benchmark of fully
rational agents. Thus, the long-term goal is to understand in exactly what ways, and
how seriously, imperfect rationality actually makes a difference for mechanism design.
The papers herein focus on direct mechanisms, where agents are asked to report
their preferences and a decision is made based on those preferences. The standard
design of (truthful) direct mechanisms is governed by incentive constraints, requiring
that each type of agent should not be able to benefit by pretending to be any other
type. The focus here is on forms of bounded rationality where agents' default be-
havior is to report their preferences truthfully, and they have only a limited ability
to strategically report other preferences. Such limitations relax the incentive con-
straints. Accordingly, the question is whether, and to what extent, this relaxation of
incentive constraints can help a mechanism designer better achieve her goals.
The first chapter of the dissertation studies the mathematical structure of incentive
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constraints, in a variety of mechanism design problems. The question is whether
local incentive-compatibility of a mechanism, by itself, logically implies full incentive-
compatibility. The paper offers several motivations for this question; in the context
of this dissertation, the relevant motivation is a simple model of bounded rationality,
in which agents may be unable to contemplate all the possible strategic misreports of
their preferences, but can at least consider misreports close to the true preferences.
If local incentive constraints do not automatically imply full incentive-compatibility,
then this raises the possibility that a designer could potentially benefit from agents'
bounded rationality, by using mechanisms in which she expects agents will tell the
truth, even though fully rational agents would instead find (nonlocal) manipulations.
It turns out that in a wide range of important mechanism design settings, local
incentive constraints - once formulated in the proper way - do imply full incentive-
compatibility. Thus, a mechanism designer cannot take advantage of agents' bounded
rationality in this way. The paper uses a simple supermodularity argument to unify
many continuous and discrete settings, showing that local incentive constraints are
sufficient for full incentive-compatibility in each case, for probabilistic as well as deter-
ministic mechanisms. Specifically, the results apply to any convex domain of cardinal
or ordinal preferences, as well as domains of single-peaked or successive single-crossing
ordinal preferences. For the ordinal domains in particular, these results imply com-
putational versions of many previous impossibility theorems: If a designer wishes
for her mechanism to satisfy some properties, and these properties cannot be met
without creating some opportunity for strategic manipulation, then in fact, there will
always be some such manipulations that can be found with a very small amount of
computational effort (by only searching for local manipulations).
The second, and main, chapter advances the methodology of looking quantitatively
at incentives for strategic behavior in mechanisms. This is motivated by the view -
which has been increasingly influential in recent applied market design literature -
that agents will not bother to be strategic if the incentive to do so is small enough.
The underlying boundedly-rational model is one in which agents face a small, additive
utility cost to behaving strategically (which may be interpreted as a computational
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or a psychological cost), whereas being truthful is costless. Then, all else being
equal, agents are more likely to be truthful if the incentive to be strategic is smaller.
The paper argues that we can and should understand just how small the strategic
incentives are in particular mechanisms. Such a quantitative understanding allows
us to compare different mechanisms in terms of their incentive properties, and helps
inform choices among mechanisms that require trading off strategic incentives against
other properties.
More specifically, a direct mechanism's susceptibility to manipulation is defined
as the maximum amount of expected utility that any agent can gain by behaving
strategically instead of sincerely. The maximum is taken over all preferences an agent
might have and all possible beliefs about other agents' behavior, within some natural
restrictions chosen depending on the environment.
As a concrete application, the paper considers anonymous voting rules, in which
each voter in a population submits a preference ranking over candidates and these
preferences are aggregated to determine a winner. The paper presents two sets of
results. The first set gives quantitative bounds on the susceptibility of several voting
systems discussed in prior literature. These results illustrate how to perform simple
estimates using the measure of susceptibility advanced here. A highlight of this
section of the paper is a finding that many voting systems previously identified as
relatively resistant to strategic manipulation, using a straightforward profile-counting
measure, actually perform worse than a simple plurality vote under this measure of
susceptibility, as long as the number of candidates is moderately large. This shows
that this measure of susceptibility leads to new insights and does not simply duplicate
previously known observations. The second set of results consists of several theorems
providing asymptotic lower bounds on the susceptibility of any voting rule satisfying
various combinations of efficiency, regularity, and informational properties. These
theorems illustrate how one can quantitatively study the tradeoffs between incentives
for strategic behavior and other properties that might be desired in a voting rule.
The proof technique for these theorems is also a contribution; for many of the results,
we simply take proofs of non-quantitative impossibility theorems and keep track of
11
error terms.
This second chapter studies the problem of designing a voting rule because it is
among the oldest and most widely-studied problems in mechanism design, and also
one where there has been significant previous literature attempting to measure manip-
ulation, using other approaches. However, the concept of susceptibility can of course
be applied to other problems. As another illustration - and one which perhaps fits
more familiarly into the domain of economic problems - the third chapter of the dis-
sertation takes the same measure of susceptibility and applies it to large private-value
double auction environments, studying the quantitative tradeoff between efficiency
and strategic incentives.
In such an environment (which may be thought of as a stylized model of more
general market environments), there are sellers who each have one unit of a homoge-
neous good for sale, and buyers who have money and would like to buy a good. Each
seller, however, has his own, privately known value for the good (or cost of procuring
it), and each buyer has his own value as well. A (direct) mechanism asks each buyer
and seller his value, and as a function of these reported values, determines who trades
with whom and how money changes hands. A mechanism designer's aim is to try to
get the goods to whichever combination of buyers and sellers values them the most.
It is well established in previous literature that, under participation and weak
budget-balance constraints, there is no way to achieve the first-best efficient outcome
while also giving all participants perfect incentives to report their values truthfully.
On the other hand, it is possible to achieve the first-best assuming agents are truthful,
with incentives to be strategic becoming negligible as the market becomes large (using
a k-double auction, a version of the Walrasian equilibrium mechanism). It is also
possible to give perfect incentives while achieving asymptotic efficiency as the market
becomes large (using a double auction due to Preston McAfee). However, under the
model of this paper, the susceptibility of the k-double auction and the inefficiency
of the McAfee double auction both converge to zero at the fairly slow rate of 1/VN
(where N measures the size of the market). A designer might be concerned that, in
moderate-sized markets, this susceptibility to manipulation for the k-double auction
12
is still too large to prevent manipulation by agents who have only small costs to being
strategic. This leads to the question of whether there is some other mechanism with
significantly smaller susceptibility than the k-double auction (but not necessarily
zero), and also significantly better efficiency performance than the McAfee double
auction. The main result of the chapter answers this question in the negative, by
showing that no mechanism does better than order I/(V/N log N) on both dimensions
simultaneously. The lesson is that, even in a model in which agents have a small cost
to behaving strategically, there is no way to do substantially better than the known
mechanisms.
The papers presented here are only the start of a long project on bounded ra-
tionality in mechanism design. One can imagine many different forms of bounded
rationality that might be theoretically modeled. My hope is that this work will in-
spire more exploration in these related but distinct directions.
13
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Chapter 1
When Are Local Incentive
Constraints Sufficient?
Abstract
We study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply
full incentive-compatibility, in a variety of mechanism design settings, allowing for
probabilistic mechanisms. We give a unified approach that covers both continuous
and discrete type spaces. On many common preference domains - including any con-
vex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences, single-peaked ordinal preferences, and
successive single-crossing ordinal preferences - local incentive-compatibility (suit-
ably defined) implies full incentive-compatibility. On domains of cardinal preferences
that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition, local incentive-compatibility is not suffi-
cient. Our sufficiency results hold for dominant-strategy and Bayesian Nash solution
concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences.
Thanks to (in random order) Alex Wolitzky, Ron Lavi, Suehyun Kwon, Vince Conitzer, Anton
Tsoy, Alex Frankel, Ariel Procaccia, Parag Pathak, Daron Acemoglu, Tim Roughgarden, Rakesh
Vohra, and Glenn Ellison for helpful comments and suggestions. This work was supported by an
NSF Graduate Research Fellowship.
1 Introduction
In the analysis of mechanism design problems, taking account of all the possible
constraints imposed by incentive-compatibility at once can be unwieldy. It can be
This chapter was originally published in Econometrica, volume 80, issue 2, March 2012, pages
661-686. Appendix B was originally published online in Econometrica's supplemental material.
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easier to focus attention on local incentive constraints, ensuring that agents have no
incentive to make "small" misreports of their type, and then check at the end of the
analysis whether or not the mechanisms obtained are fully incentive-compatible.
In the present paper, we ask the general question of whether local incentive con-
straints are sufficient on their own to guarantee full incentive-compatibility, and obtain
an affirmative answer in a wide array of settings. We allow for arbitrary probabilistic
mechanisms, which specify a distribution over some (exogenously specified) outcome
space as a function of an agent's type. (Our analysis is mostly worded in terms of a
single agent, but we show how it readily extends to multi-agent mechanisms, including
allowing a limited degree of interdependence in preferences.)
To clarify the significance of these results, it is useful to distinguish two major
branches of mechanism design literature. We give a simple and unified approach
that applies to both branches but has slightly different implications for the two. One
branch, with roots in axiomatic social choice theory, studies problems without mone-
tary transfers. These include voting [25, 50, 39, 7, 48], matching [45, 2, 14], queueing
[15], and rationing [52, 22], among others. This literature has recently been influen-
tial in applied market design as well; see for example [46] and references therein. It
is commonly taken as given here that each agent submits a ranking over outcomes
(such as candidates, in a voting context, or schools or jobs, in a matching context)
to the mechanism. Thus, agents report ordinal preferences. Incentive-compatibility
typically means that reporting one's true preferences should be a dominant strat-
egy. We will say that such a mechanism is locally incentive-compatible if no agent
type can benefit from misreporting by switching some two consecutive outcomes in
his preference ranking. We show below that for many of the most common prefer-
ence domains considered in this literature, local incentive-compatibility implies full
incentive-compatibility. Specifically, we show this for domains of ordinal preferences
having convex closure (Proposition 3.2, which actually gives a generalization to polyhe-
dral type spaces); single-peaked ordinal preferences (Proposition 3.3); and successive
single-crossing ordinal preferences (Proposition 3.4).
The second large branch of literature concerns settings in which monetary trans-
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fers are possible and agents have quasilinear preferences, with applications such as
monopoly pricing, auctions, and public projects. Seminal works include [40, 28, 41,
42, 37, 34, 35]. It is generally assumed that agents can report a cardinal valuation
for each outcome. We show that local incentive-compatibility, suitably formulated,
implies full incentive-compatibility whenever the space of agents' cardinal types is
convex (Proposition 3.5). (We should note that this result also has some relevance to
the no-transfers literature, as some authors there also allow agents to report cardinal
preferences, e.g. [5, 31, 53].)
Our results on the sufficiency of local incentive constraints are relevant for several
reasons. One is that they provide a technical tool to facilitate the researcher's task
of analyzing mechanism design problems. This is particularly relevant to the trans-
fers branch of the literature, where analysis typically begins by using local incentive
constraints and the envelope theorem to obtain an integral formula for the utility
attained by each type of agent (as in e.g. [41, Lemma 2]); our sufficiency results
provide a general tool to help assure researchers that this reduction of the problem
has not neglected important nonlocal constraints. They also can streamline proofs
of incentive-compatibility for newly designed mechanisms, since it is enough to show
local incentive-compatibility and then invoke sufficiency.
Moreover, our analysis casts light on the form of local incentive constraints needed.
It is not sufficient to specify only that each type of agent should be unable to profitably
misreport as any nearby type; one must also specify that each type cannot serve as a
profitable misreport for any nearby type. (See the discussion in Subsection 3.1.)
A separate reason our results are relevant is that one may have more literal rea-
sons to impose only a subset of incentive constraints. For example, there may be a
monitoring technology that makes it possible to detect and punish reports far away
from an agent's true type, in which case the mechanism designer does not need to
worry about such misreports (as in Green and Laffont [29]). One might hope that
this would provide an operational way to circumvent impossibility results such as
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [25, 50], which are pervasive in the no-transfers
literature; or, in a setting with transfers, one might hope, say, to obtain higher rev-
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enue than would be possible with fully incentive-compatible mechanisms. If agents
are to report truthfully, then our sufficiency results show that in many settings, hav-
ing access to such a monitoring technology does not enlarge the space of effective
mechanisms.
Relatedly, when designing a mechanism for boundedly rational agents, one might
consider that agents are not capable of contemplating every possible misreport of
their preferences, and again ask whether this provides an operational way to improve
on fully incentive-compatible mechanisms. If the designer believes that agents are at
least rational enough to be capable of imitating any nearby type, then in the settings
covered by our sufficiency results, imposing only the relevant subset of incentive
constraints actually does not enlarge the space of usable mechanisms at all.
In particular, for ordinal type spaces, this idea leads to "computational" versions
of many existing impossibility or characterization results. This gives a very general
reply to a literature that seeks ways around the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem by
devising voting mechanisms that are computationally difficult, but not impossible, to
strategically manipulate (e.g. [9, 8]). On the type spaces where our sufficiency results
apply, they immediately imply that any such mechanism is easy to manipulate in some
instances, as long as the outcome of the mechanism itself is easy to compute. (Here, as
in the preceding literature, we take "easy" to mean computable in polynomial time.)
Namely, a manipulator can exhaustively consider each local manipulation - switching
some two candidates who are consecutive in the ranking - and compute the outcome
of the mechanism; this trial-and-error search is easy and will find an advantageous
manipulation in some instances. So a computational-complexity constraint, at least
of the naive form, cannot prevent agents from manipulating. 1
More broadly, there is a tradition in social choice theory of looking for the weak-
est assumptions necessary to obtain a characterization or impossibility result. Our
results can be immediately applied to many axiomatic characterizations (such as
those cited in the third paragraph), showing that, say, an axiom requiring dominant-
'In the Gibbard-Satterthwaite context, stronger results extending this idea are already known
(e.g. [32]). But our results lead more generally to computational versions of many other existing
characterization results by the same argument.
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strategy incentive-compatibility can be replaced by local incentive-compatibility with-
out changing the conclusion.
The aforementioned results show that, for many important type spaces, local
incentive-compatibility implies full incentive-compatibility. On the other hand, there
are type spaces where the implication does not hold. In particular, we show this for
domains of cardinal preferences that fail to be convex in a sufficiently strong way
(Proposition 4.1).
Our work connects with several previous papers on mechanism design under a
subset of incentive constraints. Green and Laffont [29], mentioned above, consider a
general setup in which the space of messages that agents can send equals the space
of types, with exogenous restrictions as to which messages each type is capable of
sending, and study when the revelation principle applies. Celik [16] and Sher and
Vohra [51] consider specific mechanism design problems under subsets of incentive
constraints, though their subsets are not local in our sense.
There does not appear to be previously published work asking the broad question
of when local and full incentive-compatibility coincide. However, a contemporaneous
paper by Sato [49], independent of ours, does address this question. Sato consid-
ers only deterministic mechanisms over ordinal type spaces. For such mechanisms,
Sato shows that local incentive constraints are sufficient on all of the ordinal type
spaces that we consider (type spaces with convex closure, single-peaked, and succes-
sive single-crossing preferences), as well as some others.
This paper also bears some formal resemblance to recent work on general settings
with cardinal preferences and transfers. In such a setting, a rule mapping types to
outcomes is implementable if there exists some accompanying payment function (map-
ping types to transfers) that makes truthful revelation incentive-compatible. There
has recently been much interest in simple conditions ensuring that a rule is imple-
mentable, e.g. [47, 12, 4]. In particular, our work is somewhat reminiscent of a paper
by Archer and Kleinberg [3]. They show that local implementability (suitably de-
fined) implies implementability, on any convex space of cardinal types. However, we
show that local implies full incentive-compatibility for a given mechanism, consisting
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of an outcome rule and a payment function together, whereas they show that local
implementability by some payment functions (possibly using different payment func-
tions on different local neighborhoods) implies full implementability. Thus, both their
hypothesis and their conclusion are weaker than ours. Moreover, their sets of local
incentive constraints are larger than ours, and their theorem would not hold using our
constraint sets; this is discussed in detail in Subsection 3.1. Accordingly, our results
on cardinal type spaces do not follow from the result of Archer and Kleinberg, nor
vice versa.
2 Framework
We begin with the general framework. Ensuing sections will give the concrete results.
2.1 Definitions
We will focus on incentives in a mechanism for an individual agent. In Subsection 2.2,
we will show how the ideas extend straightforwardly to multi-agent mechanisms with
private values. We begin by introducing the definitions for the no-transfers setting;
in Subsection 3.5 we will allow for transfers, and also for interdependence.
From the agent's point of view, a mechanism takes the agent's preferences as input
and determines an outcome, or a probability distribution over outcomes. We must be
explicit about the form of preferences that the agent can announce. In some settings,
it is standard practice to assume agents announce their cardinal valuation for each
of the possible outcomes. In others (specifically in the no-transfers literature), it is
assumed that agents only report an ordinal ranking of outcomes.
This latter assumption entails exogenously restricting the message space of the
mechanism to consist of the possible ordinal preferences. This restriction is widely
accepted, although it does not yet enjoy solid theoretical foundations. It is often
made for analytical tractability, and in practical market design applications it can
also be justified by the need to make the mechanism accessible to participants who
may have difficulty thinking about their preferences over lotteries. Bogomolnaia and
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Moulin [14] give a more detailed discussion on this last point.
Finally, in some settings, one might assume that agents report even coarser in-
formation than ordinal preferences (for example, they are required to rank only a
limited number of outcomes). We will first give a unified treatment that covers all
of the different specifications of preferences, then specialize to define local incentive-
compatibility in specific settings.
Let X, the outcome space, be any finite set; m will denote its cardinality. Let
A(X) denote the space of lotteries over X. The agent is assumed to have expected
utility preferences over lotteries. It will be convenient to think of both lotteries over
X and utility functions as elements of R'. If the agent's utility function is u, his
payoff from a lottery L is given by the inner product u - L.
For subsets of R', cl denotes the closure and 0 the boundary operator. If u,v E
RM, we write [u, v] for the line segment {(1 - a)u + av | a c [0, 1]}.
A type is a nonempty subset of Rm . A type space is a set of pairwise disjoint
types. We henceforth use the term type space in preference to domain: the latter
term suggests only an exogenous restriction of the set of utility functions the agent
may have, whereas our notion of a type space conveys both which utility functions
are possible and which ones the mechanism is required to treat identically.
Given a type space T, a mechanism is a function f : T -* A(X). Thus, the
mechanism chooses a distribution over outcomes, based on the agent's (reported)
type.
An incentive constraint is an ordered pair of types. The interpretation of the con-
straint (t, t') is that a type t cannot benefit from misreporting as type t'. Accordingly,
we say that a mechanism f satisfies an incentive constraint (t, t') if, for all u C t,
u - f(t) > u - f(t'); equivalently, u - (f(t) - f(t')) > 0. A mechanism satisfies a set of
incentive constraints if it satisfies every constraint in the set.
A mechanism that satisfies the full set of incentive constraints T x T is fully
incentive-compatible. This is exactly the usual meaning of incentive-compatibility.
A set S of incentive constraints is sufficient if every mechanism that satisfies S is
fully incentive-compatible.
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We highlight several important kinds of type spaces and define local incentive
constraints in each case.
* A type space T is cardinal if every type is a singleton. In this case, abusing
notation, we will think of types as vectors and T as a subset of R'. For example,
we write f(u) rather than f({u}).
For a cardinal T, a set S of incentive constraints will be called local incentive
constraints if every u E T has an open neighborhood N in T (with the relative
topology) such that (u, u') E S and (u', u) E S for every u' E Nu.
" A type space is ordinal if every type is of the form t = {nI u(Xi) > u(X2 ) >
. . . > u(Xm)} for some strict ordering xi >- - - >x, of the elements of X. We
say that t represents this ordering. Note that our definition of an ordinal type
space does not require that all possible orderings be represented by types.
When types are ordinal, f satisfies a constraint (t, t') if and only if the lottery
f(t) first-order stochastically dominates f(t') with respect to the ordering on X
represented by t. (This is easy to show.)
Call two ordinal types t, t' adjacent if the orderings they represent differ only by
a switch of two consecutive outcomes. On any ordinal type space T, the local
incentive constraints will refer to the set of all constraints (t, t') such that t and
t' are adjacent.
" More generally, we can consider polyhedral type spaces. In the space of utility
functions, RM, an open half-space is a set of the form {u I u - A > c} for
some nonzero A E Rm and some constant c. If H is such an open half-space,
its closure cl(H) = {u | - A > c} is a closed half-space, and its boundary
9H = {u I u - A = c} is a hyperplane. Define an (open) polyhedron to be
a nonempty set that is the intersection of finitely many open half-spaces. A
polyhedral type space is a type space consisting of finitely many types that are
all polyhedra.
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Say that two disjoint polyhedra t, t' are adjacent if cl(l) n cl(t') contains a
nonempty, relatively open subset of a hyperplane. In simpler terms, t and t' are
polyhedra that border along a face. We then let the local incentive constraints
on T be the set of constraints (t, t') such that t and t' are adjacent.
Any ordinal type space is polyhedral, and one can check that the definitions
of adjacency and local incentive constraints for ordinal types agree with those
for polyhedral types. (There exists previous literature in mechanism design
also using polyhedra to represent ordinal types, e.g. Duggan [21].) For an-
other example, take the types implied by truncated rankings, i.e. {u I u(xi) >
- > u(xp) and u(x,) > u(y) for all y # x 1 ,. . .,x,}, for any distinct outcomes
xi,.. ., x, with p < m - these are again polyhedral types. Such a type space is
natural for studying matching mechanisms in applications such as school choice,
where students may be asked to rank, say, 12 favorite schools out of more than
500 available [1].
More generally, any mechanism with a finite message space gives rise to a poly-
hedral type space: for each message, the set of utility functions for which it
is optimal forms a polyhedron (ignoring boundary issues). Studying local in-
centives in these type spaces can be helpful for analyzing such mechanisms.
Gibbard [27] gives a fairly complete analysis of dominant-strategy voting mech-
anisms with arbitrary finite message spaces; much of the analysis focuses on
incentives to misreport locally.
We say that a mechanism is locally incentive-compatible if it satisfies some set
of local incentive constraints (in the cardinal case; or the canonical such set in the
polyhedral case).
We are interested in determining whether or not local incentive contraints are
sufficient, on various type spaces.
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2.2 Mechanisms with multiple agents
As already mentioned, while we focus on single-agent mechanisms, our results apply
also with multiple agents, under private values. The extension is similar to arguments
in previous literature [3, 30], but we spell it out in detail here, as we will further build
on it in Subsection 3.5.
Define a mechanism with n agents, type space T = Ti x ... x Ts, and outcome
space X to be a map f : T -+ A(X), specifying a (probabilistic) outcome as a function
of all the agents' types. Suppose that, for some i, a set Si of incentive constraints is
sufficient for Ti.
One possible notion of incentive-compatibility is to say that f satisfies the in-
centive constraint (ti, t') c T x T for agent i if, for all t-i and all ui E ti, we have
u - (f(ti, ~) - f(tz, t-)) > 0. If f satisfies every incentive constraint in Si for agent i,
then holding fixed any profile t_, the single-agent mechanism tj 1-+ f(ti, t-j) satisfies
Si and so (by sufficiency) is fully incentive-compatible. Thus, f is fully incentive-
compatible in dominant strategies (for agent i).
One can also consider Bayesian incentive-compatibility. Suppose we are given a
probability distribution Og over T for each agent j, and assume f(ti, t-j) is measurable
in t-i for all ti. Then we can say that f satisfies incentive constraint (ti, t') for agent i
if, for all ui C ti, we have ui -(Ei[f(ti, ti)] - E [f(t , ti)]) > 0, where the expectation
is over t_, with respect to the product distribution xjhiOj/. Again, if f satisfies
each incentive constraint in Si, then the single-agent mechanism tj F-* E [f(ti, t-i)]
satisfies Si and so is fully incentive-compatible for agent i. This is the standard notion
of Bayesian incentive-compatibility for f. Notice that this argument depends on the
agents' types being independently distributed: the expectation Ej needs to be defined
in a way that does not depend on ti.
3 Sufficiency
In this section we show that local incentive constraints are sufficient on a variety of
common type spaces. All proofs absent from the main text are in Appendix A.
24
3.1 Cardinal type spaces
Recalling that a cardinal type space is identified with a subset of R', we can state
our first sufficiency result:
Proposition 3.1 On a convex cardinal type space T, any set of local incentive con-
straints is sufficient.
We present the proof in detail, since the proofs of most of our other sufficiency
results (Propositions 3.2, 3.3, 3.5) follow the same model. To prove that an agent
of type u never wants to misreport as type v, we restrict attention to types along
the line segment [u, v], effectively reducing to one dimension; we then break the
segment into short pieces for which local incentive constraints apply, and combine
these local incentive constraints into the incentive constraint (u, v) using the kind of
supermodularity or "revealed-preference" argument that is familiar elsewhere in the
mechanism design literature (see e.g. [41, Lemma 2], [44, Theorem 1]).
Proof: Let S be a set of local incentive constraints and f a mechanism satisfying
S. For types u, v, write un-+v if (u, v) and (v, u) are both in S. By definition, every
u E T has some neighborhood Nu in T such that un-*v for all v E Nu.
Fix arbitrary u, v C T. We want to show that u - (f(u) - f(v)) 0.
For any a E [0, 1], define ua = (1 - a)u + av. Convexity implies ua E T. Let
A ={a I there exist 0 = ao < ai < -. < a, <; 1 with
uo*cl +-+ - - - -+u,. and a, = a}.
Clearly, if a E A, a < a' < 1, and ua<-+u0 ', then a' E A. Now let d = sup A > 0. If
= 0 then -a C A. If d > 0, then for a sufficiently close to d we have u1,y-+uz; since
we can choose a E A arbitrarily close, we again get d E A. Moreover, if -5 < 1, then
ua+-*ua, for a just slightly larger than Z; this implies a E A, contradicting z = sup A.
Therefore, we get - = 1 and 1 C A.
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So we have 0 = ao < a < --- < a, = 1with us,,k <4Uak± for each k. Now write
out the local incentive constraints:
Uak (f (Ua) - f (Uak)) 2 0,
Unkl -f (Ucek) - f (UC)) 2 0.
Multiplying by ak+1 and ak, respectively, and adding gives
[Ozk±1'Ual - CfkUckk+ll -(f (Uc') - f (u~k+l)) >_ 0.
But one directly calculates that ak+1Uk -akzk+l = (ak+1 - ak)U. Since ak+1 - ak >
0, we can divide through to obtain
U - (f(Uak) - f (Uak+l)) 2 0.
Now we can sum over k = 0, 1,... , r - 1, and telescoping gives
u -(f(u) - f(v)) = U -(f(ua.) - f(ua,)) > 0.
Proposition 3.1 applies to any convex cardinal type space. This includes, for
example, the full space of utility functions on X; or the space of utility functions that
are increasing with respect to some partial order on X; or the space of supermodular
or submodular utility functions, given a lattice structure on X; or the space of utility
functions satisfying some concavity conditions.
The proof of Proposition 3.1 clearly uses both parts of the definition of local incen-
tive constraints - that each u should have a neighborhood Nu with both (u, u') E S
and (u', u) E S for u' E Nu. A seemingly more natural way to define local incentive
constraints would only require (u, u') E S. Under this definition, Proposition 3.1
would no longer hold. For example, suppose X = {x, y} and T is the full space of
all cardinal types. Consider the mechanism f given by f(u) = x if u(x) < u(y)
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and f(u) = y otherwise. This f meets the weaker definition of local incentive-
compatibility, but is not fully incentive-compatible. (Requiring only (u', u) E S would
also not be enough: with the same X and T, consider the mechanism f(u) = x if
u(x) = u(y) - 1 and f (u) = y otherwise.) 2
By contrast, the local-to-global result of Archer and Kleinberg [3, Corollary 3.7],
on implementability in a quasilinear setting, effectively requires stronger local in-
centive constraints. They assume implementability throughout each Nu - that is,
for each u, there should be some payment function pu (specifying a payment for each
agent type) so that the mechanism-with-transfers (f, pu) satisfies incentive constraints
(u', u") for all u', u" E Nu. The analogue of our constraints in their setting would be to
merely require that (f, pu) should satisfy constraints (u, u') and (u', u) for all u' c N".
This requirement is a local form of weak monotonicity, which is not enough to imply
their implementability conclusion without further restrictions; see [12, Example Si]
or [47, Section 7].
Unlike the local constraints of [3], ours can be expressed succinctly in terms of
local maxima: f is locally incentive-compatible if every u E T is a local maximum of
both the functions v - u- f(v) and v - v - (f(u) - f(v)). With this interpretation,
local incentive-compatibility can potentially be checked by first- and second-order
conditions at points where f is differentiable. This convenience is relevant in making
the reduction from global to local incentive-compatibility a useful one: if one wishes
to check incentive constraints directly, then even local incentive-compatibility can
require checking many constraints when T is high-dimensional, since it is necessary
to check constraints in every direction at each u.
3.2 Polyhedral type spaces
Next we consider polyhedral type spaces. Our main result here is:
2A referee points out that a mechanism on a cardinal type space is fully incentive-compatible
if and only if the indirect utility function u - u - f(u) is convex, with f(n) belonging to the
subdifferential at each point u. Our two local conditions can be viewed loosely as local forms of
these requirements: the subdifferential condition at u is equivalent to satisfying (u', u) for all u' E T,
so our requiring this for all u' E Nu gives a local form of the subdifferential condition, and then
imposing the additional constraints (u, U') ensures convexity.
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Proposition 3.2 Let T be a polyhedral type space such that Utw cl(t) is convex.
Then the set of local incentive constraints is sufficient.
The argument is essentially the same as for Proposition 3.1. For utility functions
u and v, we consider the line segment [u, v]; this segment passes through various types
in succession. By jiggling v a bit if necessary, we can ensure that any two successive
types along this line segment are adjacent polyhedra, and then we can just add up
the corresponding local incentive constraints as before.
A particular case of Proposition 3.2 is that on the full space of all ordinal types over
a given X, the local incentive constraints are sufficient.3 (The union of the closures
of all types is simply all of R m.) Proposition 3.2 also applies when T consists of all
ordinal types that respect a given partial ordering on X. For example, Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [15] consider an allocation problem with real objects and a null object; all
types have the same preference ordering on the real objects, but rank the null object
differently relative to the real objects.
3.3 Single-peaked preferences
The preceding results have focused on essentially convex type spaces. One important
nonconvex type space is that of single-peaked preferences.
Fix an ordering x1 , ... ,xm of the outcomes in X. A strict preference ordering
>- over X is single-peaked if there exists some outcome xz, such that, whenever
q < p < p* or q > p > p*, we have x, >- x.. An ordinal type is single-peaked if
it represents a single-peaked ordering.
Single-peaked preferences have been popular in voting theory ever since Black's
[13] observation that the rule choosing the median of the voters' favorite outcomes
is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible. Single-peaked preferences are also impor-
tant in economic applications because single-peakedness is the same as quasiconcavity
of the utility function (aside from issues of indifference). Moulin [39] characterizes
3 An analogous result also holds if we allow indifferences - so that for each weak order on X, the
set of utility functions representing it constitutes a type - with an appropriate definition of local
incentive constraints. We omit the details here.
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dominant-strategy incentive-compatible deterministic voting systems under single-
peaked preferences. (Moulin assumes the outcome space is the whole real line, but
his proofs carry through almost unchanged for a finite outcome space.) Ehlers, Pe-
ters, and Storcken [23] extend this work to probabilistic mechanisms. Sprumont [52],
Barbera, Jackson, and Neme [6], and Ehlers and Klaus [22] study rationing problems
when consumers have single-peaked preferences over quantities.
The space of single-peaked ordinal types does not meet the convexity condition of
Proposition 3.2. However, we still have the result:
Proposition 3.3 Fix an ordering x 1,..., xm of the elements of X. On the space of
single-peaked ordinal types, the set of local incentive constraints is sufficient.
The argument is a slight extension of that used for Proposition 3.2. In general, in
an ordinal type space, say that a utility function v is accessible from another utility
function u if the segment [u, v] is contained in the union of the closures of all types.
In this case we can apply the argument of adding up local incentive constraints from
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. Now, in the single-peaked ordinal type space, it is no longer
true (as it was for Proposition 3.2) that all v in a given type t' are accessible from
u E t, but we actually only need to be able to find some such v for each u. Lemma
A.5 in Appendix A shows that this can be done.
One can also consider the space of single-dipped ordinal types [36], or of single-
peaked ordinal preferences on a tree [20, 18]. It is straightforward to extend the proof
to cover each of these cases, showing that the local incentive constraints are again
sufficient.
3.4 Single-crossing preferences
Besides single-peaked preferences, another economically important class of ordinal
type spaces is given by single-crossing preferences. These are defined as follows: Fix
an ordering xi, ... , xm of the elements of X. A sequence >1,... , >. of distinct strict
preference orderings is a single-crossing preference domain if the following holds:
whenever p < q and xq >- X for some k, we also have xq >-I x, for all 1 > k.
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Single-crossing ordinal preferences arise in economic models such as the redistribu-
tive taxation models of Roberts [43] and Meltzer and Richard [38] (see Saporiti [48]
for references to other applications). Just as with single-peaked preferences, prefer-
ences coming from any single-crossing domain satisfy a median voter property - the
voting scheme that chooses the outcome most preferred by the voter with the median
preference is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible. More generally, Saporiti [48]
characterizes dominant-strategy incentive-compatible voting schemes on any maximal
single-crossing preference domain.
For any strict preference ordering >- on X, let V(-) = {(p, q) I p < q, xP < Xq }. By
definition, a sequence of preference orderings >i, . . . , >, is a single-crossing preference
domain if and only if V(s 1 ) C -- - C V(>,r). In fact, these inclusions must all be
strict, since any ordering >- can be uniquely reconstructed from V(>-). Therefore
IV(>-1)I < - < |V(>r)|. Call the domain a successive single-crossing preference
domain if |V(>-k+1)| = IV(Sk)| + 1 for each k = 1, ... ,r - 1.
This covers the domains considered in [48] - any maximal single-crossing prefer-
ence domain -,..., > is successive. For suppose that IV(>-k+1) - IV(>-k)| > 1 for
some k. There must be some two alternatives X,, Xq that are ranked consecutively by
>-k, with xp >k Xq but Xq >-k+1 X,. Single-crossing ensures p < q. By switching the
positions of x, and Xq in >-k, we get a new ordering >-' with V (-') = V (>-k)U{(p, q)},
and hence V(>-k) C V(>-') c V(>-k+1). This means that 1, ... , >-k, -', >-k+1, -
is again a single-crossing preference domain, contradicting maximality.
For any successive single-crossing preference domain >-I,..., >-r, call the corre-
sponding space of ordinal types T = {t 1,..., tr} a successive single-crossing ordinal
type space. In this case, the local incentive constraints are precisely those of the
form (tk, tk+1) or (tk+1, tk). We shall show that on such a type space, the local in-
centive constraints are sufficient. This result may be surprising, since these incentive
constraints are especially parsimonious - each type is adjacent to just two other
types.
Proposition 3.4 On any successive single-crossing ordinal type space, the local in-
centive constraints are sufficient.
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The strategy of proof is a little different from that used for the previous proposi-
tions. Instead of breaking a single line segment into short pieces, we find a sequence
of parallel line segments, each connecting two consecutive types tk, tk+1, but such that
each segment need not begin where the previous one ended. (As pointed out by a
referee, this method has some precedent in Gibbard [26, Lemma 2], where a similar
argument is applied to the full ordinal type space; and the argument can be applied
to the space of single-peaked ordinal types as well.)
Proof: Suppose the mechanism f satisfies the local incentive constraints. Fix
any two types ti, tj', and let u E t1. We wish to show that u - (f(ti) - f(t,)) > 0. We
will show this for 1' > 1; the proof for 1' < 1 is similar.
In fact it suffices to show that
u - (f (tk) - f (tk+l)) 0 for k > 1, (3.1)
since then we can sum up (3.1) for k = 1, 1+1, . . ., 1'-1 to obtain u-(f (ti) - f(tl-)) > 0.
So fix k > 1, and also define M = maxu(x) - min. u(x). Write V (>-k+1) \
V (>-k) = {(p, q)} by successiveness; then p < q, and >-k ranks xz just above Xq.
Because u E t, with I < k, single-crossing implies that u(x,) > u(Xq) also. Let v
be any utility function representing >-k such that v(X,) - v(Xq) < u(x,) - U(Xq),
and jv(x) - v(y)| > M for all distinct outcomes x,y E X other than x, and Xq.
Because >-k ranks x, and Xq consecutively, we can do this. Then the utility function
v - u ranks every pair of outcomes in the same way as v does, except {x,, Xq}. Since
V(>-k+1) = V(>-k) U {(p, q)}, this means that v - u represents >-k+1-
So, V E tk and v - u E tk+1. The local incentive constraints give
v (f(tk) - f(tk+l)) 2 0,
[v -u] - (f(tk+l) - f(tk)) > 0.
Adding these two gives exactly (3.1), and this completes the proof. L
The hypothesis of successiveness in Proposition 3.4 cannot be dropped, even if the
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set of local incentive constraints is modified in the natural way. That is, it is not the
case that, for any single-crossing ordinal type space {ti, ... , t, }, the set consisting of
the incentive constraints (tk, tk+1) and (tk+1, tk), for 1 < k < r, is sufficient. For a
counterexample, consider the three orderings
: I 21  >1 X3  -1 X4
>2: X 2  -2 X1 -2 X3  -2 X 4
53: X4  >3 X 2  53 X 1  >3 X 3
and the corresponding ordinal types t1 , t 2, t 3 . Let f map the types to lotteries over
(Xi,X 2 ,X 3 ,x 4 ) as follows:
f (ti) = (1/4, 1/4,1/2, 0); f (t2 ) = (0, 1/2, 1/2,0); f(t 3 ) = (1/2, 0, 0, 1/2).
Then f satisfies the incentive constraints (ti, t2 ), (t 2 , ti), (t 2 , 3 ), (t3 , t 2 ), but not (ti, ts),
so it is not fully incentive-compatible. (The line of the proof of Proposition 3.4 that
fails is the statement V(>k+1) \ V(>-k) = {(p, q)} in the third paragraph. More
broadly, the approach of the proof fails because if we take, say, the utility function
u representing S1 with u(xi) = 4, u(X 2 ) = 3, u(X3 ) = 2, u(X4 ) = 1, then we cannot
find any v such that v represents >-2 and v - a represents >3.)
3.5 Transfers and interdependent preferences
We now return to the setting of cardinal preferences. However, we generalize in
two new directions. First, we consider the transfers setting, in which agents have
quasilinear utility in outcomes and money, and a mechanism specifies both a lottery
over outcomes and a transfer for each agent. Second, we allow for the possibility of
interdependent preferences, where each agent's utility for each outcome depends on
the other agents' types. Numerous recent works prove possibility and impossibility
results with transfers and interdependence [34, 33, 35, 11], and it is natural to ask to
what extent our methods apply here.
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We adopt new notations and terminology, for this subsection only, in order to de-
scribe these extensions. For clarity, it will help to explicitly write out the dependence
of the mechanism on all n agents' types, as in Subsection 2.2. (Of course, a single agent
is a special case.) Each agent i's type space T is now assumed to be a subset of an arbi-
trary finite-dimensional Euclidean space, not necessarily R". Write T = Ti x ... x T.
Agent i's utility is now represented by a function ui : T -> R' specifying his utility
for each outcome as a function of the entire type profile. (The private-values case
discussed previously is the special case where T C R' and u2(ti, ... , tn) = ti.)
To allow for transfers, a mechanism is now a pair (f, p), where f : T -+ A(X)
specifies a lottery over outcomes for each type profile, and p : T -* R' is a payment
function specifying the net transfer each agent receives. We write pi(t) for the ith
component of p(t), representing agent i's transfer.
If the true type profile is t and the agents report profile t', then agent i's realized
utility is u (t) -f (t') +p(t'). An incentive constraint for agent i is again a pair (ti, t') E
T x T. We will emphasize here the Bayesian notion of incentive-compatibility, so
assume a distribution @j on each agent's type space T is given. The mechanism (f, p)
satisfies the incentive constraint (ti, t') if
Ej[uj(tj, t_j) -f (ti, t_j) + pj(tj, t-j)] ;> Ei[ui(ti, t_j) - f (t', t_j) + pi(t', t_j)].
Here the expectations are with respect to the product distribution xyp 0j on other
agents' types; it is presupposed that the expressions inside the expectations are mea-
surable in t_j, and both expectations are finite. (As in Subsection 2.2, the assumption
of independently distributed types is crucial.)
A set Si of incentive constraints will again be called local incentive constraints if
every tj E T has an open neighborhood Nt, in T such that (ti, t') c Si and (t', ti) c Si
for all t' E Nts. Si is sufficient for agent i if every mechanism that satisfies it must
satisfy the full set of incentive constraints T x Ti.
Dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility has an analogue in the interdependent
setting, namely ex post incentive-compatibility [17, 35], which demands Bayesian
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incentive-compatibility for all probability distributions simultaneously. Our result
(Proposition 3.5 below) is expressed in terms of Bayesian incentive-compatibility,
but an immediate corollary is that the same result holds using ex post incentive-
compatibility instead.
To obtain a sufficiency result, we need to restrict interdependence by assuming
that, for each fixed t_, the utility function ui(-, ti) : T -> R" is linear in ti. Under
this restriction, we have:
Proposition 3.5 In the setting with transfers and interdependent utility linear in
own type, if agent i has a convex type space T, then every set of local incentive
constraints is sufficient for agent i.
The proof is a straightforward extension of that for Proposition 3.1.
The linearity assumption warrants some comments. It is satisfied trivially in the
private-values case (hence, Proposition 3.1 is a special case of Proposition 3.5). It is
also satisfied by many concrete models appearing in the interdependent preferences
literature; see for example [19, Examples 2,3,4,5], [34], [24] (under Aassumption A2
of that paper), [11, Example 1], and [10, Section 3]. On the other hand, it is quite
restrictive, relative to the space of all well-behaved utility functions ui : T -> R' an
agent might have.
The linearity assumption is crucial in our analysis, ensuring that the convexity
condition in Proposition 3.5 extends that of Proposition 3.1. To understand this,
notice (as observed also in [3]) that we can think of each type of agent i as specifying
a utility function X x T-i -> R, and given the priors 0j, a mechanism induces a
distribution over X x T_, for each ti. In order to apply the argument from the proof
of Proposition 3.1, we essentially need agent i's type space to be a convex subset of
the linear space of all functions X x Ti -> R. This is exactly the combination of
linearity and convexity assumptions we have made above.
The preceding paragraph does not show that sufficiency fails when the linearity
assumption is violated, only that the method of proof used here (adding up incentive
constraints along a line) cannot be used. The question of how much further sufficiency
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can be generalized is taken up in more extensively in Appendix B, which suggests
that sufficiency results do not exist much beyond what can be proven with the present
method; as well as Section 4 below, which shows how sufficiency fails under a condition
somewhat stronger than nonconvexity.
We have here extended Proposition 3.1 to allow for transfers and/or interdepen-
dence with utility linear in own type. The same extension can be applied to Propo-
sitions 3.2 and 3.3. Such results may potentially be useful, for example, in analyzing
mechanism design problems in such settings when the message spaces are constrained
to be finite.
4 Insufficiency
The previous section gave numerous classes of type spaces on which local incentive
constraints are sufficient. The discussion is not complete without giving some cases
where local incentive constraints are not sufficient. We restrict ourselves here to
cardinal type spaces. Proposition 4.1 below identifies a large class of such type spaces
- roughly, those which violate convexity in a strong enough way - for which we can
construct mechanisms that are locally, but not fully, incentive-compatible. (Sato [49,
Proposition 4.2]) gives an analogous result for ordinal type spaces.)
It is unclear just how far Proposition 4.1 can be sharpened. Proposition 3.1 showed
that if the type space is convex, any local incentive constraints are sufficient, but the
converse is not true. The question of exactly characterizing those type spaces T for
which all local incentive constraints are sufficient appears to be subtle. This topic is
explored further in Appendix B. Proposition B.4 in that appendix gives a nontrivial
example of a nonconvex type space for which all local incentive constraints are suffi-
cient; on the other hand, Proposition B.3 gives a kind of converse to Proposition 3.1
for finite cardinal type spaces. The details are somewhat technical, so we refer the
reader to the appendix, and for now proceed to give our simpler result.
In the space R', let II be the subspace of vectors whose sum of components is
zero. Let a fair open half-space be a set of the form H = {u I u - A > 0} for some
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of fair separatedness
nonzero A E H. Say that a cardinal type space T is fairly separated if there is some
fair open half-space H such that the set T n H is not connected.
Proposition 4.1 Let T be a cardinal type space that is fairly separated. Then there
exists a set of local incentive constraints that is not sufficient.
Fair separatedness certainly implies nonconvexity. To further indicate the rela-
tionship between the two concepts, a little graphical intuition is in order.
For concreteness, suppose X has four elements. By additive and multiplicative
renormalization, we can map every utility function either to a point on the unit
sphere in the three-dimensional space H, or to the origin. This sphere is illustrated
in Figure 4.1. The upper hemisphere, whose boundary is shown dashed in the figure,
corresponds to a fair open half-space. If T contains the types labeled u and v, but
does not contain any type along the thick curve (or any type cardinally equivalent to
it), then T is fairly separated.
If T were to consist of all possible utility functions except 0 and w (and anything
cardinally equivalent to them), then T would be nonconvex. Nonetheless, on this T,
any local incentive constraints are sufficient; this is just Proposition B.4 in Appendix
B. Excluding the whole curve from T, rather than just the one point w, is enough
for insufficiency, by Proposition 4.1.
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Fair separatedness might not seem like a natural condition on a type space, so
we give one economically important example. Fix an ordering Xi,... , Xm of the
outcomes, and let T be the cardinal type space consisting of all quasiconcave utility
functions - a cardinal analogue of the single-peaked ordinal type space considered
in Section 3.3. Then T is fairly separated. For example, take any 1 < p < p' <
p" < m, and let H = {u I u(x,) - 2u(x,,) + u(xt,~) > 0}. If u c T n H, then
either u(xp) > u(xp,) or u(xp,,) > u(xp,). So {u E T n H I u(xz) > u(xp,)} and
{u c T n H I u(xp,) > u(xp,)} are two open, nonempty subsets of T n H, whose union
is all of T n H, and whose intersection is empty (any a satisfying both inequalities
would violate quasiconcavity). Hence, T n H is not connected. By Proposition 4.1,
there are local incentive constraints on T that are insufficient. Note that this result
for single-peaked cardinal types contrasts with our sufficiency result for the single-
peaked ordinal type space (Proposition 3.3). The accessibility argument underlying
that proposition (Lemma A.5 in Appendix A) fails with single-peaked cardinal types.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Let H = {u I u A > 0} with A E U. There exist
lotteries L, L' on X such that H = {u I u -L > u -L'}. Indeed, let L be any lottery
with full support, and just let L' = L - 6A, where J > 0 is chosen small enough so
that all components of L' are still positive.
Now write T n H = Ta U Tb, where Ta, T are open, disjoint, and nonempty.
Consider the mechanism f defined as follows: if u E Ta, then f(u) = L; otherwise,
f (u) = L'.
Let S = (T x T) \ (Tb x Ta). This is a set of local incentive constraints: If u E Ta,
let Nu = Ta; if u E Tb, let Nu = T; and if a E T \ H, let Nu = T. In each case we
have (u, u'), (u', u) E S for all u' E Nu.
One readily checks that f satisfies the incentive constraints S, but does not satisfy
any incentive constraint in T x T and so is not fully incentive-compatible. Thus, S
is not sufficient.
A similar construction can be applied in the context of Subsection 3.5, to generate
many examples with interdependent preferences, nonlinear in own type, for which
local incentive constraints are not sufficient.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the question of whether or not a small set of local incentive
constraints is sufficient to ensure that all other incentive constraints are automati-
cally satisfied, allowing for probabilistic mechanisms. We have obtained affirmative
answers in many of the most common mechanism design settings. With convex spaces
of cardinal types, local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive-
compatibility. This result allows for monetary transfers under quasilinear utility, and
for interdependence so long as each agent's utility is linear in his own type. Local
incentive constraints are also sufficient on polyhedral (including ordinal) type spaces
with convex closure, as well as single-peaked or successive single-crossing ordinal type
spaces. Our proofs follow a unified analytical approach based on a simple supermod-
ularity argument that applies across different settings. For cardinal type spaces that
are not convex, the argument does not apply, and with a strengthening of noncon-
vexity we have insufficiency - there are mechanisms that are locally but not fully
incentive-compatible.
The sufficiency results provide an immediate strengthening of many existing im-
possibility and characterization theorems, and a negative answer to a possible line of
inquiry as to whether one could obtain new mechanisms by ignoring nonlocal incen-
tive constraints on grounds of bounded rationality or monitoring technology. Most
importantly, they facilitate the technical analysis of mechanism design problems in
these settings by ensuring that one can focus on local incentive constraints without
any loss, avoiding the need for separate verifications of full incentive-compatibility.
Our analysis on cardinal type spaces in particular also sheds some light on the
form of local incentive constraints that should be considered in order to ensure full
incentive-compatibility. A naive formulation is not sufficient. On the other hand,
our local incentive constraints are still substantially weaker than requiring incentive-
compatibility throughout a neighborhood of each type (as required for the formally
similar result of [3]), and arguably easier to verify in applications.
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A Omitted proofs
Here we present the proofs that were omitted from the main text. We begin with
some technical lemmas.
Lemma A.1 Let the polyhedron t be written as an intersection of open half-spaces,
t = n,=1Hk. Then the boundary of t is
at = cl(t)\t= U n 8H n H,).
0#4KG{l,...,r} . kEK / kgK /.
Proof: Write cl(t) = nk cl(Hk) = nk (OHk U Hk); distribute on the right side; then
remove t = nkHk from both sides. l
In particular, Ot C Uk 0 1Hk.
Lemma A.2 Suppose T is a polyhedral type space. Fix u C R"', and let t, t' C T
be distinct, nonadjacent types. Then there exist finitely many hyperplanes, each one
passing through u, whose union contains cl(t) n cl(t').
Proof: Since t, t' are open and disjoint, neither one can intersect the closure of
the other, so cl(t) n cl(t') = Ot n t'. Now suppose t= n 1 Hk and t' = nr' HI.
Applying Lemma A.1 to both t and t', and then distributing the intersection operator,
we get
at n at'= U B(K, K'),
fKC{1,...,r}
OfK'G{1,..r'}
where
B(K,K')= (l Hk) n ( H) n ( aHL,n flHL,).
kEK (kgK (k'EK' k'K'
It therefore suffices to show that each set B(K, K') is contained in a hyperplane that
passes through u. We may assume B(K, K') is nonempty.
B(K, K') is a relatively open subset of P(K, K') = (nkEK aHk) n (nk'E K' aHkI,).
The set P(K, K') is an affine set, that is, an intersection of hyperplanes. If P(K, K')
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is itself a hyperplane, then since B(K, K') c cl(t) n cl(t'), it follows that t and t'
are adjacent. This contradicts the hypothesis. Therefore P(K, K') is an affine set
of dimension at most m - 2, and we can then find a hyperplane containing both
P(K, K') and u. L
Lemma A.3 Let T be any polyhedral type space, and u G R' any utility function.
Then there exists a finite collection Z of hyperplanes such that
" for any t E T, t is contained in the union of the hyperplanes in Z;
e if t, t' are distinct, nonadjacent types, and w G cl(t)ncl(t'), then some hyperplane
in Z passes through both u and w.
Proof: Immediate from Lemmas A.1 and A.2. L
As in the text, if T is a polyhedral type space and u, v two utility functions, we
say that v is accessible from u if [u, v] C UtCT cl(t).
Lemma A.4 Let T be any polyhedral type space, let u E R', and let Z be the set
identified by Lemma A.3. Let v C R' be any utility function not lying on any hyper-
plane in Z. Suppose v is accessible from u. Let to,t 1,..., t,. be the types intersecting
the segment [u, v] in order. Then tk and tk+1 are adjacent, for each k = 0,... , r - 1.
Note in the statement that the phrase "in order" makes sense, since each type tk
intersects the segment [u, v] in a subsegment, and these subsegments must be disjoint.
Proof: As in the proof of Proposition 3.1, define u, = (1 - a)u+av for a E [0, 1].
Any hyperplane in Z can contain at most one point of [u, v]: otherwise it would
contain the entire segment and in particular would contain ui = v, contradicting the
choice of v.
As noted above, each type tk intersects [u, v] in a subsegment {u , a c Jk}, where
Jk is an open subinterval of [0, 1] - that is, Jk is of the form (-Y, 6), [0, 6), or (y, 1].
Write -yk = inf Jk, 6 k = sup Jk. By the assumption that the tk are in order, we have
ok Yk+1 for each k = 0,..., r - 1.
Next we show that in fact ok = Yk+1 for each k. Suppose instead that ok < Yk+1-
By assumption, the union of the closures of all types in T contains all of [u, v]. So
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for any a with ok < a < Yk+1, then, u,,, is in the closure of some type t. Such a point
u, cannot belong to t proper, so it belongs to &t. Then uc, belongs to one of the
hyperplanes in Z. But there are infinitely many choices of ui,. Since Z is finite and
each hyperplane in Z meets [a, v] at most once, we have a contradiction.
This establishes ok = 7Yk+1. On the other hand, us, E cl(tk), and uke+1 E cl(tk+l)-
So, Us5k C cl(tk) n cl(tk+1). If tk, tk+1 are not adjacent types, then some hyperplane of
Z passes through usk and u. This again contradicts the fact that each hyperplane of
Z can intersect [u, v] only once. So tk, tk+1 are adjacent. L
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Suppose u E t, for some type t E T, and let t' be
any other type. Suppose the mechanism f satisfies the local incentive constraints.
We wish to show that u - (f(t) - f(t')) > 0.
Let Z be given by Lemma A.3. Because t' is an open set, we can choose v E t' not
lying on any of the hyperplanes in Z. By convexity, v is accessible from u, so Lemma
A.4 applies, and the successive types tk, tk+1 identified in that lemma are adjacent for
each k.
Again define c, = (1 - a) u + av. For each k = 0, . . , r, pick any ak with u, E
tk l [u, v]. The local incentive constraints (tk, tk+1) and (tk+1, tk) for k = 0,... , r - 1
ensure that
Uak (f(tk) - f(tk+l)) 2 0,
Uak+l (f (tk+1) - f(tk)) > 0.
From here we proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 3.1 to reach the conclusion
U - (f (t) - f (t')) = U - (f (to) - f (tr)) > 0.
Lemma A.5 Let T be the space of single-peaked ordinal types. Fix u E t for some
t c T. For any t' C T, there exists a nonempty open set contained in t' such that
every v in the open set is accessible from u.
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Proof: Let u, t' be as in the lemma. We know that u is strict (i.e. gives different
values to different outcomes) since it belongs to an ordinal type. Then a sufficient
condition for v to be accessible from u is that (1 -a)+av be single-peaked whenever
it is strict: the set {a E 0, 1] 1 (1-ca)u+av is not strict} is finite, hence (1-a)u+av
will be in the closure of some single-peaked ordinal type for each a.
We first construct some v that is accessible from u. Let x, be the outcome ranked
highest by u, and let xz, be the outcome ranked highest by t'. If p' = p, then any
v E t' is accessible from u: since u(xq) and v(Xq) are both increasing in q for q < p
and decreasing for q > p, the same is true of any weighted average (1 - a)u + av, so
each such weighted average is single-peaked (as long as it is strict).
Now suppose p' > p (the case p' < p is similar). So u(xq) is decreasing and v(Xq)
must be increasing in q for p < q < p'. Choose v(xz,) and v(x,,_1 ) arbitrarily, with
v(x,,_1) < v(x,,). If p < p' - 1 then successively choose v(xq) for q = p' - 2,p' -
3, ...,p', such that
V(Xq+2) - v(Xq+1) v(xq+1) - v(xq)
u(Xq+1) - U(Xq+2) u(Xq) - u(Xq+1)
This can be done by choosing v(xq) low enough at each step. Finally, we can choose
v(xq) for q > p' or q < p so that v represents the ordering given by t'.
Now we will show that, for a E [0, 1], (1 - a)u + av is single-peaked whenever it
is strict. That is, we claim that (1 - a)u(xq) + av(xq) is increasing in q for q up to
some peak, and decreasing after that. Both u(xq) and v(xq) are increasing in q for
q < p, and decreasing in q for q > p', so we focus on the range p < q < p'. We will
show that there cannot exist any q E {p, ... ,p' - 2} such that
(1 - a)u(xq) + av(Xq) > (1 - a)u(Xq+1) + av(Xq+1) (A.2)
and
(1 - a)u(Xq+1) + av(Xq+1) < (1 - a)u(Xq+2) + av(xq+2) (A.3)
simultaneously hold; this will prove the claim.
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Suppose (A.2) and (A.3) do both hold, for some q. (A.2) implies
1 - a V(xq+1) - V(xq)
a 'u(xq>'IL(Xq,+i)
while (A.3) implies
1 - a V(Xq+2) - v(xq+1)
a U(xq+1) - U(Xq+2)
(Note we used the fact that u(xq) > u(xq+i) > U(Xq+2) to make sure the signs don't
switch when we divide. We know a > 0 since (A.3) is violated at a = 0.) Combining
these two inequalities gives a contradiction of (A. 1), completing the proof of the claim.
At this point we have shown that any v E t' satisfying the inequalities (A.1) is
accessible from u. Since these inequalities carve out a nonempty open subset of t',
the lemma is proven.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Suppose that T is the space of single-peaked ordinal
types. Let u E t, for some t E T, and let t' be any other type. We wish to show that
u - (f(t) - f(t')) > 0, for any f satisfying the local incentive constraints.
Let Z again be the set of hyperplanes promised to us by Lemma A.3 (with respect
to T and u). By Lemma A.5, we can choose a v E t' that is accessible from u and
does not lie on any of the hyperplanes in Z. Accessibility ensures that Lemma A.4
applies. From here onward we just repeat the argument used to prove Proposition
3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.5: Suppose that the mechanism (f,p) satisfies the set
Si of local incentive constraints for agent i. Consider any two types ti, t' E T. Write
ta = (1 - a)ti + at'. As in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we can find 0 = ao < a1 <
- < ar = 1 with (takI tk1), , (tak+tok) E Si for each k = 0,...,r - 1. These local
incentive constraints give
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Multiply by ak+1 and ak, respectively, and add:
Ei [[ak+1Ui(tfk, ti) - akui(tksl,, t... - (f(tc, ti ) - f(takl,, ti)) +
[ak+1 - ak) - (Pi (tak , t__i) - pA (t f,, t-i ))] 2 0. (A.4)
Because utility is linear in own type, and tak is equal to the weighted average
(ak/ak+1)tak+l + (1 - ak/ak+1)ti, we know that for each realization of t_,
U(tak,ti) - " Ui(tca+l, ti) + 1 - 0kai_
ak+1 ak+1
Rearranging gives
ak+1ui(ta,, t-i) - akui(tak+L, t-i) (ak+1 - ak)Ui(ti, t-i)
Applying this identity and dividing through (A.4) by the constant ak+1 - ak > 0
gives
Ei [Ui(ti t _i) - ( f (tCak 7t-i) - f t-ak,,,t _i) + (i (ak It-_i) - pA (ak+1 ,t-i))] > 0.
Summing over k = 0, . . ., r - 1 gives
Ej [ui (ti,7 t-j) -(f(tjI, t-j) - f (t', t-i)) + (pi (ti, t-i) - pi (t' , t-i))] ;> 0
which shows that the incentive constraint (ti, t') is satisfied.
B On proofs by adding up
This appendix gives a more detailed study of conditions under which the basic method
of proof used for the sufficiency results in the main text can be applied, with an eye
to understanding how much the method might potentially be further generalized, and
whether the results still hold when the method does not apply. We restrict ourselves
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to cardinal type spaces and no transfers, as in Subsection 3.1.
All of the proofs of sufficiency results in the main text follow the general method
of showing that the linear inequality corresponding to any desired incentive constraint
can be obtained by adding up inequalities corresponding to local incentive constraints.
We show here that for finite type spaces, whenever a set S of incentive constraints
is sufficient, there exists a proof of sufficiency by adding up (Lemma B.1 below).
Moreover, with minor exceptions, whenever an incentive constraint (u, v) is provable
by adding up, there exists such a proof that uses only types along the line segment
[u, v], or types cardinally equivalent to them (Proposition B.3). The conclusion, then,
is that for finite type spaces, there exist essentially no sufficiency results beyond those
that can be proven using the method of Proposition 3.1.
On the other hand, for infinite type spaces, the conclusions are not as tight. We
give an example (Proposition B.4) of a type space where local incentive constraints
are sufficient, but sufficiency cannot be proven by adding up. In that example, we
prove sufficiency by a combination of adding-up arguments and limiting arguments
exploiting the compactness of the space A(X).
To begin the investigation, we must first be precise about what it means for an
incentive constraint to be provable by adding up other constraints. Let T be a cardinal
type space, and let S be a set of incentive constraints. Let 1 E R' denote the vector
all of whose components are 1, and let e, denote the pth unit vector for p = 1,..., m.
For any mechanism f, we have
1 -f (U) = 1 (B. 1)
for all u E T, and
e, f (u) > 0 (B.2)
for p = 1,..., m and all u E T. If f satisfies S, then we also have
u - (f(u) - f(v)) > 0 (B.3)
for each (u, v) E S.
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We say that an incentive constraint (U*, v*) E T x T is provable from S by adding
up if the inequality
U* - (f (U*) - f(v*)) > 0 (B.4)
can be obtained as a finite linear combination of the equations (B.1) and inequalities
(B.2), (B.3), with nonnegative coefficients on the inequalities. That is, (u*, v*) is
provable from S by adding up if there exist real numbers
" au for u E T,
" bpu for p= 1,. . ,m, u E T, and
* ca, for (u, v) C S,
such that all but finitely many of these numbers are zero, all the b,2 and cU, are
nonnegative, and such that adding up au times (B.1), bu times (B.2), and c, times
(B.3) gives (B.4). (For notational convenience, we will assume ca, to be defined for
all u, v c T, with c, = 0 whenever (u, v) V S.)
We can write out the adding-up conditions explicitly, by comparing coefficients
of f(u), for each u E T. Assume u* $ v* (otherwise (B.4) just reads 0 = 0 which is
trivially provable by adding up). Then the adding-up condition says that for each u,
we have
u* if U = u*
au1 + Z puep + cu=u - couv -u* if u = v* (B.5)
plJ VET vET { 0 otherwise.
Also, for the constant terms, the adding-up condition is simply
Zau = 0. (B.6)
uET
We say that the set S of incentive constraints implies the incentive constraint
(u*, v*) E T x T if every mechanism that satisfies S also satisfies (u*, V*).
46
The present question is: If S implies (u*, v*), must the constraint (u*, v*) neces-
sarily be provable from S by adding up? When S is finite, the answer is affirmative;
this is just a form of the theorem of the alternative.
Lemma B.1 If T is a cardinal type space and S a finite set of incentive constraints
that implies the incentive constraint (u*, v*), then (u*, v*) is provable from S by adding
UP.
Proof: We may as well assume that T consists only of u*, v*, and the types
that appear in constraints of S. Thus, T is finite. A mechanism f satisfying S then
consists simply of a choice of m - |TI real numbers - the components of the |TI
vectors f(u) for u E T - satisfying (B.1), (B.2), and also (B.3) for (u, v) E S. The
hypothesis is that any such numbers must also satisfy (B.4).
This can be recast as a linear programming statement: for any choice of m- TI real
numbers satisfying the nonnegativity constraints (B.2) and the linear equations (B. 1)
and inequalities (B.3), the minimum value of the linear function u* - (f(u*) - f(v*))
is 0. (This minimum is attained, for example, by any mechanism such that f(u) is
constant across all u.) The duality theorem of linear programming then tells us that
(B.4) is expressible as a linear combination of (B.1), (B.2), (B.3), with nonnegative
coefficients on the inequalities. That is, (u*, v*) is provable from S by adding up. O
To proceed further, it will be helpful to have an alternative, cleaner definition
of provability by adding up. Let II C R' be the hyperplane orthogonal to 1, as in
Section 4. For any u E R', let U denote its orthogonal projection onto II.
Lemma B.2 Assume u* $ v*. Then (u*, v*) is provable from S by adding up if and
only if there exist numbers cu, ;> 0, finitely many of which are nonzero, such that the
equation
U* ifu=u*
Sc.UV-EcVUv= U* ifu=v* (B.7)
vCT VET 0 otherwise.
holds for each u c T, and cu, = 0 unless (u, v) C S.
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Proof: First suppose that (u*, v*) is provable from S by adding up under the
original definition; let au, bPu, cu, be the coefficients satisfying (B.5). By summing
(B.5) over all choices of u we get E aul+Ep E bue, = 0. (On the left side, each cu,
occurs once multiplied by u and once multiplied by -u. On the right side, we get one
U*, one -u* , and all zeroes otherwise.) From (B.6), this reduces to L E bpep = 0.
Since the bu are nonnegative, they must all be zero. Once we know this, then, taking
(B.5) and projecting orthogonally onto UI gives (B.7).
Conversely, suppose there are coefficients cu, satisfying (B.7). Put bU = 0 for all
p and all u. Note that (B.7) implies that for each u, the expression
Ev cUn - E cVuV - u* if u = u*
ScuCVU - E cvUV + U* if u = v*
E cUVU - E cUV otherwise
must be some multiple of 1. Choose au so that this expression is equal to -au1. Then
it is immediate that (B.5) is satisfied for each u. Moreover, summing (B.5) across all
u E T, the cu, terms cancel as in the previous paragraph, and we are simply left with
Lu au1 = 0; hence, with this choice of au, (B.6) is satisfied as well. Finally, au # 0
only when u = u*, v* or when cuv or cu, is nonzero for some v; thus, only finitely
many of the au are nonzero. Thus, the original definition of provability by adding up
is satisfied. D
We need just a few more definitions. Say that two types u, v are equivalent if
v = au + 31 for some a, # E R, a > 0, and a type is indifferent if it is equivalent to
0. For u*, v* E T, let T[u*,v.] be the set of all types in T that are equivalent to some
type on the segment [u*, v*], and let
S[u*,v.] = {(u, v) E S | u, v E T[u.,v*.}.
We now arrive at the main result of this appendix.
Proposition B.3 Let T be a cardinal type space and S a set of incentive constraints
such that (u*, v*) is provable from S by adding up. Assume that v* is not equivalent
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to -u*. Then (u*, v*) is provable from S[u.,,. by adding up.
This result says that if an incentive constraint (U*, v*) can be proved by adding
up constraints in S, then it can be proved by adding up in a way that only uses types
equivalent to convex combinations of u* and v*. Thus, the method used to prove
Proposition 3.1 is (almost) the only possible adding-up argument.
The proof of Proposition B.3 is a bit long, but the main idea is straightforward. It
consists of taking the coefficients c, satisfying (B.7) and successively replacing them
by zeroes, checking that (B.7) still holds at each step, until only constraints in Stu.,v.)
have nonzero coefficients.
Proof: We may assume that u* is not indifferent, since otherwise the conclusion
is immediate: (B.7) holds with all cuv equal to 0. We also assume u* j v*; otherwise
the conclusion is again trivial.
Let cu, be the coefficients satisfying (B.7), with cu, > 0 only if (u, v) E S. We may
as well assume that S consists only of the (finitely many) incentive constraints (u, v)
for which cuv > 0, and T consists only of the types appearing in these constraints.
Now consider any fixed vector w E II with the following properties:
(i) W -' > 0;
(ii) w - * > 0;
(iii) if u E T and w -U = 0, then - = 0.
We claim that if (u, v) E S such that either
(a) w - >Oandw-U< 0,or
(b) w-U> 0 andw-U=0 andv/v*, or
(c) w-U<0andw-U>0,
then cu, = 0.
Proof: Consider any u E T such that w -U < 0. Take the dot product of w with
(B.7). We get
S cUV(w.- ) - 5cVU(w -Vi) = 0
vET vET
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(note that u f u*, v*). Now sum over all u such that w -U < 0. For each incentive
constraint (u, v) c S such that w - U < 0 and w - U < 0, the term cu, (w - U) appears
once with a + sign and once with a - sign, so these cancel out. The remaining terms
give us
S cU (w.- )- cVU(W -U)=0.
W-W<0; W-U20 W-U<0; w-U20O
Since each cu, is nonnegative, every term in the first sum is < 0 and every term in
the second sum is > 0. Hence, every term must be equal to zero. This implies that
whenever w - < 0 and w -U 0, cuv = 0, and when moreover w -U > 0, we also have
CVU = 0.
This covers (a) and (c). For (b), when w = 0 and v 74 v*, (B.7) for v gives
E ceu - EL cuu = 0. Dotting with w gives E cu,(w - U) = 0 (after canceling).
We have already established that c,, = 0 if w - - < 0, so all the terms on the left are
nonnegative, and hence they must all be zero. So cu, = 0 whenever w - U > 0.
This proves the claim.
Next, for each u, v E T, define c', = ce, if w - E> 0 and w U > 0- and c',, = 0
otherwise. Then we again have, for each u,
il if U= U*
c' - c -U* ifu=v* (B.8)
V V
0 otherwise.
Proof: If u is such that w -U < 0 then (B.8) is trivial since both sides are zero. If
w - U > 0, then the left side of (B.8) differs from the left side of (B.7) by the terms
ceE) and -cquji for w - - < 0. These are all zero, by cases (a) and (c) of the claim,
respectively; thus (B.8) follows from (B.7). If w = 0 and u 74 v*, then again all
the left-hand-side terms of (B.8) are zero:
" all the c',EU are zero because WU = 0, by condition (iii) on w;
* c'.U = 0 for w -W > 0 by (b) of the claim;
e c',u = 0 for w -U = 0 again by (iii) on w;
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c'.U = 0 for w - < 0 by definition of c',,.
So both sides of (B.8) are zero, and it again holds.
Thus, (B.8) is verified for all u except possibly for u = v*. But summing (B.8)
over all u E T gives the identity 0 = 0; so if it holds for all u except u = v*, it must
hold for u = v* as well.
At this point, we have shown the following: If we start with coefficients cev for
which (B.7) holds, pick any w E H satisfying (i)-(iii), and replace cu, by 0 whenever
w -U < 0 or w -U < 0, then (B.7) still holds.
If we find any finite set of vectors w1,..., Wq c H, each satisfying conditions (i)-
(iii), and for each Wk we successively replace cu, by 0 whenever wk - < 0 or Wk -U < 0,
then the resulting coefficients will still satisfy (B.7).
Now let T[*,*]+ consist of the types in T[*,v* together with all indifferent types
(alternatively stated, all types that are equivalent to au* + 3v* for some a, 3 0);
and let S[*,v*+ = {(u, v) c S | u, v c T[*,v.;+}. We will show that, for any u E T that
is not in T*,*]+, there is some w E H satisfying (i)-(iii) with w -U < 0. If we consider
each such w in turn, and successively replace cuv's by 0 as in the previous paragraph,
we will be left with coefficients cu, > 0 that still satisfy (B.7), and such that cev = 0
unless u, v C T[*,,*+. Therefore, we will have shown that (u, v) is provable from
S[u*,v*+ by adding up.
Thus, consider any u C T \ T[*,,*+. We wish to show that there exists w C H
satisfying (i)-(iii) with w -U < 0. The assumptions that v* is not equivalent to -u*
and u* is not indifferent imply that there exists w' E H with
w- > 0, w'. > 0
and the latter inequality holding strictly unless V = 0. The assumption u ( T[u.,v.;+
implies that U is not a nonnegative combination of u* and v*; hence there is some
w" E H such that
W" - > 0, w" -v > 0, W" < 0.
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Taking w = w'+ rw" for large K will give (i), (ii), and w -U < 0. Finally, by perturbing
w slightly, we can ensure w -T 74 0 for all v C T, 7U 74 0, without breaking any of the
strict inequalities; thus we get (iii) as well.
At this point we have finished showing that (U*, v*) is provable from S[,.,*+ by
adding up.
If v* is indifferent, then S[u.,v.;+ = S[U*,V*] and so we are done. Otherwise, we have
to do just a little more work.
Let cuv now be the coefficients used to prove (U*, v*) from S[*,v*+ by adding
up (i.e. the coefficients satisfying (B.7)). Whenever ;U = 0, we can replace cuv by
0 without affecting the validity of (B.7) (since cuv only ever appears as part of the
product cuvii). So we may assume cu, = 0 whenever u is indifferent.
Since u*, v* are both non-indifferent and v* is not equivalent to -u*, we can find
w E H such that w - uW > 0 and w - v* > 0. Thus, for any element of T[K.,v*+ that is
not indifferent, its projection has positive dot product with w.
Now for any indifferent u, taking (B.7) and dotting with w gives - Ev cvu (w -U) =
0. Each term in the sum is nonnegative, so they must all be zero. Hence cu, = 0
whenever U has positive dot product with w; and the remaining v C Tlu*,v.)+ are
indifferent, so cu = 0 for them too by assumption. Thus, if u is indifferent then
cu,, cu = 0 for all v.
But this means that (B.7) holds with cu, zero unless u, v E T[*,*], so in fact
(u*, v*) is provable from S[*,,* by adding up.
D
Proposition B.3 is stated as a description of the form of proofs by adding up.
However, it also provides us with a tool to show show when a particular constraint
is not provable by adding up. In particular, we can apply it to give an example of
an infinite type space and a set of local incentive constraints that are sufficient, but
whose sufficiency cannot be proven by adding up, as promised at the beginning of this
appendix. In fact, we will give a stronger example: a type space such that any set
of local incentive constraints is sufficient, yet there exist fairly large such sets whose
sufficiency cannot be proven by adding up.
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Let X have four elements, and let w be some utility function on X that is not
indifferent. Let T+ be the set of all cardinal types that are either indifferent or
equivalent to w, and let T = R4 \ T+ be the set of cardinal types not in Tw+. Say
that two types u, v C T are T+-opposed if [u, v] rA T+ # 0. Let S be any set of local
incentive constraints such that if u and v are T,4-opposed, then (u, v) 0 S.
This requirement on S can be easily satisfied. Indeed, for each u E T, start with
any neighborhood Nu, and let d(u, T,+) > 0 be the Euclidean distance from u to T+.
Then the set Nu = {v E N I d(u, v) < d(u, T.+)} is again an open neighborhood of
U, not containing any types Tw+-opposed to u. So S = {(u, v) | u E Nc or v E Nu} is
a set of local incentive constraints meeting our requirement.
Proposition B.4 With T, S as above, S is sufficient. However, for any u*, v* G T
that are Tw+-opposed, with u* not equivalent to -v*, the constraint (u*, v*) is not
provable from S by adding up.
Proof: First we show that S is sufficient. Let f be any mechanism that satisfies
S. For any possible incentive constraint (u, v), if u and v are not T"+ -opposed, then
the entire line segment from u to v is contained in T. Therefore, the usual argument
from Proposition 3.1 of the main text shows that f satisfies (u, v).
So we need only deal with the case where u, v are T,4-opposed. In this case,
notice that we can choose Uk E T arbitrarily close to (u + v)/2 such that Uk is not
TW+-opposed to either u or v. (Any type Tw+-opposed to u must lie on the hyperplane
fIl, generated by u, w, and 1. Similarly, any type Tw4-opposed to v must lie on the
hyperplane generated by v, w, 1, which is again Iu.. There are types in T arbitrarily
close to (u + v)/2 not lying on this hyperplane.) For any such Uk, then, we have
already shown that f satisfies the constraints (u, uk), (v, uk), (Uk, v); that is:
u (f(n) - f(k)) > 0, (B.9)
v (f(v) - f(k)) > 0, (B.10)
uk (fUk) - f(v)) > 0. (B.11)
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So we can choose a sequence of types 1 , U2,... in T with Uk -+ (i + v)/2, such that
(B.9)-(B.11) are satisfied for each Uk. Moreover, because the image of f is contained
in the compact set A(X), we may assume by passing to a subsequence that f(Uk)
converges to some limit f*. Then, taking limits, we get
u -(f(u) - f*) 2 0, (B.12)
v -(f(v) - f*) 0, (B.13)
2 - (f* f (V)) >- 0. (B. 14)
Adding (B.12), (B.13), and twice (B.14) gives
u - (f(u) - f(v)) 2 0
so f satisfies the constraint (U, v).
This shows that S is sufficient.
It remains to prove that if u*, v* E T are T+-opposed, and u* is not equivalent
to -v*, then (u*, v*) is not provable from S by adding up. By Proposition B.3, if
(U*, v*) were provable from S by adding up, then it would be provable from S[*,v*
by adding up. So we just need to show that the latter is not the case.
For any a C [0, 1], let ta = (1-a)u* + av*. Let a* E (0, 1) be such that u,* E T+.
Notice that if u, v are equivalent to u,, u3 respectively, and (u, v) E S, then a, # are
either both less than a* or both greater than a*: otherwise u, v are Tw+-opposed.
Suppose that (u*, v*) is provable from S[u*,v* by adding up. Let cu, be the coef-
ficients that satisfy (B.7). Let T< be the set of types in T[u*,V* that are equivalent
to some uc for a < a*. The observation of the previous paragraph implies that if
cU, > 0, and one of u, v is in T<, then the other is as well.
Sum up (B.7) over all u E T<. The cuU terms on the left side appear in pairs of
opposite sign, which cancel; thus we are left with 0 = i. Since u* E T cannot be
indifferent, we have a contradiction. L
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Chapter 2
A Quantitative Approach to
Incentives: Application to Voting
Rules
Abstract
We present a general approach to quantifying a mechanism's susceptibility to strate-
gic manipulation, based on the premise that agents report their preferences truthfully
if the potential gain from behaving strategically is small. Susceptibility is defined as
the maximum amount of expected utility an agent can gain by manipulating. We
apply this measure to anonymous voting rules, by making minimal restrictions on
voters' utility functions and beliefs about other voters' behavior. We give two sets
of results. First, we offer bounds on the susceptibility of several specific voting rules.
This includes considering several voting systems that have been previously identified
as resistant to manipulation; we find that they are actually more susceptible than
simple plurality rule by our measure. Second, we give asymptotic lower bounds on
susceptibility for any voting rule, under various combinations of efficiency, regularity,
and informational conditions. These results illustrate the tradeoffs between suscepti-
bility and other properties of the voting rule.
Thanks to (in random order) Ben Golub, Elchanan Mossel, Alex Wolitzky, Anton Kolotilin,
Mihai Manea, Nathan Hendren, Yusuke Narita, Pablo Querubin, Lirong Xia, Abhijit Banerjee, Jing
Chen, Rakesh Vohra, Pablo Azar, Jim Schummer, Ivan Werning, Robert Akerlof, Glenn Ellison,
Daron Acemoglu, Horacio Larreguy, Nabil Al-Najjar, Jim Snyder, Xiao Yu Wang, Jonathan We-
instein, Parag Pathak, and many seminar audiences for discussions and advice. This work was
partially supported by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
It is standard in mechanism design, as elsewhere in economic theory, to assume that
agents perfectly optimize. In particular, for direct revelation mechanisms, which ask
agents to report their preferences, conventional theory requires perfect incentives - it
should be exactly optimal for agents to report truthfully. In reality, however, decision-
makers do not perfectly optimize, or at least do not optimize the material payoffs that
are usually modeled. They may not know their environment well enough to be able to
do so, and they may prefer to take computational shortcuts. Accordingly, this paper
proceeds from an alternative behavioral premise: agents will report truthfully if the
potential gains from doing otherwise - that is, from strategically manipulating the
mechanism - are sufficiently small.
Under this premise, a mechanism designer may want to mildly relax the incen-
tive constraints, rather than treat them as absolutely rigid, if doing so allows her to
improve the performance of the mechanism in other respects. This suggests quan-
titatively measuring the incentives that a mechanism provides. Armed with such a
quantitative measure, the designer can compare different mechanisms in terms of the
incentives to manipulate, and consider tradeoffs between these incentives and other
properties of the mechanism.
We propose in this paper to measure a mechanism's susceptibility to manipulation
as the maximum amount of expected utility that an agent can gain by manipulating.
That is, in very stylized terms, susceptibility is
o- = sup (E4[u(lie)] - Eo[u(truth)] (1.1)
where the supremum is taken over all true preferences the agent may have (the utility
function u, represented by the truthful report truth); all possible strategic misrepre-
sentations lie; and all beliefs # that the agent may hold about the behavior of other
agents in the mechanism. Of course, the outcomes u(lie), u(truth) depend on the
60
choice of mechanism, as well as on the behavior of other agents (encapsulated in the
belief #).
The paper's mission is to advocate this approach to quantifying incentives. Issues
of motivation and methodology will be taken up in some more detail in Subsection
1.3, but the bulk of the paper is dedicated to demonstrating how our measure can be
used to obtain concrete results. For this, we apply the measure to voting rules: Given
a population of voters, each with preferences over several candidates, what voting rule
should they use to choose a winner as a function of their (reported) preferences?
The problem of choosing among voting rules provides a natural test case for any
attempt to quantify manipulation. It is one of the oldest and most widely-studied
problems in mechanism design, not to mention its wide range of applications. More-
over, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [22, 52] shows that no interesting voting
rule is immune to strategic manipulation. Since incentives for strategic behavior are
unavoidable, the need to quantify such incentives immediately presents itself in this
setting.
To operationalize (1.1) for voting rules, we need two restrictions.
" First, we need to restrict the manipulator's utility function: otherwise the utility
from a lie could be taken to be arbitrarily larger than the utility from the truth,
and hence every (interesting) voting rule would have u = o.. We therefore
impose the normalization that utility functions take values in [0, 1].
" Second, we need to restrict the belief #: otherwise the manipulator could put
probability 1 on some one profile of other voters' preferences for which he can
manipulate, and hence we would always have o- = 1. We impose the restriction
that, from the manipulator's point of view, the votes of the rest of the population
should be independent and identically distributed across voters. In fact, as we
elaborate further in Subsection 2.1, it is enough for us to require others' votes
to be IID conditionally on some aggregate state; this restriction is still quite
permissive. However, it does mean that we will restrict attention to anonymous
voting rules (those that are invariant under permuting voters): it would not be
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appropriate to assume each voter treats the others interchangeably unless the
voting rule does so as well.
We will give the precise definition of susceptibility for voting rules in Subsection 2.1,
after laying out basic vocabulary.
Our concrete results are of two sorts. First, in Section 3, we give quantitative
bounds on the susceptibility of several rules discussed in prior voting literature. We
begin by developing intuitions using simple voting systems, such as supermajority
with status quo, plurality, and Borda count. We then reconsider several voting sys-
tems which previous literature identified as resistant to strategic manipulation: the
Black, Copeland, Fishburn, minimax, and single transferable vote systems. It turns
out that under our measure, all of these are more susceptible than simple plurality
rule, unless the number of candidates is very small. Indeed, it is not trivial to supply
an interesting example of a voting system that is less susceptible than plurality rule.
We give such an example, in the case of three candidates.
Second, in Section 4, we give several theorems providing asymptotic lower bounds
on the susceptibility of any voting rule satisfying various conditions, showing how fast
the susceptibility of such rules can shrink as the number N of voters grows. These
lower bounds illustrate the tradeoffs between susceptibility and other properties of the
voting rule. For example, if the voting rule is simply required to be weakly unanimous
(a minimal efficiency condition), our lower bound is on the order of N-3/ 2 . If the
voting rule is required to be monotone, we have a much stronger bound, on the order
of N-'/2 . The latter bound goes to zero more slowly in N, and does not hold without
the monotonicity restriction. Thus, imposing monotonicity substantially limits the
voting rule's ability to resist manipulation, at least for a large number of voters. If
we impose that the voting rule be monotone, unanimous, and also tops-only (i.e. the
winner depends only on each voter's first choice), then we can solve exactly for the
minimum possible susceptibility. This minimum is also on the order of N-1/2 , and is
attained by majority rule with status quo, among others. The finding that majority
rule is optimal again contrasts sharply with results on least-manipulable voting rules
using a different measure of manipulability [34, 37]. We also give several more results
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of this flavor (see Table 4.1 for a summary).
We should emphasize that this paper focuses on voting rules mainly because doing
so constitutes a canonical theoretical exercise. Our conclusions are certainly not
meant to be read literally as policy prescriptions - in practice, individual strategic
manipulation is only one of many considerations that go into choosing a voting rule.
Our measure of susceptibility can be used to compare mechanisms and evaluate
tradeoffs in many other mechanism design settings as well. As an example, the third
chapter of this dissertation applies the same approach to study the tradeoff between
incentives and efficiency in double auction mechanisms.
We believe that the generality of our method, its connection with a positive de-
scription of manipulative behavior, its tractability as illustrated by our results here
for voting rules, and the contrast of several of our results with earlier findings using
other measures of manipulability, taken together, provide a strong case for using this
approach as one way to evaluate and compare mechanisms. In the concluding Sec-
tion 5, aside from summarizing and indicating directions for future research, we also
discuss how our approach fits into a broader program of mechanism design.
In order to avoid interrupting the flow of text with computations, most of the
proofs are only sketched in the main text. The details of the omitted proofs are in
Appendices C through H.
1.2 Related literature
The motivating viewpoint behind this paper is that quantifying strategic incentives
is important for practical mechanism design. Accordingly, this paper is allied most
closely with a literature arguing that the incentives to manipulate in particular mech-
anisms are small - beginning with the seminal paper of Roberts and Postlewaite
on the Walrasian mechanism [50] and including recent work on matching markets
[4, 25, 27, 28]. However, we build on the approach of this literature by showing how
to quantify incentives explicitly, and by introducing them into the design problem,
rather than focusing only on specific mechanisms.
Our evaluation of voting rules in terms of the incentives to manipulate is most
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similar in spirit to a paper by Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken [18]. As in the present
paper, their notion of susceptibility is defined as the maximum utility gain from
manipulation. However, where we consider voting over a finite number of candidates,
they consider voters who must collectively choose a point in Euclidean space, and
they restrict attention to tops-only voting rules.
Recent independent work by Birrell and Pass [10] considers quantifying incentives
in voting rules, using ideas very similar to ours, but they consider probabilistic voting
rules and do not impose any restriction on beliefs. Day and Milgrom [16] and Erdil
and Klemperer [19] used quantitative measures of strategic incentives to compare
mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. Some other theoretical literature has also
constructed mechanisms with small incentives to manipulate [5, 29, 32, 33, 39, 53], but
without focusing as we do on comparisons between mechanisms or tradeoffs between
incentives and other properties.
Finally, our work also naturally brings to mind the extensive prior literature that
evaluates and compares voting systems using other measures of manipulation. By
far the most common approach is profile-counting - that is, considering all possible
profiles of voters' preferences that may occur, and measuring manipulability as the
fraction of such profiles at which some voter can benefit by manipulating. This
method appears to have been pioneered by Peleg [47] and has been followed by many
authors since [2, 20, 26, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 45, 55, 56]. Variations include counting
profiles in some weighted manner, e.g. weighted by the number of voters who can
manipulate, or by the number of different false preferences by which a manipulator
can benefit; or partially ordering mechanisms by the set of profiles at which someone
can manipulate [21] (see also [46] for this approach applied to matching mechanisms).
Some of the literature also considers manipulation by coalitions rather than individual
voters [30, 31, 48, 49, 51]. The measure used by Campbell and Kelly [13], like ours, is
based on the maximum gain from manipulating, but they define gain in terms of the
number of positions in the manipulator's preference ordering by which the outcome
improves. Yet another approach involves studying the computational complexity of
the manipulation problem [7, 8].
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1.3 Methodology
We now discuss in more detail the motivation behind our approach to measuring
susceptibility. Readers interested in getting to the concrete results quickly can skip
this subsection without loss of continuity.
Our measure is grounded in the following simple model of manipulation (again
expressed in terms of voting systems just for specificity). Voters face a cost of E > 0
to behaving strategically, while truthful behavior is costless. The E may be thought
of as a computational cost (to computing a strategy, or acquiring information on
other voters' preferences that is needed to strategize), or as a psychological cost of
dishonesty. Then, if the gain from strategic manipulation is sure to be less than E,
the voters will simply vote truthfully.
A planner needs to choose a voting rule for such voters. The planner cannot
anticipate the voters' preferences, beliefs, or their exact strategic behavior, and she
evaluates voting rules by their worst-case performance. The planner is, however,
certain of one thing: if she chooses a voting rule with susceptibility o- < E, voters
will vote truthfully. Truthful voting will then ensure that the result of the election
really does reflect the voters' preferences in the way specified by the voting rule. This
motivates the planner to choose a voting rule with low susceptibility, if possible.
This informal story summarizes verbal arguments in recent market design litera-
ture [4, 12, 27, 28], which use approximate strategyproofness of certain mechanisms
to advocate their use in practice. We develop the model more formally in a game-
theoretic framework in Appendix A.
In our model, the planner tries to prevent manipulation altogether. A common
critique [9, 14, 61] argues that the planner's real goal should instead be to choose
a mechanism that will ensure a good outcome in equilibrium, which may involve
some manipulation along the way. However, that criticism, applied to the present
paper, would miss the purpose. As discussed at the end of Appendix A (and further
elaborated in the third chapter of this dissertation), a similar model could be used
when the planner does have some specific theory of manipulative behavior. Our
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general point that incentives can be measured quantitatively remains valid.
In view of the long previous literature mentioned in Subsection 1.2 using other
approaches to measuring manipulation, we should also explain why we propose a
new measure rather than taking an existing one off the shelf. Our approach has the
following benefits:
" The measure of susceptibility (1.1) as the utility gain from misreporting is
portable across many mechanism design problems.
" Our measure is tied directly to manipulative behavior via the simple model of the
E cost of behaving strategically. Consequently, it acknowledges the distinction
between when manipulation is possible and when it will actually occur, in ways
that a profile-counting measure would miss.
For example, suppose that there are two candidates A, B, and suppose the num-
ber of voters is large. Each voter votes for his (reportedly) preferred candidate.
Consider the voting rule that chooses A if the number of A votes is even and B if
it is odd. This rule is manipulable at almost every profile. But if a manipulator
is fairly uncertain about the votes of the rest of the population, then it is not
immediately obvious what the strategically optimal vote is; and the benefits
from manipulation are low, because A wins with probability close to 1/2 no
matter what the manipulator does. Hence, even a small cost of strategizing can
discourage manipulation.
For another example, consider the voting rule that chooses A as winner if ev-
eryone votes for B, and B otherwise. This voting rule is manipulable at only
N + 1 out of the 2 N possible vote profiles. But voting truthfully is weakly
dominated, and the incentives to vote strategically can be very strong - each
voter is pivotal if his belief is that everyone else will vote for B - so we should
expect manipulation to be an important issue.
" Our comparison of plurality vote with other voting systems, and our identifica-
tion of least-susceptible voting rules (Theorem 4.5 in particular), contrast with
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previous results using profile-counting measures of manipulation. So even an
analyst who prefers to use profile-counting measures should still take our o- into
consideration, as it gives novel insights.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Framework and definitions
We now review standard concepts from voting theory, and subsequently introduce
the terminology that will be needed to study our measure of susceptibility.
There is a set of M candidates, C = {A, ... , AM}. We may refer to the candidates
also as A, B, C, .. .; we will use whichever notation is most convenient at the moment.
There is also a set of N + 1 voters. (From here onwards we take the number of
voters to be N + 1 rather than N, as this simplifies calculations.) We assume M > 3
and N > 1.1 Some of our results are asymptotic; it will be understood that these
asymptotics apply with M held fixed and N -> oo.
Each voter is assumed to have a strict preference (linear order) on the set of
candidates. The symbol >- denotes a generic such preference. Let L denote the set
of all M! such preferences. A preference may be notated as a list of candidates; for
example, if M = 3, ACB denotes the preference that ranks A first, C second, and
B third. We may similarly write AC... to indicate that A is first, C is second, and
the rest of the preference is unspecified. A (preference) profile is an element of LN+1,
specifying each voter's preference. A voting rule is a map f : LN+1 -* C, choosing a
winning candidate for each possible profile. (Note that some authors use terms such
as social choice function, reserving voting rule for the special case where each voter
reports only his top choice, e.g. [18, 34]).
We restrict attention throughout to voting rules that are anonymous, meaning that
the outcome is unchanged if the voters are permuted. Consequently, we can notate
the argument of f as a list specifying the number of voters with each preference
'The case M = 2 is uninteresting in terms of incentives, e.g. using majority rule to decide between
two alternatives gives no incentives to manipulate.
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that occurs. For example, f(3 ABC, N - 2 BAC) refers to the candidate who wins
when any 3 voters report preference ABC and the other N - 2 report BAC. This
numbered list will also be called a profile. When there is potential ambiguity, we will
use nonanonymous profile for a list specifying each voter's preference and anonymous
profile if only the number of voters with each preference is to be specified. It will
be useful to think of anonymous profiles as the integer points of a simplex in M!-
dimensional space - those integer points whose coordinates are nonnegative and
sum to N + 1.
More generally, we define a K-profile (anonymous or nonanonymous) to be a list
specifying the preferences of K voters. When such partial profiles are concatenated,
we mean that the votes are to be combined in the obvious way. For example, if s
represents one voter's preference and P an N-profile describing preferences for the
other N voters, then f(-, P) is the candidate chosen when the N + 1 voters have the
specified preferences.
We will also define here a few properties of voting rules which will be useful later.
We organize these into three categories:
" Efficiency properties: A voting rule f is Pareto efficient if, for any two can-
didates Aj, Aj and any profile P such that every voter ranks Ai above Aj,
f(P) # Aj.
The voting rule is weakly unanimous if, for every preference >-, f(N + 1 >-) is
the candidate ranked first by >-. That is, if all voters have identical preferences,
their first choice wins. It is strongly unanimous if, for every profile P such that
all N + 1 voters rank the same candidate Ai first, f(P) = A2 . Clearly, Pareto
efficiency implies strong unanimity, which in turn implies weak unanimity.
" Regularity properties: One regularity condition often viewed as normatively
desirable [41] is monotonicity, which says that if the current winner's status
improves, she remains the winner. The precise definition is as follows. First,
given a preference >-, a preference >2 is an Ai-lifting of >- if the following holds:
for all Aj, Ak # Aj, we have Aj >- Ak if and only if A >-' Ak, and Ai >- Aj
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implies Ai >-' A,. That is, the position of A is improved while holding fixed the
relative ranking of all other candidates. Then, a voting rule f is monotone if it
satisfies the following: For every profile P, if P' is obtained from P by replacing
some voter's preference >- by an f(P)-lifting of >-, then f(P') = f(P).
We will also define here another very weak regularity condition (though not im-
plied by monotonicity). Say that f is simple on the pair of candidates {Ai, Aj}
if the following two conditions are satisfied:
- at any profile P where every voter ranks Ai, A, first and second in some
order, f(P) E {Ai, Aj};
- moreover, there is a value K* such that at every such profile, f(P) = Ai
if the number of voters ranking Ai first is at least K*, and f(P) = A
otherwise.
Note that the often-invoked property of Condorcet-consistency [41] - that, if a
Condorcet winner exists (see Subsection 3.2), she should be elected - implies
simplicity on every pair of candidates.
e Informational properties: We define just one property here. The voting rule f is
tops-only if the outcome depends only on each voter's first-choice candidate. In
this case we can further economize on notation, writing, for example, f(3 A, N-
2 B).
Tops-onliness is useful for intuition, because when M = 3, tops-only voting
rules can be represented graphically. Indeed, since only first choices matter,
the vote profiles now form a simplex in M-dimensional space rather than in
M!-dimensional space. With M = 3, this simplex is just a triangular grid; the
corners represent the all-A profile, the all-B profile, and the all-C profile. We
can illustrate a voting rule by coloring each cell of the grid according to the
winning candidate. For example, Figure 2.1 illustrates a supermajority rule
with N + 1 = 7 voters: either B or C is elected if she receives 5 or more votes;
otherwise A wins.
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Figure 2.1: A tops-only voting rule
For non-tops-only rules, we can draw such grids, but only for small portions of
the vote simplex.
Following [47], we will use the term voting system to denote a family of voting
rules, one for each value of N. (In fact, our examples of voting systems will generally
consist of a rule for each M and N, but this detail is irrelevant since we think of M
as fixed and N as varying.) A voting system is tops-only if the corresponding rule is
tops-only for each N, and similarly for other properties.
We can now discuss manipulation. We consider one distinguished voter, the
manipulator. The manipulator has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
u : C -> [0,1].2 We say that the utility function u represents a preference >- if,
for every two candidates Ai, Aj, Ai >-- Aj implies u(A) > u(Aj). We say that u
weakly represents >- if Ai >- Aj implies u(Ai) > u(Aj).
We will use the term opponent-profile to refer to the N-profile representing the
voters other than the manipulator. Suppose that the manipulator believes that the
opponent-profile, P, follows the joint probability distribution b E A(LN). (A(X)
means the simplex of probability distributions on X.) If >- is his true preference
ranking, represented by u, then the amount of expected utility he can gain from
2Other voters may also have utility functions, but these are irrelevant from the manipulator's
point of view because we assume they may only report ordinal preferences.
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strategic manipulation is
max (E,[u(f (',P))] - ED[u(f P)).
Here the operator Eq indicates expectation with respect to the distribution 4 for P.
We focus attention on a particular class of beliefs 1, those for which the other
voters' preferences are IID. As argued by McLennan [38], this is a reasonable model of
beliefs in a large population, where each member treats the others as interchangeable
strangers.3 For any # E A(L), write IID(#) for the distribution over opponent-
profiles obtained by drawing each preference independently according to 4.
We can now formally define our measure of susceptibility to manipulation. Let
Z = {(-, >-', u, #) E L x L x [0, 11" x A((L) | u represents }.
The susceptibility of the voting rule f is
0- = sup (EIID(4)[U (f (>-' P))] - EID(4) [U- P (2.1)
In words, o- is the supremum of the amount the manipulator could gain in expected
utility u by reporting a preference other than his true preference >-, given that his
belief about P is IID(#) for some #.
The restriction to IID beliefs may seem confining. In fact we can relax it con-
siderably, to conditionally IID beliefs. That is, suppose that instead of requiring the
manipulator's belief to be IID, we allow that the manipulator has some uncertainty
regarding the aggregate distribution of preferences # in the population; but condi-
tional on the realization of #, the opponent-profile P is drawn IID(#). Then, for
any such belief, the manipulator still cannot gain more than o- expected utility by
manipulating. Indeed, suppose he manipulates by reporting >-' instead of the true
preference >-. Conditional on any value of the aggregate preference distribution #,
3It would be easy to extend the model, say, to allow each voter to have separate beliefs about a
small number of other voters, representing his friends and family.
71
the expected gain from manipulating is at most o- (by definition). So, by the law of
iterated expectations, the unconditional expected utility gain from manipulating is
again at most c.
Thus, we could have defined susceptibility in (2.1) using conditionally-IID be-
liefs, rather than pure-IID beliefs; the two definitions would be equivalent. However,
the pure-IID definition is easier to work with, so we stick to it, and refer to the
conditionally-IID definition only for motivation.
We next introduce a useful alternative formulation of the definition of susceptibil-
ity. To work toward this alternative definition, we first use continuity to rewrite the
supremum over Z in (2.1) as a maximum over the closure cl(Z), and also take the
difference inside the expectation:
r = sup E(IID() [u(f(>-', P))] - EIID($) [u(f>, P)))
= max EIID()U >-' P)) - U (22)(>-,>-',u,#)Ecl(Z) P
Here the maximum is over the set
cl(Z) = {(>-, >-', u, ) 1 u weakly represents >}.
For given >-, >-', #, the maximand in (2.2) is a linear function of the values of u,
so the maximum is attained at an extreme point of the simplex of utility functions u
weakly representing the given >-. The extreme points are those that take the value 1
for the highest-ranked L candidates, for some L, and 0 for the remaining candidates.
Hence, we can also write
a= max ( Er() [I(f(7', P) E C+) - I(f(>- , P) E C+)] (2.3)
where I(E) is the indicator function of event E, and the maximum is taken over all
>-, >-/E L, # E A(L), and C+ C C such that C+ consists of the L highest-ranked
candidates under >- for some L. This is our alternative definition.
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Expression (2.3) can be suggestively interpreted as the probability of being piv-
otal - that is, the probability (under the critical belief #) of drawing an opponent-
profile P for which the manipulation >-' changes the outcome from an undesirable
one to a desirable one (f(>-, P) V C+, f(-', P) E C+). Indeed, many of our re-
sults, especially in Section 3, will be built on this interpretation. We stress however
that the interpretation is not exactly correct, since for some opponent-profiles P the
manipulator is "antipivotal," changing the outcome from desirable to undesirable
(f(>, P) E C+, f(>-', P) V C+). Thus, (2.3) can be more accurately described as the
net probability of being pivotal.4
2.2 Analytical tools
When each voter's preference is drawn IID, the resulting profile follows a multinomial
distribution. Consequently, it will be essential to have a compact notation for such
distributions. We will write M(K; o a,..., r) to denote the multinomial distribution
with K trials and per-trial probabilities ai,.. , a,, with E> ai = 1. We likewise write
P(xi,..., x, I K;o 1,. . .,Oar) = ,K.!a -. -- a (2.4)
the probability that the values (X1 , ... , x,) are realized in such a distribution. (This
applies when the x are nonnegative integers with E> Xz = K. For any other values
of the xi, we define P(xi,... , X, I K; ai,,. . , a,) = 0.)
If P is an (unordered) list of K preferences and # a distribution on C, then we
will write P(P I K; #) with the same meaning.5 As before, we may notate P by
simply writing out each preference with its multiplicity. Similarly # may be repre-
sented by writing each preference, preceded by its probability. More generally, we
4 Expression (2.3) is also reminiscent of the notion of influence developed by Al-Najjar and
Smorodinsky [3]. However, there are some important differences. Influence in [3] is defined with
respect to a specific belief 4, whereas we take the max over beliefs. The analysis in [3] imposes a
noise assumption on 4 - every voter must report every possible preference with probability bounded
away from 0 - whereas we make no such assumption.
5 We often use the letter a for a vector, or ai, .. ., ar for its components, to denote the parameters
of the multinomial distribution thought of as abstract quantities, and 4 for this same vector thought
of as a probability distribution on L or C.
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can concatenate probability distributions, preceded by weights, to represent convex
combinations: if #, 0' c A (L) and A C [0, 1], we may write (A #, 1 - A #') rather than
A# + (1 - A)#'. These concatenations will sometimes be written vertically rather than
horizontally, as in
K1 ABC a1 ABC
P K2 ACB N; a2 ACB .
N- K-K2 BCA a3 BCA
If S is a set of profiles, we may write P(S I K; #) for E s P(P | K; #).
Many of our results will concern asymptotics as N -> 00, so we should estab-
lish convenient notation accordingly. We are concerned not only with how quickly
susceptibility declines to zero as N --+ oo, but also with the constant factors in-
volved (when we are able to estimate them). This calls for somewhat nonstan-
dard notation. We will write F(N) ~ G(N) to indicate that F(N)/G(N) -> 1
as N -+ oo. If F and G depend on both N and M, then it is understood that M is
held fixed. We will write F(N) < G(N), or equivalently G(N) > F(N), to indicate
lim supN- F(N)/G(N) < 1.
Now that we have finished introducing notation, we can lay out the main analytical
tools that will be used in the rest of the paper. We present here a conceptual overview
and a few of the most important technical results. The proofs of these results, as well
as other useful technical computations, are given in Appendix C.
The single most important conceptual tool for our asymptotic analysis is the
central limit theorem approximation of multinomial distributions: When K is large,
the distribution M(K Iai, a 2 , ... , ar) is approximately normal with mean equal to
(Kai, Ka 2,... , Kar) and variance matrix
ai(1 - ai)K -aa 2 K - -aiaK
-a 2a 1 K a 2 (1 - a 2 )K - -a2aK
-ara1K -ara 2K - ar(1 - ar)K
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This has numerous implications. For example, if 0 < # < 1 and x is an integer
with x ~ ON, then P(x, N - x | N; 0, 1 - I) /(27rN#(1 - #)). For a precise
statement:
Lemma 2.1 Let 0 </3 < 1, and let c be a constant. For each positive integer N, let
XN be an integer with IXN - /N| < c, and let ON E [0, 1] satisfy IXN - ONNI < c.
Then
XN ON
P N-;
(N - XN N -/ON 27rN(1 - 0)
Another set of implications that will be extremely useful for Section 3, where we
bound the susceptibility of specific voting rules, is given by the following lemma. Its
statement is notationally intense, but the content is intuitive, as we explain momen-
tarily.
Lemma 2.2 Let I be a finite collection of strict linear inequalities in r free variables
/31,..., /,, each of the form co + c1/31 + --- + cr/r > 0. Let J be a compact set
of probability distributions (ai,... , of,.), satisfying all the inequalities in I. For each
positive integer N, let SN be the set of all r-tuples of nonnegative integers (X1,... , x )
summing to N, such that the numbers x 1 /N,... , x,/N satisfy the inequalities in I.
(a) There is some A > 0 such that
1 - min P(Si I N; ai,..., a,) < e-N
(a1,..,ar)EJ
(b) Fix (a1,... , a,) C J, and suppose further ai = a3 G (0, 1/2) for some i, j; and
let y be any (integer) constant. Let Tijy = {(X 1,. . .Xr) J Xi - Xj = y}. Then
1 1
P(Sy' n T-., N;ai, .. . , a) ~ f - E.2 iraiN
Part (a) is just a strengthened form of the law of large numbers. It states that
when (X1, ... , x,) ~ M(N; a 1 ,..., ar), then each xi is close to aiN, with probability
converging exponentially fast to 1 for large N. Part (b) estimates the further prob-
ability that xi - xz takes on a particular constant value. The estimate follows from
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the fact that xi - x is approximately normal with mean 0 and variance 2azN, and
is approximately independent of all other components of x.
In many of the examples we will consider in Section 3, the manipulator is pivotal
when the number of other voters reporting some preference order >-i is exactly equal
to the number of voters reporting another order >-j. In these cases, Lemma 2.2(b) is
useful for estimating the probability of being pivotal.
We note for future reference that the pivotal probability in Lemma 2.2(b) declines
in N at rate 1/ VN, but that the constant factor depends on aj. In particular, the
smaller ai is, the higher the probability is. This is because the population shares of
>-i and s- have smaller variance, so are more likely to differ by exactly the required
constant y.
We draw attention to one peculiarity: Consider r = 2, ai = a2 = 1/2. This is
a limiting case of Lemma 2.2(b), and so one might expect that the corresponding
probability would be - (1/2) 1/7r - (1/2) - N = 1/27rN. However, the probability
is actually 0 if N is the opposite parity from y, and ~ -2/rN if N is the same parity
as y (this follows from Lemma 2.1). The discontinuity occurs because the equality
x 1 + X2 = N constrains the difference x 1 - X2 to be the same parity as N, whereas in
Lemma 2.2(b), as long as ai = a3 < 1/2, the parity of xi - xj is unrestricted.
Finally, in view of our worst-case approach to susceptibility - and particularly
interpretation (2.3), the worst-case probability of being pivotal - it is natural to
be interested in identifying the critical probability distributions for which some vote
profile is most likely.
Lemma 2.3 For given nonnegative integers x 1,...,x, with sum K, the maximum
value of P(x1,..., x, | K; a,..., ar) with respect to the ai is attained at ai = x2/K.
Lemma 2.4 The expression
K a
max P N;
mac1x N-K 1 - a
is strictly decreasing in K for K < N/2 and strictly increasing for K > N/2. In
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particular, it is minimized over K at K = N/2 if N is even, and (N ± 1)/2 if N is
odd.
3 Susceptibility of specific voting systems
Now that we have developed the basic tools, we can begin applying our measure of
susceptibility to manipulation to various voting systems.
We first develop intuitions in Subsection 3.1 by studying the susceptibility of
four simple voting systems: (super)majority with status quo, plurality, Q-approval
voting, and Borda count. Then, in Subsection 3.2, we consider several voting systems
that have been identified in previous literature as resistant to manipulation, and
find that by our measure, they are all more susceptible than simple plurality rule.
In the process, we uncover several qualitative properties that make a voting rule
relatively susceptible. Finally, the result of Subsection 3.2 raises the question of
whether there are well-behaved voting systems that are less susceptible than plurality
rule; in Subsection 3.3, we give an example of such a voting system for the case of
three candidates.
For each of the voting systems studied in this section, the winner can be identified
by checking a fixed set of inequalities (independent of N) in the population shares of
the various possible preference orderings. In thinking about such systems, the most
useful interpretation of susceptibility is (2.3), the probability of being pivotal.
3.1 Four simple voting systems
Supermajority with status quo. We begin by studying a rule for which we can
compute the susceptibility exactly. Let K be an integer with (N+ 1)/2 < K < N+ 1,
and choose any fixed candidate, without loss of generality say A. The supermajority
rule with status quo associated to K and A is the tops-only voting system defined
as follows: if any candidate other than A receives at least K first-place votes, this
candidate is chosen; otherwise A wins. (Recall Figure 2.1.) If K = [(N + 3)/2] then
we have the majority rule with status quo. If K = N + 1 then we have unanimity
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rule.
Proposition 3.1 The supermajority rule with status quo has susceptibility
07smaj{K) =P K - 1 (K - 1)/N
(N - (K -1) 1 - (K - 1)/N
The basic approach to calculating susceptibility is to identify the profiles where
opportunities for manipulation occur, and then identify a particular belief for which
such opportunities are especially likely. For supermajority rule, we can actually iden-
tify the critical distribution that exactly maximizes the probability of being pivotal.
Manipulation is possible only when the manipulator is pivotal between candidate A
and some other candidate (say C), and his true first choice (say B) cannot get elected.
The manipulator is pivotal when C has K - 1 votes among the other voters. This is
most likely to occur when each other voter chooses C with probability (K - 1)/N.
We give the full proof here.
Proof: Consider the formulation of susceptibility (2.3), as the probability that
the manipulation changes the outcome from an undesirable one to a desirable one. If
the manipulator's first choice is A, then manipulation cannot have such benefits: for
any opponent-profile P, either the manipulator can ensure A wins by voting for A, or
else some other candidate has at least K votes and the manipulator cannot change
the outcome. If his first choice is some other candidate, say B, then manipulating
to A cannot affect whether or not any candidate different from A and B wins, and
therefore cannot change the outcome except by adversely switching it from B to A.
So the only possible beneficial manipulation is when the true first-choice is some
non-A candidate, and the manipulator votes for some other non-A candidate. With-
out loss of generality, these are B and C. The manipulation can be advantageous
only if the opponent-profile P is such that the manipulation changes the winner from
A to C. This in turn happens only if C has exactly K - 1 first-place votes in P.
Let Sc be the set of such profiles. Thus, the maximand in (2.3) is bounded above by
PrIID(#)(P - SC) = P(Sc I N; #). If P is distributed according to IID(#), and #c is
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the probability (under #) of ranking C first, then the total probability that P E Sc
is P (K - 1, N - K + 1 | N; #c, 1 - 4c). So, combining these observations, we have
o-<max Pr (PESc)=maxP(K-1,N-K+1 N;#c,1-#c). (3.1)
# IID(#) #c
On the other hand, suppose the manipulator's true preferences are BCA ... and
the opponents' votes are distributed (0c C, (1 - #c) A), with #c = (K - 1)/N.
A manipulation from B to C changes the outcome from A to C if P E Sc, which
happens with probability P (K -1, N - K +1 I N; 0c, 1- 4C), and leaves the outcome
unchanged otherwise. By taking C+ = {B, C} in definition (2.3), then, we get the
reverse inequality of (3.1). Thus the inequality must hold as an equality.
From Lemma 2.3, the maximum in (3.1) is attained when #c = (K - 1)/N, giving
the result of the proposition.
From Lemma 2.4, the susceptibility oaj(K) is increasing in K. In particular,
it is maximized for unanimity rule. This contrasts with results for (nonanonymous)
profile-counting measures, where the number of manipulable profiles is lower for higher
K (compare in particular with [34, 36, 37], who identify the least-manipulable voting
rules by such measures; they look qualitatively like unanimity rules). Likewise, the
value of K that minimizes oma(K) is K = (N+1)/2 (for N odd) or N/2 (for N even).
The corresponding value will actually come up again several times, so we establish a
separate notation for it: The susceptibility of majority rule with status quo is given
by
(N N if N is even
N N ) . ((N-1)/2) (N-1)/2 (N+1)/ 2 (N+1)/ 2  if N is odd\(N-1)/2) N N
By Lemma 2.1, o* 2/rN. This quantity will in fact appear again in the analysis
of plurality rule, which we turn to next.
Plurality rule. The definition is as follows: For each candidate, we consider the
number of first-place votes, and whoever has the most votes wins. For concreteness,
ties are broken "alphabetically" - that is, in favor of earlier-numbered candidates;
or earlier-lettered, when we use the notation A, B, C, ... for candidates. (Most of our
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results are not actually sensitive to how ties are broken).
Proposition 3.2 Let o'l denote the susceptibility of plurality rule.
(a) For each N, up"' > -*
(b) o'ur satisfies
1 1 M 1 M
< pur <2 :N ~7 N xN
The lower bounds come from considering some potential critical distributions.
One case where the manipulator has a relatively high probability of being pivotal is
essentially when the manipulator's preferences are ABC... and the other voters split
their first-place votes evenly between B and C. Note that either B or C is sure to
win, and the manipulator may want to vote for B instead of A in order to increase
the chance of B winning. This underlies part (a).
Another, related case is when the other voters split their votes almost evenly
among all M candidates, but with slightly higher (and equal) probabilities of voting
for B and C than any of the others. In this case, again the outcome will almost
certainly be either B or C (by Lemma 2.2(a)), incentivizing a vote for B instead of
A. Since the vote probabilities of B and C are equal and are approximately 1/M each,
we can estimate the probability of being pivotal using Lemma 2.2(b); this probability
is approximately (1/2) M/rNV. The lower bound in (b) follows.
It is not immediate, however, that the lower bound is sharp: By manipulating to
B, the manipulator not only has a chance of changing the outcome from C to B but
also a chance of changing from other undesirable outcomes D, E, ... to B. Any upper
bound on susceptibility must take account of all these possibilities.
The argument behind our upper bound runs as follows. Suppose the manipulator's
true first choice is A but he considers voting for B as above. Consider the critical belief
# E A(C) that maximizes his probability of being pivotal. There must be at least
one other candidate, say C, for which #c is close to #B; otherwise the manipulator
is unlikely to be pivotal. Now, beginning from any arbitrary opponent-profile, move
along the B - C axis - that is, hold constant the number of votes for all candidates
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except B and C, and vary the breakdown of the remaining votes into B and C. We
show that only one pivotal opponent-profile can be reached in this way. Consider the
conditional probability of drawing this pivotal profile, given the number of votes for
all candidates other than B and C. Either the pivotal profile either has B getting far
more votes than C, in which case it is very unlikely; or it has both of them getting
at least 1/M of the votes, in which case its probability is at most ,< VM/IrN. So
in either case, the conditional probability of the pivotal profile is ' VM/irN. It
follows that the unconditional probability of being pivotal is also 1 7M/irN, giving
the upper bound.
The full proof of the proposition is in Appendix D.
Proposition 3.2 gives two different lower bounds on o", using two different be-
liefs. For small M, the bound in (a) is stronger than that in (b). Pivotality depends
on the balance between larger population shares (1/2 for the belief used in (a), versus
1/M in (b)), which would tend to make the manipulator less likely to be pivotal
under the belief used for (a), by the logic of Lemma 2.2(b) (the difference between
these two shares has higher variance). On the other hand, in the case of (a), parity
considerations add an extra factor of 2 to the probability of being pivotal, exactly as
in the discussion following Lemma 2.2 above.
For the case of three candidates, we are able to extend this idea to show that
the bound from (a) is exact - that is, the critical belief for a manipulator with
preferences ABC is that the opponents are split evenly between B and C. However
much or little probability of A is introduced into the belief, the decrease in variance
of the B - C split is outweighed by the uncertainty over parity.
Proposition 3.3 If M = 3, o =O-
The proof is in Appendix D.
Q-approval voting. Next, we consider the voting system known as Q-approval
voting, for any given Q with 2 < Q M - 1. Each voter gives a point to each of
his Q favorite candidates. The candidate with the most points wins; ties are broken
alphabetically. In the case Q = M - 1, this system is often known as antiplurality
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voting.
Despite the superficial resemblance to plurality voting, this system is much easier
to analyze, and also gives quite different results.
Proposition 3.4 For each Q, the susceptibility of Q-approval voting is 1.
Proof: Let the manipulator's true preference be BA ... and let <p be the distribu-
tion putting probability 1 on a preference of the form AB.... So the manipulator's
belief is that everyone else will report this preference, with probability 1. If the ma-
nipulator tells the truth, then A receives N + 1 points, the maximum possible, and
hence (by alphabetical tie-breaking) A wins, regardless of the other candidates' scores.
If the manipulator instead reports any preference with B ranked first and A ranked
last, then A receives only N points and B receives N + 1, so (again by alphabetical
tie-breaking) B must win. Thus, this manipulation improves the outcome from A to
B with probability 1.
This example shows that the susceptibility of Q-approval voting is at least 1. Since
susceptibility can never be more than 1, the result follows. 0
The result is perhaps surprising, since standard approval voting (in which each
voter approves any set of candidates, and whoever receives the most approvals wins)
has often been specifically advocated as resistant to manipulation [11, 21]. We do not
analyze this version of approval voting here, because it does not fit directly into our
framework - in particular, it is unclear how a voter's default truthful vote should
be defined. Appendix B discusses possible ways of extending our methods to treat
approval voting.
Borda count. Another often-discussed voting system is the Borda count, which
determines a winner as follows. Each voter assigns M(M + 1)/2 points to the can-
didates: M points to his first choice, M - 1 to his second choice, ... , 1 point to his
last choice. For each candidate, we compute a score by totaling across voters. The
candidate with the highest score wins. Ties are again broken alphabetically.
We content ourselves to give a lower bound on susceptibility.
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Proposition 3.5 The Borda count has susceptibility
Borda> M -2 2
N ~_1 2 ,rN
The argument is analogous to that of Proposition 3.2(a). Consider a manipulator
with preferences ABC.... Let the belief be as follows: opponents are evenly split
between ABC... and BAC.... Then the winner is surely either A or B. By moving
B to the bottom of his reported preference ordering, instead of being truthful, the
manipulator can improve the score of A relative to B by M - 2 points. Hence, the
manipulator is pivotal if, among the other voters, A trails B by more than 1 point
but not more than M - 1. Our lower bound follows by estimating the probability of
this event.
The full detailed proof is in Appendix D.
To segue into the next section, we compare the results of Propositions 3.1, 3.2(b),
and 3.5. Supermajority with status quo, plurality, and Borda count all have suscep-
tibility declining as N -> o at rate i/VN; but the constant factors (relative to N)
are different. In particular, the constant factor for supermajority is constant in M;
that for plurality is on the order of v'_7; and that for Borda count is linear in M.
This allows unambiguous comparisons between these rules for sufficiently large M.
For example, the comparison between Propositions 3.2(b) and 3.5 shows that, when
M > 5, Borda count is more susceptible than plurality rule if the number of voters
N is large.
3.2 Low manipulability revisited
Next, we consider voting systems which have been specifically identified as resistant to
manipulation in previous literature, using different measures, and ask whether they
continue to fare well under our measure of susceptibility. To decide which voting
systems to examine, we turn for guidance to the work of Aleskerov and Kurbanov [2],
which appears to be the most extensive prior comparison of voting rules in terms of
strategic manipulation. Aleskerov and Kurbanov used Monte Carlo simulations, with
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small numbers of voters and candidates, to compare 25 voting systems according
to several profile-counting-based measures of manipulability. We will consider the
systems highlighted by their analysis, and give lower bounds on the susceptibility of
each of these systems. As a benchmark for comparison, we use plurality rule, which
is surely the most widespread voting rule in practice. Our lower bounds will imply
that each of the systems picked out by [2] is actually more susceptible than plurality
rule, under our measure. Table 3.1 gives a quick summary of our findings, and the
details are explained below.
Like most of our results, the comparisons will be asymptotic (in the number of
voters). For given M, we say that a voting system f is more susceptible than g if
there is a positive constant c such that the susceptibility of f is at least 1 + c times
the susceptibility of g, for all sufficiently large N. Thus, for example, we say that
Borda count is more susceptible than plurality rule (for M > 5), even though both
have susceptibility decaying at rate 1/v'W.
The comparison paper by Aleskerov and Kurbanov [2] does not conclusively favor
some particular voting system. Instead, we consider all the systems that are identi-
fied by name in their concluding section. In addition to the Borda and Q-approval
voting systems, which we have already considered, these include the Black, Copeland,
Fishburn, minimax, and single transferable vote systems.
We will define these voting systems momentarily, but we first need a couple pre-
liminary definitions. Given an (N + 1)-profile P, we say that candidate A majority-
defeats candidate A - notated Ai -+ Aj - if
* more than (N + 1)/2 of the voters rank Ai above A, or
" exactly (N + 1)/2 of the voters rank A above A, and i < j.
(The second case is used to ensure that among any two candidates, one majority-
defeats the other. Again, our results are not sensitive to how such ties are broken.)
A Condorcet winner is a candidate that majority-defeats every other candidate; if a
Condorcet winner exists, she is unique.
The voting systems we consider are defined as follows:
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" Black's system: If a Condorcet winner exists, that candidate is chosen; other-
wise, Borda count is applied.
" Copeland's system: Define the score of each candidate Ai to be the number of
candidates A, such that Ai -+ A,. Choose the candidate with the highest score
as the winner; break ties alphabetically.
" Fishburn's system (also known as the uncovered set system [56]): Say that a
candidate Ai covers another candidate Aj if, for all k such that Ak -+ Aj, we
also have Ak -+ A,. (In particular, this requires Ai -* A,.) This is a partial
ordering on the set of candidates, so there must exist at least one uncovered
candidate. This candidate is the winner. If there is more than one uncovered
candidate, we choose the alphabetically earliest.
" Minimax system (also known as Simpson's system): For each candidate Aj, let
the score be the maximum, over all j 4 i, of the number of voters ranking A,
above Aj. Choose the candidate with the lowest score as the winner, breaking
ties alphabetically as usual.
" Single transferable vote system (also known as successive elimination or Hare's
system): Each voter has one vote, initially assigned to his first-choice candidate.
For each candidate, we determine the number of votes she receives. The candi-
date Ai, with the fewest votes is eliminated; ties are broken alphabetically (that
is, in favor of keeping alphabetically earlier candidates). Each voter who ranked
A, first has his vote reassigned to his second-choice candidate. Then, among
the remaining candidates and new votes, we again eliminate the candidate Aj 2
with the fewest votes, reassign these votes, and so forth. The last candidate to
escape elimination is the winner.
These voting systems are listed in the first column of Table 3.1. In the second
column, we give an asymptotic lower bound on the susceptibility of each system. In
each case, we prove the lower bound for all M except possibly some small values. The
table indicates exactly for which M we prove the bound. (For the minimax system,
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System Susceptibility Bound rN> (1+ - c) N
Black o-Black > [,] for M > 5 M > 5
Copeland o-Copeland > [M lJ for M $ 5 M > 6
Fishburn oFishburn > (M - 3) M > 5
Minimax offnirao > n forM>4 M>4
STV STV > 2 M-1all M
_________._' 7rN all___ _ ___M_
Table 3.1: Comparison of voting systems identified in [2] against plurality rule. The
second column gives lower bounds on susceptibility. Each system is more susceptible
than plurality, for the values of M indicated in the third column.
the statement is that there is some absolute constant c such that o- > c//N for all
N and M.)
For most of the voting systems, our lower bound is decreasing in N at rate 1/v/N,
but with different constant factors. Each such constant factor grows at least linearly
in M - faster than the v/Mi factor for plurality rule (from Proposition 3.2(b)).
Therefore, each voting system is more susceptible than plurality rule when M is large
enough. Specifically, by comparing the second column of the table with Proposition
3.2(b), we get the results shown in the third column: each voting system listed is
more susceptible than plurality rule for the indicated values of M.
In particular, our lower bound for single transferable vote is exponential in M, so
that it is substantially more susceptible than plurality rule for moderately large num-
bers of candidates; and our lower bound for minimax is on the order of N-'/4 rather
than N- 1/2 , so it is much more susceptible than plurality rule, in large populations,
as long as M > 4.
Proposition 3.6 The five voting systems listed in Table 3.1 satisfy the asymptotic
lower bounds on susceptibility listed in the table. (In particular, all of them are more
susceptible than plurality rule when M > 6.)
The proof of Proposition 3.6 is in Appendix E. Here we give a sketch of the
arguments used. In the process, we highlight the insights gained about the properties
of these voting systems that make them particularly susceptible.
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Broadly, the approach is the same as for the lower bounds in Propositions 3.2(b)
and 3.5. For each system, we prove the lower bound by constructing a particular
belief # and proposed manipulation, and estimating the probability of being pivotal.
For minimax and single transferable vote, the crucial intuition is that a rule is
highly susceptible if it is sensitive to the balance between two very small shares of
the population.
In more detail: We construct the belief 4 in such a way that pivotality occurs
when the numbers of opponents reporting preferences >- and >-' are equal, for some
particular >-, >-'c L. In this belief, >- and >-' occur with equal probability a. Then,
from Lemma 2.2(b), the probability of being pivotal is ~ (1/2) 1/7raN. In par-
ticular, for small a, the probability of being pivotal is high. For these two voting
systems, we can construct beliefs with the relevant a quite small. In particular, in
the case of minimax, we achieve the N-1 /4 convergence rate by varying the belief as
N increases, so that the population shares of the two relevant preference orders go to
zero. Plurality rule, on the other hand, does not suffer from this sensitivity to small
population shares, since the opportunity to be pivotal between some two potential
winners only arises when each of them is the first choice of at least 1/M of the voters.
The Copeland and Fishburn systems are defined in terms of the majority de-
feat relation, which cannot hinge on small population shares, so we cannot use a
similar construction to show that these systems have high susceptibility. Instead,
the intuition we use here is that a rule is highly susceptible if the manipulator can
simultaneously be pivotal in many independent ways.
Specifically, for each of these systems, we construct a belief with the following
property: there are many pairs {Ai, Aj} over which the population is close to evenly
split, and if the manipulator is pivotal for any one of these pairs, he can manipulate
advantageously. For each such pair, the probability of being pivotal is ~ V2/7rN. The
number of pairs is linear in M, and pivotality for any pair is independent of pivotality
for any other pair, so that the overall probability of being pivotal is - - 2/rN times
a coefficient linear in M.
One might at first think that plurality rule allows the same construction, since,
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as pointed out in the discussion preceding Proposition 3.2, it is possible to be pivotal
in many ways simultaneously: a manipulation from Ai to Aj can change the outcome
from Ak to Aj, for each k /4 j. But these pivotality conditions are not independent
of each other, since the manipulator can only be pivotal from Ak to Aj when Ak, Aj
are the two candidates with the most first-place votes.
Finally, for Black's system, we exploit the same intuition as for the Borda count:
a manipulation can have a large effect on the relative standing of two candidates, so
that the slice of the vote simplex for which the manipulator is pivotal has "thickness"
proportional to M. Indeed, the construction we give for Black's system is based
on our construction for Borda count, with some extra foolery added to prevent the
existence of a Condorcet winner.
Before closing this subsection, we should comment on the practical significance of
a comparison like Proposition 3.6. Is it not enough to simply know that each voting
system's susceptibility tends to zero for N large?
In the context of our motivating model, with the E cost of strategic behavior,
a result comparing the susceptibility of two voting systems is most cogent if we
believe that a plausible cost of behaving strategically would be on the same order of
magnitude as the susceptibility of the two rules. In this case, there would be agents
who would consider manipulating under one system but not the other.
Consider a six-candidate election, in an organization with 2, 000 members (this
could correspond to, say, a leadership election in a modest-sized professional orga-
nization). Treating the asymptotic bounds as exact, we have from Proposition 3.2
an upper bound of 0.031 for the susceptibility of plurality rule, whereas the lower
bounds from Proposition 3.6 are 0.036 for Black and Copeland, 0.054 for Fishburn,
and 0.071 for single transferable vote. These numbers are economically distinguish-
able from zero. More precisely, the differences in susceptibility between the voting
systems are important if the voters' cost of behaving strategically is on the order of
3 to 7 percent of their concern about the outcome. This seems a reasonable estimate
in many organizations, where most members' interest in the outcome of elections is
modest.
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3.3 A new voting system
We have now shown that a number of voting systems, previously identified as resistant
to manipulation under profile-counting definitions, are in fact more susceptible to
manipulation than the benchmark of plurality rule under our worst-case measure. A
question which naturally presents itself is: is there any reasonable voting system that
is less susceptible than plurality?
There are a couple of easy, but not entirely satisfactory, answers. In Section 4, we
will indicate how to construct a unanimous voting system whose susceptibility is on
the order of 1/N', for some r, > 1/2. Thus, such a rule is considerably less susceptible
than any of the voting systems we have considered, for large N. However, that rule
will be arguably artifical and violates almost any standard regularity condition.
Another possible answer is one we have already given, namely majority rule with
status quo; our bounds imply that it is less susceptible than plurality rule if M > 9.
However, this voting system treats the candidates in a very asymmetric manner.
We will give below a voting system that is less susceptible than plurality rule, for
the special case M = 3. This voting system is well-behaved, in the sense of being
unanimous and monotone, and arguably treats the candidates as fairly as possible.
(Complete symmetry among candidates - often called neutrality in social choice
theory - would be complicated by the need to break ties. Rather than formally
define neutrality with exceptions for tie-breaking, we just argue intuitively that our
rule breaks symmetry only in knife-edge cases.)
The construction is based on the following observation: Under plurality rule with
M = 3, the strongest incentive to manipulate arises when voters split evenly between
two candidates (see Proposition 3.3). In this case, however, deciding by majority
rule between these two candidates (ignoring the third candidate), rather than using
plurality, would eliminate the incentive to manipulate. This suggests constructing a
voting rule such that
* when two candidates are "far ahead" of the third in terms of first-place votes,
the winner is chosen by majority rule between the two leading candidates;
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" when all three candidates are roughly evenly matched, plurality rule is used;
and
* the transition between the two preceding cases is smooth enough to avoid cre-
ating other opportunities for manipulation.
We now construct a voting system f along these lines, which we will call the pair-
or-plurality voting system. For N sufficiently large, let K, L be positive integers with
2K < L < N/6. (These values can depend on N, in ways to be specified later.)
Say that a candidate Ai is viable if Ai receives at least K first-place votes. The
winner is determined as follows:
(a) If there is only one viable candidate, she wins.
(b) If there are two viable candidates, the winner is determined by majority vote
between them (with ties broken alphabetically).
(c) If all three candidates are viable, then we compute a score for each candidate.
For each candidate Ai, consider the voters ranking her first. Let the number
of voters reporting preferences AiAj Ak, AiAkA be x, y respectively. We will
award x + y corresponding points to the three candidates, as follows:
- If x + y > L, then all x + y points are awarded to Ai.
- If x + y < L, then we award
L(x + y - K) points to A,
max {;min x- (x+y-K)L K(L-xy)}} points to A 
f 2(~L - K) -
max 0, min - (xy-K)L K(L-x- y} points to Ak-2( L - K) L - K
After doing this for each candidate Ai, ultimately we have allocated N + 1
points, corresponding to the N + 1 voters. Then the candidate with the most
points wins. Ties are broken alphabetically.
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Figure 3.1: Scoring system in case (c) of the pair-or-plurality voting rule. The level
plots show what fraction of the x + y points are allocated to each candidate, as a
function of x and y. Darker regions represent more points for the candidate indicated.
For reference, the gray lines connect the points (X, y) = (K, 0), (0, K), (L, 0), (0, L),
and (L/2, L/2).
The scoring system in case (c) is illustrated in Figure 3.1, which shows the allo-
cation of points as a function of x and y. This system achieves a smooth transition
between majority rule (in the case x + y = K, where the x + y points are awarded to
A1 and Ak based on pairwise preference) and plurality rule (when x + y > L, where
all x + y points go to Ai).
Lemma 3.7 For each N, the pair-or-plurality voting rule constructed above is mono-
tone and Pareto efficient.
We now give our main result for the pair-or-plurality voting rule. It applies when
K and L are chosen to vary in the appropriate way as functions of N.
Proposition 3.8 If K, L are chosen for each N so that L/K -+ oo and K -> oo as
N -+ o, then
1 3POP < 11 _
N ~2 ,wN'
Comparing this upper bound to Proposition 3.2(a), we see that the pair-or-
plurality rule is indeed less susceptible than plurality rule.
The proofs of both of the above results are in Appendix F.
Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to generalize the construction of the pair-or-
plurality voting rule to a system that is less susceptible than plurality rule for arbitrary
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M. For large M, the critical distribution for plurality no longer has opponents evenly
split between two candidates, so our motivating idea does not apply. Finding a well-
behaved voting system that is less susceptible than plurality rule for arbitrary M,
or showing that no such voting system exists (under an appropriate definition of
"well-behaved"), is a task for future research.
4 General lower bounds
The previous section gave comparisons of several specific voting systems. However, a
mechanism designer may often approach her problem not with particular mechanisms
in mind, but rather with a list of desired properties that a mechanism should satisfy,
and then ask how well she can do in terms of strategic incentives while satisfying those
other properties. In this section, we give several illustrative results to show how our
measure of susceptibility can be used to address such questions. Each of our results is
of the following form: for some combination of (efficiency, regularity, informational)
properties, we provide an asymptotic lower bound on the susceptibility of any voting
rule satisfying them. The properties we use are those defined in Subsection 2.1.
These lower bounds (together with some partial tightness results) offer insights
into the quantitative tradeoffs between susceptibility to strategic manipulation and
other desiderata. They can also be viewed, more pessimistically, as quantitative
versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, analogous to the recent results of
Isaksson, Kindler, and Mossel [26] and Mossel and Racz [40] which used a profile-
counting measure. (A version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for our IID
setting was first proved by McLennan [38].)
For expositional smoothness, we begin by presenting all of the results, in Subsec-
tion 4.1. That subsection ends with a very brief sketch of the tools used in the proofs.
Ensuing subsections give more careful outlines of the proofs. These outlines are of
interest in themselves, as they illustrate more general techniques for working with our
measure of susceptibility. The full proofs are for the most part left to Appendix G.
As before, our results are asymptotic in N, so we treat M as fixed. Thus when
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any result in this section refers to a "constant," it is understood that the constant
may depend on M but not N.
4.1 Statement of results
The discussion here will explain the motivation behind each result. A quick summary
of the results is provided in Table 4.1 near the end of this subsection.
Since any constant voting rule obviously has susceptibility zero, some efficiency
condition needs to be imposed to obtain any interesting results. A minimal such
restriction is weak unanimity, which leads to the following general lower bound:
Theorem 4.1 There exists a constant c > 0 such that, for every value of N, every
weakly unanimous voting rule f has susceptibility o- > cN- 1 2 .
If we add tops-onliness, then we can improve the exponent from -3/2 to -1.
(Note that a less negative exponent of N means a higher value, thus a stronger lower
bound.)
Theorem 4.2 There exists a constant c > 0 such that every unanimous, tops-only
voting rule has susceptibility o- > cN'.
(We simply say unanimous because weak and strong unanimity coincide for tops-
only voting rules.)
It is unknown whether the bounds in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 are tight. The voting
systems considered in Section 3, which all had susceptibility of order N- 1/2 or larger,
might suggest that a tight lower bound should have an exponent of -1/2. The
following result shows that such a bound actually does not hold in general:
Theorem 4.3 There exist a number rK > 1/2 and a Pareto-efficient, tops-only voting
system with susceptibility -< N-^.
The slower rate of decline in Section 3 exploited the interpretation of susceptibility
as the probability of being pivotal. Theorem 4.3 instead depends on a construction
for which the pivotal intuition does not apply.
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Instead, we construct a low-susceptibility voting system based on the following
ideas. Imagine temporarily that we allow voting rules to specify probabilistic out-
comes. Thus instead of being a function f : LN+1 -+ C, a voting rule is a function
f : LN+1 -+ A(C). With expected utility over lotteries, our definition of susceptibility
(2.1) remains applicable. But now the random dictatorship voting rule, which picks
a voter uniformly at random and then chooses that voter's first choice as the winner,
has susceptibility zero.
In this paper, we have forbidden explicitly random voting rules, so the random
dictatorship is disallowed. However, there is still room for implicit randomization, via
the manipulator's IID uncertainty about others' votes. This allows us to construct
an f that looks approximately like random dictatorship from the manipulator's point
of view: For any (N + 1)-profile P, we choose the values f(Q) for profiles Q close
to P, so that the fraction of such profiles at which any candidate Ai wins is close
to the fraction of the population voting for Ai at P. This is illustrated in Figure
4.1. The construction in Appendix H in effect achieves this for all P simultaneously,
to within an error of order strictly smaller than N-1/2 . (That construction requires
some additional details not reflected in the figure.)
A
M B
M c
B C
Figure 4.1: The approximate random dictatorship voting rule
This approximate random dictatorship is extremely sensitive to the exact vote
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profile, so that the pivotal intuition does not apply. However, one might argue that
it is not a realistic voting rule, and impose a regularity condition to rule out such a
construction. For example, monotonicity does the trick, at least as long as we are
also willing to strengthen unanimity to Pareto efficiency. This restores the N-'/2 rate
of decline in susceptibility that we saw in Section 3:
Theorem 4.4 There exists a constant c such that every Pareto efficient and mono-
tone voting rule f has susceptibility o- > cN- 2
If we impose both monotonicity and tops-onliness, the problem becomes structured
enough so that we can compute the minimum susceptibility exactly. Moreover, we
can partially characterize the voting rules attaining the minimum. Say that a tops-
only voting rule f is a majority rule if it satisfies the following: for every profile P at
which more than half the voters rank the same candidate Ai first, f(P) = Ai.
Theorem 4.5 Every unanimous, monotone, tops-only voting rule f has susceptibility
o- > o-*. Moreover, if equality holds, and N > 4, then f must be a majority rule.
Equality is attained, for example, by majority rule with status quo (Proposition
3.1). Again, this contrasts with the results of [34, 37], using a profile-counting measure
of manipulation; the least-manipulable voting rules they identify look qualitatively
like unanimity rules, not majority rules.
Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 both give bounds on the order of N-1/ 2 . The example of
Section 3.3 shows that Theorem 4.5 is not redundant: the bound there would not
hold if we did not require tops-onliness.
Finally, we give two theorems showing that the relatively mild regularity condition
of simplicity already makes some demands on incentives. By itself, it is enough to
imply an N bound (where we had N-31 2 otherwise); and combined with tops-
onliness, it gives N-1/ 2, the same order of magnitude as monotonicity.6
6 The latter result, Theorem 4.7, does not even require an explicit efficiency condition: simplicity
imposes enough efficiency to yield the bound. Note that even though simplicity only concerns two
candidates, the usual method of giving perfect incentives by using majority vote between these two
candidates is unavailable, because it violates tops-onliness.
95
Theorem 4.6 There is a constant c > 0 such that every weakly unanimous voting
rule that is simple over some pair of candidates has susceptibility 0- > cN-'.
Theorem 4.7 There is a constant c > 0 such that every voting rule that is simple
over some pair of candidates and tops-only has susceptibility o- > cN-1 2 .
In proving all of these lower bounds, we focus on profiles and beliefs # that are
concentrated on just two or three preference orderings. To understand why, recall
that if we had not imposed any restrictions on beliefs in the definition (1.1) of sus-
ceptibility, then every voting rule would have susceptibility 1. Lower susceptibility is
made possible by the smoothing of beliefs that the IID restriction achieves. A belief
placing non-negligible probability on many preference orders is smoothed along many
dimensions. Beliefs concentrated on a small number of orderings give coarser smooth-
ing, and thus are more powerful in translating the discreteness of local changes in f
into lower bounds on susceptibility.
For the theorems involving monotonicity (4.4 and 4.5), the most important intu-
ition behind the lower bounds is the interpretation of susceptibility as the probability
of being pivotal. For the others, the main driving force is the coarseness of discrete
approximation described in the previous paragraph.
Efficiency Regularity Information Bound J Theorem]
Weakly unanimous 0- > cN-3/ 2  4.1
Weakly unanimous Simple o- > cN 1  4.6
Pareto Monotone o- > cN-/ 2  4.4
Unanimous Tops-only o- > cN 1  4.2
Simple Tops-only o>  cN-11 2  4.7
Unanimous Monotone Tops-only o-> uo* (- cN-/ 2) 4.5
Table 4.1: Summary of lower-bound theorems
The remaining subsections sketch these proofs. Instead of following the order
of exposition above, they are arranged in a more convenient way for presenting the
tools. Subsection 4.2 covers Theorem 4.5. Since this is an exact bound, the proof
is combinatorial. The remaining proofs are at least partly analytic, building on a
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lemma introduced in Subsection 4.3 that bounds the variation in local averages of
f in terms of the susceptibility o. Subsection 4.4 proves Theorem 4.4 for monotone
voting rules, using the lemma to help formalize the pivotal intuition. Subsection 4.5
covers the results for tops-only voting rules, Theorems 4.2 and 4.7, while Subsection
4.6 proves the more general Theorems 4.1 and 4.6. These last two subsections exhibit
a "meta-technique" for proving lower bounds on susceptibility: Begin with a proof by
contradiction showing that susceptibility cannot be zero; then introduce error terms,
and calculate how large the error terms need to be in order for the contradiction
to disappear. In particular, Subsection 4.6 builds on Gibbard's [23] classic charac-
terization of strategyproof probabilistic voting rules by including error terms in this
way.
As for Theorem 4.3, we have already sketched the main idea of the construction;
further details are left to Appendix H.
4.2 Monotone, tops-only voting rules
We begin with the proof of Theorem 4.5. Notice that for tops-only voting rules,
monotonicity means that if a candidate Ai wins at some profile P, and we change P
by replacing votes for candidates other than Ai with votes for Aj, then Ai remains
the winner.
For intuition, consider the case of three candidates; an example of a monotone,
tops-only voting rule is shown in Figure 4.2. Such a rule carves the simplex of possible
vote profiles into a region where A is chosen, a region where B is chosen and a region
where C is chosen. Focus on the B - C edge of the simplex. There is exactly one
profile along this edge where the manipulator can be pivotal between B and C -
either by changing his vote from A to B, he changes the outcome from C to B, or
else (as in the figure) by changing his vote from A to C, he changes the outcome
from B to C. Thus, if his true first choice is A, he can change the outcome from his
third to second choice by manipulating. The critical distribution < is then chosen to
maximize the probability of this pivotal profile, and the bound follows via Lemmas
2.3 and 2.4.
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B
C
B C
Figure 4.2: A unanimous, monotone, tops-only voting rule
The full proof, which is in Appendix G, modifies this argument to allow for ar-
bitrarily many candidates. The proof also requires some extra work to deal with
extreme shapes for the boundaries between regions, particularly when proving the
equality case.
4.3 A crucial lemma
For the remaining results, we use analytic methods rather than purely combinatorial
ones. Henceforth, we will need to refer to N + 1 more often than N directly, so put
N = N + 1.
The following definitions will be useful throughout the rest of this section. For
any distribution #5 E A(L), write f(#) for the distribution over candidates induced by
f when all N + 1 votes are drawn IID from #. Also write 7A, (#) for the probability
of candidate Ai in this distribution. Rather than studying f directly, it will be more
convenient to work with 7: the latter, being a continuous object, lends itself to
analytic techniques.
From the point of view of the manipulator, reporting a preference >-', the distri-
bution over outcomes is similar, but not identical, to f(#): the manipulator reports
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>-' for sure, while the other N preferences are drawn from 4. The incentives to ma-
nipulate involve a comparison between two such distributions. As it turns out, this
difference between two distributions is exactly equal to the directional derivative of
f, in the direction of changing preferences from - to s', up to a scaling factor. More
precisely:
Lemma 4.8 Let >-, -' be any two orderings; let A C (L) and a G [0,1]. For
x E [0, 1], define
#X = aZ((1 - x) - +x >-') + (1-a) #
Then, the components of the derivative of the function f(0px) are given by
d Ai(#)) = aN - EIrD(O)[I(f (>-', P) = A) - I(f (>-, P) = A)].dx
The proof, by direct computation, is in Appendix D.
This leads to the following key lemma, which relates rates of change of f to the
susceptibility of f.
Lemma 4.9 (Local Average Lemma) Suppose the voting rule f has susceptibility
o-. There exists a constant c, independent of N (or f or -), such that the following
hold:
(a) Let -, >-' be any two orderings; let A C (L) and a c [0,1]. Then for any set
C+ consisting of the L highest-ranked candidates under -, for some L, we have
Sc f~~> ±(1- a)4)- S (a>+ (I1-ac) 0))<Nau. (4.1)
AkEC+ AkEC+
(b) Let -, >-' be two orderings differing only by a switch of the adjacent candidates
Ai, Aj; let # E A(L) and a G [0,1]. Then for any set C' of candidates not
containing A1 or Aj,
Sf A(a +(- -- a)#) - f7Ak(a > +(1 - a)#) < c~aO-. (4.2)
AkEC' AkEC'
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(c) Suppose f is tops-only. Let # E A(C) and a G [0, 1]. Then for any set C' of
candidates not containing Ai or Aj,
Z fA, (aAj + (1 - a)#0) - E fA,(aAj + (1 - a)#0) < cNao-. (4.3)
AkEC' AkEC'
Proof: We focus on proving (a), then check that the other parts follow imme-
diately. Using the notation of Lemma 4.8, put g(X) = EAkCC+ Ak (#X). We then
have
dg
dx = aN -EIID(Ox) [I(f(>-', P) E C+) - I(f(>-, P) E C+)].
From (2.3), the right-hand side is at most o. Therefore, L < aNo- for all x, hencedx -
SA(a -' +(1 - a)#) - E fA(a >- +(1 - a)#) = g(1) - g(0) < a o-.
ACC' AEC'
This proves (a).
For (b), notice that if C' consists of the L highest-ranked candidates under >-
(and hence also under >-') for some L, then (4.2) with c = 1 follows from part
(a), applied once directly and once with >- and >-' reversed. If C' consists of the L
lowest-ranked candidates, then (4.2) with c = 1 likewise follows from part (a), taking
C+ = C \ C'. Finally, any C' not containing Ai or Aj can be obtained by taking unions
and differences of at most M -2 such highest- or lowest-ranked sets. Hence in general
(4.2) holds with c = M - 2, using the triangle inequality.
Part (c) is immediate from (b).
4.4 Monotone voting rules
We now take on Theorem 4.4, for monotone voting rules. Clearly it suffices to show
the result when N is sufficiently large.
Monotonicity again allows us to carve the simplex of vote profiles into regions
where each candidate wins. The intuition of susceptibility as the probability of being
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pivotal then applies: for the appropriate critical distribution, the probability of being
on the boundary of two regions is of order N /2 , and we show that some such
boundary is sloped so that a non-negligible fraction of the boundary profiles are in
fact ones where manipulation is advantageous.
Lemma 4.10 formalizes this pivotal intuition, in the form that we need. The lemma
focuses on a portion of the vote simplex spanned by three particular preferences
>'-, >-', -". We suppose that there are two candidates Ai, Aj who are ranked in the
same way by >-' and >-"; and that this simplex contains an Ai region adjacent to
an A, region, with the boundary between them sufficiently sloped relative to the
- >-" edge of the simplex. If the manipulator expects the vote profile to lie near
the boundary, he has an incentive to manipulate from >' to >-" or vice versa, in order
to help the more-preferred of the two candidates win. The size of this incentive is of
order N-1/ 2
The formal statement of the lemma below is lengthy, but the idea is as above. The
statement focuses on a parallelogram-shaped portion of the >- - >-' - -" simplex, and
assumes that throughout this parallelogram, f chooses either Ai or Ay, as illustrated
in Figure 4.3. (The parallelogram shape makes the lemma easier to state, but is not
crucial to the result.)
Condition (iii) of the lemma says the relevant regions are well-behaved enough to
talk about the boundary between them. When applying the lemma, we use mono-
tonicity to verify this condition. Conditions (iv) and (v) express that the boundary's
slope is bounded below by r, > 0.
Lemma 4.10 Let r, > 0 be a constant. There exists a constant c(K) > 0, depending
only on ri, for which the following holds.
Suppose f is a voting rule with N voters, having susceptibility -. Let "
be any three preference orderings. Let 0 < J < J < N with J - J > rN. Let
0 <K< - J. Define
R={(J,K) | J<:5J<7;0<K K;J+K j };
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of Lemma 4.10
and PJ,K =
J
K
-J-K Iifor (J, K) E R.
Let Aj, Aj be two different candidates. Suppose the following conditions hold:
(i) f (PJK) E IA, Aj} for all (J, K) E R;
(ii) >-' and >-" rank Aj, A, in the same way relative to each other;
(iii) if (J, K) E R and f(PJK) = Ai, then f(PJ+1,K) = Ai and f(PJ+1,K-1) = Ai
(whenever the relevant index pairs are in R);
(iv) f(PJK) = Aj whenever K = 0; and
(v) f (PJK) = Ai whenever K = K.
Then
o- > c(r)N-11 2 (4.4)
The lemma is proven by identifying two distributions #1, #2 on either side of the
boundary, with the distance between them on the order of N-1 /2 , such that f(# 1) ~ A_
and f(02) ~ A, (see the figure); and then applying the local average lemma. The
proof is in Appendix G, as is the full proof of Theorem 4.4.
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We proceed to describe the proof of Theorem 4.4 itself. The main strategy is
illustrated in Figure 4.4, for the case of three candidates A, B, C. We focus on the
behavior of f on the ABC-BCA-CAB, ABC- ACB-C AB, ACB-C AB-CBA,
and ACB - CBA - BAC simplices, which are shown unfolded into a single plane in
the figure. Monotonicity and Pareto efficiency give us A, B, and C regions, with the
shapes indicated. Note that B cannot win anywhere in the middle two simplices, by
Pareto efficiency. Consider the boundary between the A and C regions. If (as in the
figure) the slope of this boundary is far from zero, then we can apply Lemma 4.10
to obtain the desired cN-1/2 bound on susceptibility. (Actually, the application of
the lemma is straightforward when the portion of the boundary in the middle two
simplices of the figure is sloped. But when the sloped portion appears in the leftmost
or rightmost simplex, a more detailed case analysis is needed, as sketched in Figure
G.1 in Appendix G.)
It may be that the A - C boundary is not sloped enough to apply the argument
directly. However, Figure 4.4 shows only a part of the vote simplex. We can repeat the
construction of this figure, replacing A, B, C by B, C, A, respectively, or by C, A, B,
respectively. Thus we obtain two more such figures. The proof of Theorem 4.4 shows
that at least one of these figures contains a boundary whose slope is bounded away
from zero, and then the argument goes through.
ABC ACB BAC
Ac
BCA CAB CBA
Figure 4.4: Proof of Theorem 4.4
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4.5 Tops-only voting rules
Next, we show how to prove Theorems 4.2 and 4.7, on tops-only voting rules.
For Theorem 4.7, which gives a cN 1 / 2 bound when the voting rule is simple,
we take the approach of first sketching a proof that a > 0, and then introducing
error terms to find out explicitly how large o needs to be. Without loss of generality,
suppose f is simple over B and C, and consider the values of f at several distributions
in the A - B - C simplex, as shown in Figure 4.5. We choose #1 and #2 so that
f(#1) puts high probability on B, f(#2) puts high probability on C, and the distance
between #1 and #2 is on the order of N-1 2
Suppose for contradiction o = 0. Then f(#1) and f(#3) must put the same total
weight on A and B, by Lemma 4.9(c). Similarly, f(#2),f(#03) put the same total
weight on A and C. We conclude that f(#3) puts high probability on A. Next, again
using Lemma 4.9(c), f(0 3 ),f(#4) put equal weight on A; and (#1),f7(#4) put equal
weight on B. Then f(#4) puts high weight on both A and B, which is a contradiction.
Now, repeat the argument without assuming a = 0. Each time we apply Lemma
4.9, the conclusion remains the same as before, to within an approximation error of
order oN- 1/2 . As long as the total approximation error accumulated in the course of
the proof is smaller than some positive constant, we end with the same contradiction
as before. Thus, the contradiction arises unless o- > cN- 2
The formal proof of Theorem 4.7, following the above sketch, is short enough that
we can include it here in the text.
Proof of Theorem 4.7: Assume that f is simple over B and C, and assume
the threshold K* is < N/2 (otherwise switch B and C). Also let co be the constant
from Lemma 4.9.
We will assume that f has susceptibility
0 < V2.-N /2 (4.5)32co
and obtain a contradiction.
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AB
C
B
Figure 4.5: Proof of Theorem 4.7
Let
#1 = (a1 B, 1 - 0i C) with ai = 
~
Then f(#) = (yi B, 1 - -y1 C), where -y1 is the probability that at least K* voters
vote B. The number K of such voters is binomial with mean Nai = K* + \ 25 and
variance Na 1 (1 - ai) N/4, so by Chebyshev's inequality,
Pr(K < K*) Pr(jK - E[K]I > \/25) < .8
Thus, y1 > 7/8.
Let
#2 = (a 2 B, 1 - a 2 C) with
Then f(#2) = (Y B, 1-y2 C), where now
if a 2 > 0, and if a 2 = 0 then f(# 2 ) = C).
a 2 = max 0 .
y2 1/8 (this follows again by Chebyshev
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C01 02
K* - \f25
N
We have#1-# 2 = A(B - C) whereA= ai -<a2 <; 2 2/N. By (4.5),
1
coRZO- < .8
Let #3 = #1 + A(A - B) = <2 + A(A - C) (this is again a valid probability
distribution). Applying Lemma 4.9(c) to #1 and #3, with the set of candidates C \
{A, B}, we find that f(# 3 ) places total weight at most 1/8 + coNAo- < 1/4 on
candidates other than A and B. Likewise, applying Lemma 4.9(c) to #2 and #3 , with
C' = C\{A, C}, we conclude that f(4 3) places total weight < 1/4 on candidates other
than A and C. Consequently, f(#3) places weight > 1/2 on A.
Now let #4 = #1 + A(A - C) = 0 3 + A(B - C). This is a valid distribution as
long as #1 places probability at least A on C. If N is large enough then
N/2 - 2N 2 2N1-01= ~ > N >
NN
so this requirement is satisfied.
Applying Lemma 4.9(c) to #1 and 4 with C' = {B} gives that f(# 4) places weight
> 3/4 on B. Applying Lemma 4.9(c) again to #3 and # with C' = {A} gives that
f(# 4 ) places weight > 3/8 on A. Since 3/4 + 3/8 > 1, this is a contradiction. O
The proof of Theorem 4.2 builds on the above. We begin by considering various
potential manipulations when the belief # lies on the B - C edge of the vote simplex.
We show that if no such manipulation gives a gain greater than cN-1 in expected
utility, then f is "approximately simple" over B and C. From there we can repeat
the proof of Theorem 4.7. The proof of Theorem 4.2 is in Appendix G.
4.6 General voting rules
Finally, we prove our most general result, Theorem 4.1, for any weakly unanimous
voting rule. As an inexpensive by-product, we will also obtain Theorem 4.6, for simple
and weakly unanimous voting rules.
The proof is closely modeled on Gibbard's [23] proof of the characterization of
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strategyproof7 probabilistic voting rules. Gibbard shows that any such voting rule is
a convex combination of unilateral rules, in which only one agent's preference affects
the outcome, and duple rules, where only two distinct outcomes are possible. Under
our assumptions of anonymity and weak unanimity, the only such probabilistic voting
rule is random dictatorship.
The connection between Gibbard's result and ours is made by the local average
lemma, which says that if f has low susceptibility, then the probabilistic voting rule
f^(P) = f(P/N) is approximately strategyproof. We retrace Gibbard's proof and keep
track of error terms, showing that if f is approximately strategyproof then it must be
approximately a random dictatorship. Finally, we use the coarseness of approximation
(since f is deterministic) to show that f cannot be too close to random dictatorship.
At a technical level, the proof of Gibbard's characterization of strategyproof prob-
abilistic voting rules g is based on equations of the form
g(>-, P) - g(>-', P) = g(>-, P') - g(>-', P') (4.6)
for certain pairs of preferences >-, >-' and opponent-profiles P, P'. If (4.6) were to
hold for all >-, >-', P, P', it would say that g is linear (as a function of the number of
voters having each preference). Combined with weak unanimity, this linearity would
immediately imply that g is random dictatorship. In fact, Gibbard's proof only shows
(4.6) for certain >-, >-', P, P', but these cover enough cases to give the needed linearity.
Gibbard's original proof was quite involved, but our assumptions of anonymity
and weak unanimity make the argument less difficult. (See also [171 and [59] for
streamlined versions of Gibbard's argument under the unanimity assumption only.)
The key tool used in our argument - a version of (4.6) with error terms - is
given by the following lemma. The absolute value notation for vectors here refers to
the L 1 norm.
Lemma 4.11 Let >-, >-2, >3 >-4 be preference orderings, and let A, Aj, Ak, A, be
candidates (not necessarily distinct), with the following properties:
7That is, those where truth-telling is a dominant strategy.
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S > 1 , >2 differ only by a switch of the adjacent candidates Ai, Aj,;
S>3, >4 differ only by a switch of the adjacent candidates Ak, A;
e {AiAj} / {Ak, AI}.
Let # E A(L), and let a,0, ;> 0 with a+3+}= 1. Take co to be the constant from
Lemma 4.9. Then, if f is a voting rule with susceptibility o-, we have the bound
a >i 1 0 2 Si a -2
f p -3 -f -3 -f >4 +f S-4  < 16coNu. (4.7)
The proof simply involves decomposing the four-way difference on the left-hand
side of (4.7) into a sum of two differences in two ways, and applying Lemma 4.9 to
each of these differences. The details are in Appendix G.
We now outline the proof of Theorem 4.1, via three lemmas, whose proofs are again
in Appendix G. Focus on candidates A, B, C. We assume a fixed ordering for the
remaining candidates, and write expressions such as CAB... to denote a preference
beginning CAB, with the remaining candidates arranged in their fixed order.
We maintain throughout the assumption that f is weakly unanimous, with sus-
ceptibility o-.
Lemma 4.12 There is a constant c1 > 0 with the following property: if u < c1|N,
then
f(K CAB..., - K CBA...)=C for all K. (4.8)
This is easy to show using beliefs along near the CAB. .. - CBA ... edge. If (4.8)
were violated, we could find some such belief where the manipulator can increase the
probability of C by ci/N by manipulating from CAB... to CBA ... or vice versa.
Lemma 4.13 Assume (4.8) holds. Let x, y, z, x', z' be nonnegative numbers with x +
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y+z=x'+y+z'=1. Then
_ x ABC ...
(f y+z BAC ...
_/ xABC..
fB
((y + z' B AC ..
x+y ABC ... (4.9)
z BAC... )
. - x'+y ABC...( f< 192coNo-,
.z' B AC ... )
where co is the constant from Lemma 4.9.
This key step is proven by repeated applications of Lemma 4.11. The bound
(4.10) says that if we start at some distribution concentrated on the preference or-
derings ABC... and BAC..., and move some fixed amount y of mass from ABC...
to BAC..., then the change in f cannot depend too much on where we started.
More simply put, f is approximately linear along the ABC... - BAC ... edge of the
preference simplex.
Lemma 4.14 There exists some absolute constant c2, independent of N, with the
following property: for any weakly unanimous f, there exist some nonnegative values
x, y, z, x', z' with
ABC ...
BAC...)
ABC...
z' BAC ...
ABC...
BAC...
y ABC...
BAC ...
(4.10)
> c2/V N.
This simply quantifies how much the discreteness forces f to be far from linearity
along the ABC... - BAC ... edge.
Theorem 4.1 now follows directly.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Let Co, c1 , c2 be as in the three preceding lemmas. Ei-
ther a 2 ci/N, and we are done; or else Lemma 4.12 applies, in which case the ensuing
two lemmas imply that (4.10) and (4.11) both hold, from which a 2 c2 /192coN 3 / 2 .
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If we impose the additional requirement of simplicity, the bound c2/ N on the
right side of (4.11) can be sharpened to a constant c3, because f is not close to linear
along the ABC... - BAC... edge - its values are always close to A or close to
B, except right near the threshold. By repeating the proof of Theorem 4.1, we then
find a lower bound for susceptibility of order N' rather than N 3 /2 , thus proving
Theorem 4.6. The details are in Appendix G.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Summary
This paper has advanced a new way to quantify the susceptibility of decision-making
mechanisms to strategic misbehavior, and argued its usefulness. We have focused here
on voting rules as a canonical choice of application, but our approach is applicable
quite broadly to other classes of mechanisms. Our measure of susceptibility is defined
as the maximum expected utility an agent could gain by acting strategically rather
than truthfully. To make this measure operational for voting rules, we needed a
normalization of utility to the range [0, 1], and an IID restriction on beliefs. Our
measure has a simple interpretation in terms of behavior, in which agents trade off
the benefits to manipulation against some (computational or psychological) costs.
To demonstrate the usefulness of this measure of susceptibility, we gave two classes
of results. The first consisted of concrete estimates of the susceptibility of various
voting systems. In particular (Table 3.1), we found that other systems previously
identified as resistant to manipulation, including the Black, Copeland, Fishburn,
minimax, and single transferable vote systems, actually are more susceptible than
plurality rule, by our worst-case measure of incentives. We also identified qualitative
properties of these voting systems that make them susceptible.
The second class of results consisted of lower bounds for the susceptibility of voting
rules satisfying various efficiency, regularity, and informational properties (Table 4.1).
These bounds illustrate how our measure can be used to study tradeoffs between
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susceptibility and other properties. The proofs are built on a few, widely generalizable
key ideas - such as susceptibility as the probability of being pivotal, the coarse
smoothing provided by the IID assumption, and the broader technique of introducing
quantitative error terms into impossibility proofs - thus showing how our measure
of susceptibility can be worked with in practice.
5.2 Onwards
This is an appropriate place to discuss directions for future research.
At the most immediate level, there are many ways to extend the analysis here
in technical directions. For example, one could seek lower bounds on susceptibility
under other regularity conditions, or consider probabilistic voting rules. One could
also consider different classes of probabilistic beliefs, in place of the IID model we have
used here. For example, we have stuck to a model in which the number of other voters,
N, is known with certainty, because this makes conditions such as monotonicity
easy to formulate; but one might find the Poisson model [42, 43], which describes
uncertainty about the population size as well as the distribution of preferences, to
be more realistic. Our approach could also be extended to consider manipulation by
coalitions.
A more important direction would be to apply our approach to measuring sus-
ceptibility to other classes of mechanism design problems. The third chapter of this
dissertation, which studies the quantitative tradeoff between incentives to manipulate
and efficiency in double auction environments, provides an example.
On a conceptual level, the approach to measuring susceptibility presented here
would be greatly improved by incorporating some description of the decision process
behind manipulation. The positive interpretation of our approach is based on a
comparison of costs and benefits to the manipulator, but the modeling of costs here is
simplistic - behaving strategically just always costs E. More realistically, it might be
harder to manipulate in some mechanisms than others. A computational model that
captures such distinctions would help in better understanding manipulative behavior.
Finally, a few words on how our approach fits into a broader agenda. There
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are two main paradigms in mechanism design theory. One is the dominant-strategy
paradigm [6, 58, 57]. This paradigm in effect evaluates mechanisms by their worst-case
performance. Positive results, when they exist, are extremely robust to uncertainty
about agents' beliefs, their assumptions about each other's strategic behavior, or
the details of their preferences over lotteries; but existence of dominant strategies
is a stringent requirement, and for many problems no dominant-strategy mechanism
exists.
The second paradigm is Bayesian: the theorist presumes a common prior distri-
bution over agents' types, assumes that agents maximize expected utility, and shows
how to construct a mechanism that maximizes the expectation of some objective, such
as welfare or revenue. The Bayesian paradigm allows for more positive results than
dominant strategies (e.g. [15]), but often depends on stringent common knowledge
assumptions that limit its practical usefulness [60].
The space in between the dominant-strategy and Bayesian approaches - explored
by the recent literature on robust mechanism design [9, 14, 61] - may offer new av-
enues to obtain robust positive results. The approach of the present paper fits into
this intermediate space: in the motivating model sketched in Subsection 1.3, we as-
sume that the voters are Bayesian expected utility maximizers, but the planner takes
a worst-case approach, with no probabilistic assumptions about the voters' prefer-
ences or beliefs (nor any requirement that voters' beliefs about each other correspond
to the truth). More generally, integrating elements of the Bayesian and worst-case
approaches will be valuable in bringing mechanism design theory closer to practice.
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A A consequentialist model
This appendix presents a game-theoretic model of voting rule choice by a social plan-
ner who cares about how well the outcome of the vote reflects the voters' preferences
(but not about whether manipulation occurs per se). The model fleshes out the ar-
gument sketched verbally in Section 1.3 to describe how our measure of susceptibility
would be involved in the choice of a voting rule. It is a formalization of the informal
arguments that have long been used to justify dominant-strategy mechanisms, with
a small cost of strategic behavior added in.
We imagine a planner choosing a voting rule for a society with N voters and M
candidates. After the planner chooses the rule, the voters' types - meaning their
preferences, beliefs, and their individual costs of manipulation - are realized. The
voters cast their votes, and the election result is determined.
In the main model, the planner evaluates voting rules by their worst-case perfor-
mance and is totally agnostic about what strategic voters will do, except that she
believes voters will not strategize if they cannot benefit by more than e from doing
so. This extreme agnosticism is meant to represent the idea that the planner finds es-
timating strategic incentives to be much easier than predicting in detail how strategic
voters will actually behave. (This models the trend in recent market design litera-
ture, such as [4, 12, 27, 28], which argues that incentives to manipulate in particular
mechanisms go to zero, without going into exactly what the optimal manipulations
would be.) However, our general point - that a quantitative measure of incentives
to manipulate is relevant to choice of mechanism - does not depend on extreme
agnosticism, as discussed further in Subsection A.5.
A.1 Planner's preferences
We assume the planner cares ultimately about the relationship between the voters'
preferences and the candidate who is elected. Thus, the planner has a utility func-
tion U : C x ([0, 1]M)N+1 -* R, specifying her utility for each candidate contingent
on all voters' preferences. To follow the ordinal framework of the main paper, we
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assume that the planner's preferences depend only on the voters' ordinal rankings of
candidates. So let >*: [0, 1]M -+ L be a given function, such that for each possible
utility function u C [0, 1]M, u weakly represents >-* (u). (The function >-* describes
how to convert cardinal preferences u to ordinal rankings; the choice of >-* (U) is
nontrivial only when tie-breaking is necessary.) We assume there exists a function
V: C x LN+1 -+ R such that
U(Ai; u1,..., UNV+1) - A ul), -. - -* UN+1))
for all Ai and all u1,.. ., UN+1- Let V denote the minimum value attained by V, over
all preference profiles and all outcomes A .
The planner is to choose from some nonempty set F of possible voting rules. We
assume that every f C F is surjective. We further assume that every f satisfies
V(f(P); P) > V
for every profile P. That is, the planner only considers voting rules with the follow-
ing property: as long as all voters vote honestly, catastrophically bad outcomes are
avoided.
A.2 Mathematical states of nature
The planner expects that voters will behave strategically, if doing so is worth the
cost E. In this case, she expects they will correctly solve their strategic optimization
problem. However, the planner's task of predicting voters' behavior is much more
complex than each individual voter's problem, since there may be many voting rules
that the planner could consider, and many preferences and beliefs that each voter
could potentially have. So we imagine that the planner does not know the solution to
each voter's problem. We represent the planner's ignorance by ambiguity about how
a voter's choice of vote maps to a distribution over outcomes (for a fixed distribution
over others' votes).
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More specifically, we model the planner's ignorance via mathematical states of
nature. A mathematical state is a continuous function
wK x L xA(L) -+ A(C).
(Continuity is relevant only to the third argument, since Y and L have discrete
topologies.) Let Q be the set of all possible mathematical states.
A mathematical state w has the following interpretation: in this state, if the
voting rule in use is f, a voter expects others' votes to follow distribution #, and he
reports preference >-, then he expects the outcome of the election will be distributed
according to w(f, >-, #). There is one "true" mathematical state wo, described by the
actual outcomes of each voting rule: for all f, >-, #, the distribution wo(f, >-, #) is
equal to the actual distribution over fQ-, P) that results if P ~ IID(#). But the
planner does not know the true state.
In any state w, the susceptibility of a voting rule f is given by the analogue of
(2.1):
(f)= sup (u(w(f , )) - u(w(f, >-, )).
(Here, and subsequently, we extend u to lotteries over C by linearity.) This definition
coincides with (2.1) in state wo.
We assume that, although the planner does not know the true state, she has
estimates on the susceptibility of each voting rule, which serve to narrow down the
possible states. Specifically, for each f E F, she knows that the susceptibility of
f is less than some exogenous upper bound -(f). We may have 5(f) > 1, which
corresponds to no knowledge about the susceptibility of f. (We do not model the
process by which the planner learns of these upper bounds. We could also assume the
planner knows lower bounds on susceptibilities; this would not change our results.)
With these upper bounds, the set of states the planner considers possible is
{* = w E o r,(f) < 5(f) for all f E T}.
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We assume that the planner's bounds are consistent with the truth: wO E Q*.
We will not need to specify a prior belief for the planner over Q*, because we will
assume she has maxmin preferences, as detailed below.
A.3 Voters' preferences
Each voter has a utility function on candidates, u: C -+ [0, 1], and a cost of behaving
strategically, E E [fj]. Thus, the space of basic types of the voters is
T = [0, I]M x If
The bounds E, E are commonly known parameters, with 0 < E < i and E < 1.
We assume there is some rich type space T of possible types for each voter, a
compact Polish space, together with two continuous maps: a basic type map p : T -+
T0 and a belief map # : T -- A(T). When a voter has rich type t, p(t) is his basic
type, and he believes other voters' rich types are drawn IID from the distribution
#(t). Let p : A(T) --+ A(T) be the induced map: if t is distributed according to /
on T, then 7P(#O) is the distribution of p(t).
We assume the type space is rich enough so that the map
p x (5 o 3) : T -> To x A(To)
is surjective. That is, any combination of own basic type and (first-order) belief about
others' basic types is possible.
Voters know the true mathematical state w. 8 Thus, each voter's type in the game-
theoretic sense consists of his type in T as well as the state W E Q. A (mixed) strategy
for a voter specifies a distribution over C, as a function of t E T and w E Q.
Voters have expected utility with respect to lotteries over candidates. The lottery
that results from any particular vote is determined by the mathematical state. Thus,
8This assumption is not intended to mean literally that voters are computationally stronger than
the planner; it is simply a technical shortcut to express that each voter can solve his own optimization
problem.
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in state a, for a voter with utility function u, if he votes > and expects others to vote
according to #, then his material payoff is u(w(f, >-, #)).
A.4 The game
The full timing of the game is as follows:
* The planner publicly announces a voting rule f E F.
* The voters' types in T are realized, as is the state Lo E Q*.
(The fact that the true state is always wo will not be relevant, since we are
studying the behavior of the planner, who does not know the true state.)
" Each voter chooses a preference ordering in L to report.
* The winning candidate is determined by applying f to the reported preferences.
Now, we need to specify payoffs. Consider a voter in state u;, with utility function
u, and strategizing cost e. His utility if he truthfully reports preference >-* (u), and
other voters' votes are IID draws from #, is
U P f, Mu, #)).
If the voter reports any other preference >-', then his utility is
u(w(f, >-, #)) - E.
As for the planner, her ex post preferences (given voters' utility functions and
the outcome of the vote) are given by the function U. Her ex ante preferences are
maxmin with respect to the voters' type profile and the mathematical state of nature:
she wishes to maximize
inf E[U(f(1,..,N+1) U1,---UN+1)1 (A. 1)
(tl,...,tN+1)ETN+l
wEQ*
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where the inf is over type profiles and mathematical states; each ui is the utility
component of voter i's basic type p(ti); and the expectation is over the reported
preferences ' determined by the (possibly mixed) strategies of the voters in state W.
Finally, our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, symmetric among
the voters. That is, in each state, the voters play a symmetric Bayesian equilib-
rium (where the incomplete information is about each other's types); and given the
strategies of the voters, the planner chooses a voting rule to maximize her utility
(A.1).
With the game laid out in detail, we can finally state the proposition tying sus-
ceptibility to the planner's choice of a rule.
Proposition A.1 If there exists a voting rule f G F whose known susceptibility
bound 5(f) is at most iE then in any equilibrium, the planner will choose such a
rule. Specifically, she will choose f to maximize minpCgN+1 V(f(P), P), subject to
(f) < g.
If no such f exists, then in any equilibrium, the planner is indifferent among all
voting rules; they all give her utility V.
The full proof is in Appendix D, but the argument is quite straightforward. If
the planner can choose a voting rule with susceptibility less than E, then she will
be certain that all voters will vote truthfully, giving the outcome that the voting
rule prescribes. On the other hand, if the planner cannot choose such a voting rule,
then she cannot rule out the possibility that the voters will manipulate in the worst
possible way, because the mathematical state and the voters' beliefs may be such that
this manipulation is optimal for each voter.
A.5 Variants
The preceding positive model gives a simple connection from our measure of suscep-
tibility to a planner's choice of voting rule. We briefly sketch here several ways to
extend the model, that would retain or strengthen this connection.
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(a) We have considered here a model of a single election, leading to the conclusion
that the planner would choose a voting rule whose susceptibility is known to
be less than e, if one exists. With a large number of elections, the model could
justify choosing a voting rule f whose known susceptibility bound oj is as small
as possible.
To be more specific, suppose that the planner anticipates the voting rule being
used for many elections, some more important than others. Importance is rep-
resented by an upper bound U on voters' utilities from the outcome. Thus for
each election there is a type space '1f, in which voters' utility functions have
range [0, U] rather than [0, 1]; whereas the bounds 6, - on manipulation costs are
constant across elections. The planner has a belief C about the distribution of U
across elections, with full support [0, oo]. The planner's total utility is the long-
run average of her utilities from each election. For a large number of elections,
we can express this as an expectation. Thus the planner's utility becomes
inf E([U (f(, . N+1);U1, - - -UN+1)) d(U)-/o (ti,...,tN+1)E'1':+1
Then the planner's choice of voting rule depends on the tradeoff between suscep-
tibility and the desirability of the outcomes that result under honest behavior.
If the planner is very risk-averse in terms of outcomes - i.e. V is very low
compared to other values of V - then in equilibrium she will simply choose a
voting rule f E F whose susceptibility bound is as low as possible.
(b) We could also suppose that the planner has some inherent preference for non-
consequentialist properties of the voting rule - say, regularity properties. This
could be represented by preferences of the form
inf E[U(f (>1, ... 'N+1)1 ul, ... , UN+1) + H(f)
(ti,---rN1)
where H : F -+ R is some function expressing the planner's preference over
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these other properties. In such a model, the choice of voting rule would depend
on the tradeoff between susceptibility and other properties.
(c) The preceding model makes extreme assumptions in terms of the players' knowl-
edge. On one hand, the voters know the mathematical state perfectly: they are
able to optimize their material payoffs exactly (if they choose to do so). On the
other hand, the planner knows nothing about how voters will behave, except
that they will not manipulate when the gain is definitely less than E.
However, in a model where agents might not manipulate optimally, or where
the planner had some idea how agents manipulate, our general approach to
quantifying incentives would remain relevant. Susceptibility would just have to
be redefined, not as the maximum incentive for any manipulation, but as the
maximum incentive specifically for manipulations that could potentially lead to
undesirable outcomes (suitably defined).
The third chapter of this dissertation, on double auctions, explores the conse-
quences of one such model in more detail. There, we assume no uncertainty
about mathematical states. On the other hand, rather than optimizing exactly,
the agents may potentially attempt any manipulation that gives them at least
E expected utility gain over truthfulness. The planner would like to minimize
the maximum amount of inefficiency that can result from such manipulations.
The analysis of this problem uses quite similar methods to the analysis of the
tradeoff between susceptibility (as originally defined) and inefficiency.
B Approval voting
In approval voting, each voter names a set of candidates, interpreted as the candi-
dates who receive his approval. Whichever candidate receives the largest number of
approvals wins. (As usual, we assume ties are broken alphabetically.)
Approval voting has often been specifically advocated as resistant to strategic
manipulation [11, 21], so it is natural to ask how it fares under our approach to
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measuring susceptibility. We have not addressed approval voting in the main paper
because it does not fit into our framework. It requires voters to submit a set of
approved candidates, rather than a ranking. More importantly, we have presumed
that there is an unambiguous way to vote truthfully, for any given utility function
u. In the case of approval voting, it is unclear how a voter should decide how many
candidates to approve. This clashes with our motivating assumption - that truthful
voting is costless - since the need for strategic calculation is now unavoidable. (Niemi
[44] also argued that approval voting actually encourages strategic behavior for this
reason.)
Still, it is possible to adapt our framework to formally cover approval voting, or
vice versa. Here we present two possible ways of doing so. The discussion will be less
detailed than in the main text.
B.1 Multiple truthful strategies
We could simply allow that multiple strategies by voters are deemed truthful. In the
case of approval voting, we might specify that it is truthful to approve a set S C C if
S consists of the L most-preferred candidates, for some L. That is, S is sincere for a
utility function u if, whenever A, E S and u(Ai) > u(Aj), then Ai E S as well. (This
is the definition used in previous literature on approval voting [11, 21].) We could
then define the susceptibility of approval voting to be the maximum gain from voting
strategically, relative to voting sincerely.
To be precise, let S denote the set of all subsets of C. The natural modification
of the definition (2.1) for approval voting would then be
0- = sup (sup(EIID() [U(f S', P)))) - sup(EIID(#) [U(f (S, P))])), (B.1)
u,# \ S' S
where
" the outer supremum is over preferences u E [0, 1]M and beliefs # E A(S);
" the first inner supremum is over arbitrary S' C C;
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e the second inner supremum is over S that are sincere for u.
Notice that all suprema are taken over compact sets, so in fact we could write max
instead of sup. (Alternatively, we could continue restricting u to have no indifferences,
as in the main text.)
With this approach, we can show that when M > 4, approval voting has suscep-
tibility ;> 1/4. In particular, its susceptibility does not go to zero as N -- oo.
Let the manipulator's true preference be BADC..., with the utility function
u(B) = 1, u(A) = 1/2 + E, u(D) = 1/2 - E, u(any other candidate) <; E
for arbitrarily small e. Suppose the manipulator's belief # is that each other voter
approves {A, B} with probability 1/2 and {C, D} with probability 1/2.
With probability - 1/2, a majority of other voters vote {A, B}. In this case, the
manipulator is pivotal between A and B: if he votes for B but not A, then B wins;
otherwise, A wins. With probability - 1/2, a majority of other voters vote {C, D},
and the manipulator is pivotal between C and D. (The other voters may be exactly
evenly split, but the probability of this event goes to 0 as N -> oo, so we disregard
it.)
Hence, if the manipulator votes {B}, his expected utility is ~ ju(B) + lu(C) ~
1/2. If he votes {B, A, D}, then his expected utility is ~ ju(A) + lu(D) ~ 1/2. And
with any other sincere vote, his expected utility is ~ ju(A) + lu(C) ~ 1/4.
However, with the manipulation S' = {B, D}, his expected utility is ~ ju(B) +
lu(D) ~ 3/4. Thus the gain from strategic voting expressed in (B.1) is approximately
1/4 as N -> oo. Only by being insincere can the manipulator ensure that he gets the
preferred outcome in both likely situations.
Why do our results here conflict with the view of previous literature, that approval
voting resists manipulation? Unlike in Section 3, where the main issue was how to
quantify manipulation, the basic difference here is one of modeling assumptions. The
arguments in [11, 21] in favor of the strategic properties of approval voting assume
that voters partition the candidates into three or fewer indifference classes. Indeed,
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in the case M = 3, voting sincerely is always optimal (o as defined in (B.1) is
zero). However, our argument shows that this finding breaks down severely as soon
as M > 4. Indeed, Brams and Fishburn [11] were aware of this; they give an example
that is almost identical to ours.
B.2 Approval with status quo
An alternative way to model approval voting, without leaving the framework of the
main paper, would be to specify an unambiguous choice of truthful vote for each
preference order. For example, we could choose a particular candidate (here we will
use A) as status quo, and declare that voters should approve all candidates who are
preferred to the status quo.
Thus, the voting system approval voting with status quo is defined as follows:
Each voter submits a preference order. Each candidate receives a score, defined as
the number of voters who prefer her over A. The candidate with the highest score
wins; ties are broken alphabetically. If every voter ranks A first, then A wins.
Then we can apply our usual definition (2.1) of susceptibility. In this case, we
find that approval voting with status quo has susceptibility 1, similarly to Q-approval
voting. Indeed, suppose that the manipulator has preference CBA... but expects
that every other voter will vote BCA ... with probability 1. Then, with probability
1, sincere voting will lead to the outcome B (by alphabetical tie-breaking); whereas
the manipulation CA ... will lead to the better outcome C.
Thus, with this modeling approach, we again find approval voting to be highly
susceptible to manipulation.
C Computational tools
The present section gathers a collection of technical tools used in subsequent calcu-
lations. It includes proofs of the preliminary results stated in Subsection 2.2 of the
main paper.
The following notation, not introduced in the main paper, will be useful here and
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subsequently. For a vector x = (X1,... , ,.), we will write X-k for the vector of all
components except zk, and X-jk for the vector of all components except xz and Xk;
and Xijk similarly. We will write Xj+k for the sum of components x and Xk. Notice
that if Xjk and El x, are given then Xj+k is uniquely determined.
One other useful bit of notation: if f is a function of N and c a constant, we write
f(N) ~ c to say that f(N) converges exponentially fast to c, i.e. If(N) - c < e-N
for some A > 0 (as in the statement of Lemma 2.2(a)).
Lemma CA (Stirling's approximation) For any positive integer K,
K! = 42,r K(K/e)KL with 1 < t < e1/1 2K
We cite this without proof; see e.g. [1, eq. 6.1.38].
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Expand the probability explicitly, and apply Lemma
C.1 to the factorials. Since the t factors all tend to 1 as N -- oo, we get
S XN N;ON
N -xN 1 - 3N
2N N , xN(1 - N N-XN
2 7N (X N -2r(N - XN) (N-xN)N-xN
,3NN xN (1 - ON)N N-xN1
\ XN \V - XN J 2rN/3N(1 ~-ON)
We know 3 N - 43 (since ~(3 -/ 3,N)NI < 2c), so the result will follow if we can show
NN XN (1 -ON)NJN-XN
xN NV -XN
-* 1. (C.1)
Now, the logarithm of the left-hand side of (C.1) is Nh(XN/N,#fN), where
h(-y, 6) = -y(In 6 - In y) + (1 - -y)(ln(1 - 6) - ln(1 - -)).
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The derivative of h with respect to its first argument is
Oh
07
6 1 - J
= In - - In
7 1 - -Y
In particular, Oh/O-y is continuous on (0, 1) x (0, 1) and is zero when = 6. We also
have h(#N, ON) = 0, and so
Nh N ) < N N- 3N- max h (7, ON)
Oh
< c- max (,#N)
-(E [:N,3N] '9Y
Oh
-4C - (##(9-
=0.
(The notation assumes XN/N < 3 N, but of course an identical argument applies when
ON < IN/N.) Then (C.1) follows. 0
Proof of Lemma 2.3: Taking logs and ignoring the constant, we see the problem
is to maximize E> xi In ai subject to Ei ai = 1. This is a concave maximization
problem; the solution is given by the first-order condition xo/ai = A for all i, where
A is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. Hence the ai must be proportional to
the x at the maximum. L
Lemma C.2 For 1 < q < r, we have
P(
X 1
Xr
K;
al
ar
-P
Xq
al
K;
aq
a
Xq+1
Xr
aq+1/a
ar/a I
where x = xq+1 + - - -+ Xr and a = aq+1 + -- -+ a. (assuming a > 0).
This is the familiar decomposition property of the multinomial distribution: given
that K - x voters are of the first q types and the remaining x voters are of the
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remaining r - q types, the distribution of types among the last x voters is independent
of the distribution among the first K -x voters (and in particular is again multinomial
M(X; aq+i/, ... , ar /a,).
Proof: Immediate from the definitions. 0
Lemma C.3
S P(, N - x I N; a,1 - a) = (1+ (1 - 2a)N)/2.
x even
Proof: Write the right-hand side as (((1 - a) + a)N + ((1 - a) - a)N)/2; ex-
panding by the binomial theorem, the terms with odd powers of a cancel and we get
Ex even (N) (I _ a)N-xax which is the left-hand side. D
Proof of Lemma 2.2:
(a) Choose E sufficiently small such that if (a1,..., a,) c J and 113 - aj < E for
each index j, then 01,...,#3, must still satisfy the inequalities I. (We can do
this since J is compact and the inequalities _I carve out an open set.) We can
find K < 1 such that
# o(1 - #)-l < K for all o,# E [0,1] with 1/# - al > E, (C.2)
where we interpret 00 as 1. Indeed, the denominator of the left side of (C.2)
is bounded away from 0, whereas as a -+ 0 the numerator is < aE and so
converges uniformly to 0 for # E [E, 1]; likewise as a -+ 1 the numerator is
< (1 - a) E and so converges uniformly to 0 for / E [0, 1 - E]. This shows that
for some q > 0, we can choose K < 1 to ensure that (C.2) holds when a < q or
a > 1 - q. Otherwise, use the fact that the logarithm of the left side of (C.2)
is #(In a - In #) + (1 - 3)(ln(1 - a) - ln(1 - #)). This expression is continuous
on the rectangle [a, #] E [77, 1 -q] x [0, 1], and takes its maximum value of zero
only at a = 3 (by Lemma 2.3), and therefore is bounded strictly below 0 for
la - #1;> E. Statement (C.2) follows.
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Now take any (ai, ... , a,) E J. Consider any given index j, and any value xi
with |xj/N - aj > E. Let #j = x/N. The probability that the realized j-th
component is x, is
P N; X P N; x
N - X 1 - a N -z 1-#i'3
(a -(1 - 1--i
< KN
There are r possible choices of index j and at most N + 1 values x to consider
for any given j, so the total probability that some event Ixz/N - a| > E occurs
is at most r(N + I)N. This bound still decays exponentially in N, and is
independent of the choice of (ai, ... , ar) E J.
(b) Fix arbitrarily small E > 0. We will show that
1 2 1 2
- < P(SN n Ti, I N;ai .. .,) < - c ) (C.3)2 7r (2aj + e) N ~-' 2 7r(2ai - e)N
and the conclusion will follow by taking E -+ 0.
Let SN = {(Xi,... , Xr) | (2ai - E)N < x + xz < (2ai + e)N}. By (a), the
probability of drawing a profile in SI and the probability of drawing a profile
in S both go to 1 exponentially as N -* o.
Let 57 be the set of profiles such that xi - zy - y is even, or equivalently
xi + x - y is even. Certainly Ti,, g Sr. From Lemma C.2, (Xi + Xi, kEi,j Xk)
is multinomial with parameters N; ai + aj, 1 - (ai + a3 ). So the probability
of drawing a profile in Sg' is (1 ± (1 - 2(ai + aj))N)/2, by Lemma C.3. This
converges exponentially to 1/2 as N -+ oo.
Write PN for the probability that P E Ti,,, conditional on P E SN nl S,. Be-
cause the probabilities of drawing profiles inSi, T, S' converge exponentially
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to 1, 1,1/2 respectively, it suffices to show that PN satisfies
2 2
Ce -- < PN < 2(C.4)7r(2ai + e)N r(2ai - E)N
and then (C.3) will follow.
For any given N, fix any value of the subvector x-ij, such that
(1 - 2ai - E)N < 5 Xk < (1 - 2ai + e)N
koi,j
and
zi+j = N - EXk is the same parity as y.
kji,j
Also write x" and zgi for the maximum and minimum possible values of xi+j
subject to these conditions. Note that whether or not P E S' fl Sgr depends
only on z-ig.
Conditional on the values xij, the remaining coordinates (xi, xj) are distributed
M(xi+j; 1/2,1/2) by Lemma C.2. Moreover x E Tij,v if and only if xi - zj = y,
or equivalently x = (xi+j + y)/2 (which is an integer). Hence, conditional on
x-ij, the probability that x E Tiv is
((=(i+ + y)/ 2  1/2
hpz~)= P ii -
(zi+j - y)/2 1/2
Applying Lemma 2.1 together with Xzi ~ (2ai - e)N, x"f ~ (2ai + E)N gives
2 22 -< min hz (xi+j) < max h. (zi+j )
ir(2ai + E)N xi+ Xi+j ~ r(2ai - e)N'
where the maxima are taken over xi+j E [X mn <]. For each realization
of xzig, the conditional probability of x E Ti,y lies between min hy(xi+j) and
max hy(xi+j), so the overall probability of x E Ti,y also lies in between these
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bounds. At this point (C.4) follows.
As already shown, this in turn implies (C.3), and the proof of part (b) is com-
plete.
Proof of Lemma 2.4: For any K, the maximum is attained by a = K/N by
Lemma 2.3. Hence it suffices to study the behavior with respect to K of the expression
(N) (K/N)K((N - K)/N)N-K, or equivalently of b(K) = KK(N - K)N-K/K!(N -
K)!. In particular, by symmetry it suffices to show that b(K) is strictly increasing
for K > N/2.
Put c(K) = KK/K!. Notice that c(K+ 1)/c(K) = (1 + 1/K)K which is increasing
in K (this can be verified directly by taking the logarithm and differentiating). Hence
for K > N/2 we have
b(K + 1) c(K + 1)c(N - K - 1) c(K + 1) c(N - K) >1
b(K) c(K)c(N - K) c(K) c(N - K - 1)
because K> N - K - 1. El
Next we give a simple bound on the probability of large deviations under multi-
nomial distributions.
Lemma C.4 For all N, K, a,
N(a-K/N)2
P(K, N - K I N; a, 1 - a) < e-N 2 .
(One can obtain a slightly stronger bound from Hoeffding's Inequality [24], but
the proof here is self-contained.)
Proof: Consider the function h(a) = In P(K, N - K I N; a, 1 - a), whose max-
imum is at a = K/N by Lemma 2.3, and its value there is certainly at most 0.
Moreover d2h/da2 = -(K/a 2 + (N - K)/(1 - a) 2 ). Now by Cauchy-Schwarz,
+ N - K a2 + 1-a)2) (NK + VN - K) 2>N.
a2 (1+ a)2
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Then d2 h/da2 < -N so h(a) < -N(a - K/N) 2 /2.
The next two results concern the quantity o-* , defined in Subsection 3.1.
ED
Lemma C.5
1 2 1 2N
e 3(N-1) - o 612N
rN < r(N2 _ 1).-
Proof: Put a = 1/2 if N is even and (N - 1)/2N if N is odd. By Lemma C.1,
write
[taN(aN/e)ON 27raN] -
where the three t terms
to
o-) = aaN _ (1-a)N _
LN(N/e)N 2,N aN _ (1-a)N
[t(1-)N ((1 - a)N/e)(1-a)N V27r(1 - a)N]
satisfy 1 < t, < e/12x. Cancelling common factors reduces
LN
taN t(1-a)N 27rNa(1 - a)
Both aN and (1 - a)N are at least (N - 1)/2, hence e-1/3(N-1) < tN/aNtc(1-a)N <
el/12N; and a(1 - a) E {(N - 1)2 /4N 2, 1/4}, hence the square-root term is either
V2/TrN or V2N/7r(N 2 
- 1).
Corollary C.6 o-* is decreasing in N.
Proof: For N < 15, o <o 1 can be verified by direct computation. For N > 15,
Lemma C.5 implies that it is sufficient to check that
e i N 2 _ e 3(N-2) (C.5)
or equivalently
N_ 1 N
Since ((N + 1)/N)N+l > e, we have }N/(N + 1) < e-1/ 2 (N+1), So (C.6) follows from
the inequality 1/12N + 1/3(N - 2) < 1/2(N + 1) which holds for N > 15. O
We provide a few more useful bounds.
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Lemma C.7 If x, y > K > 0, then for all a we have
P(x,y | X+y; a, 1 -a)< 'r.
Proof: By Lemma 2.3, the probability is maximized by taking a = x/(x + y). In
this case, we can write the probability explicitly using Lemma C.1 and simplify as in
Lemma C.5 to obtain
(x
P y
X/(x + y) e1 / 1 2  27r(x + y)
y/(X + y) 27rx 2iry
Either (x + y)/x < 2 or (x + y)/y < 2, so we can cancel the numerator radical with
one of the denominator radicals and a V2 factor, and the result follows. O
Lemma C.8 There exists an absolute constant c > 0 with the following property.
For every positive integer N and every nonempty subset S C {0,... , N}, there exists
a 2 max(S)/N such that
K-i
N-K+1
a
N;
Proof: It suffices to prove the lemma when S = {K}. Indeed, since P(K, N -
K I N; a, 1 - a) is increasing in K when K < a(N + 1), every term on the left-hand
side of the inequality in the lemma is nonnegative as long as a 2 max(S)/N, so it
suffices to show that the term corresponding to K = max(S) is at least c/N.
So let S = {K}. If K = N then take a = 1. If K = 0 then take a = 0. Otherwise,
let L = K + L/ K(N - K)/NJ; we will show that a = L/N does the job. (Note that
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K
N-K
a
N; -P
1 - a
C
N.P
KES (
L < N, i.e. a < 1.) We have
K-i
N-K+1
a
1-a )
N
- 1
a
1-a)
a
1-a>
K
1-
N-K+1
Now, the middle bracketed expression is a product consisting of L - K factors,
each of which is greater than
K 1-a K(N - L) 1
N-K a L(N - K) - L-K
(to verify the last inequality, cross-multiply and rearrange terms to find that it is
equivalent to (L - K) 2N < L(N - K), which is true). Hence this product is
L-K) -4
as long as L - K > 2. Otherwise, L - K = 0 and the middle product is empty, or
else L - K = 1 and the middle product equals (N - K - 1)/(N - K) > 1/2 (notice
that if K = N - 1 then L = K). Hence in every case the middle bracketed expression
is > 1/4.
It therefore suffices to show that there is some constant c' such that the bound
/
L a ~ K 1-a] c';N-L i-a N-K+1 a > N (C7)
always holds. We split into three cases.
* Suppose K < N/2 and L > K. The P( ... ) factor is bounded below by -* >
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K
N-K
P ( N;7 1-a
P
N-
L
=P
(N-
K
L
N
N;
K 1-al
N-K+1 a
[L-1 k+11 
-a
.k=N-k a
*1-a]
2/7rN, by Lemma 2.4. Also, L - K
L - K < K, so
K 1-a1- -
N-K+1 a
where there last step uses the assumptioi
on the left side of (C.7) is bounded beloi
> 0 implies (1/2) K(N - K)/N <
K(N - L)
L(N - K)
(L - K)N
L(N - K)
L-K
L
L-K
2K
iNK
4 NK
11 1
n K < N/2. So each of the two factors
v by a constant times F1/N.
* Suppose K > N/2 and L > K. In this case, we apply Stirling's approximation
(C.1) as usual to observe that P(L, N - L I N; a, 1 - a) is bounded below
by a constant times VN/L(N - L). Combining with the chain of inequalities
from the previous case, we see that the left side of (C.7) is bounded below by a
constant times
N 1
L(N - L) 4
N-K 1 N N-K 1 1
NK - 4 K(N - K) NK 4K 4N
* Finally suppose L = K. This can only happen for K = 1 or N - 1, or for small
N (which we can ignore since the result is asymptotic), and so we verify (C.7)
directly in these cases. We have P(L, N - L I N; a, 1 - a) = ((N - 1)/N)N-1
1/e, a constant. If K = 1 then the second factor in (C.7) is 1/N; if K = N - 1
then this factor is 1/2.
This verifies that (C.7) holds in every case.
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Lemma C.9 Fix any positive constant c. If N is taken large enough and a - c/l VN
then
N
EP
K
N-K
N; 1a ~
(Actually the left side goes to zero exponentially fast in VW, but this very crude
bound is all we will need.)
Proof: Put p(K) = P(K, N - K I N; a, 1 - a). We have
p(K+1) = N-K a <N-K
p(K) K+1 1-a- K
a
1-a
1
whenever K > 2Na. Since p(K) < 1 for K = |2Na~, we have by induction p(K) <
1/ 2 K-[2Na] for K > 2Na, and therefore by the expression in the lemma statement is
at most
1 1 1 1
2K2-[2a] 2 3Na]-2Na]- 1 - 2 cv--2 N'K= 3Na]
The remaining lemmas in this section are bounds on certain alternating sums of
multinomial probabilities. These bounds are useful for the construction in Appendix
H.
If S is a set of positive integers, let u(S) and 7r(S) denote, respectively, the sum
and the product of elements of S (with o-(0) = 0, 7r(0) = 1).
Lemma C.10 Fix e > 0 and a G (0,1/2), and fix a positive integer d. There exists
a threshold No with the following property: For all N > No, all a C [a,1 - a], all
integers K, and all sets S of positive integers with |SI = d,
Z(-1)TIP
TCS
K - o-(T)
N - K +o-(T)
N < 7r(S)N-d 2 ).
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Proof: The expression inside the absolute value is (up to a sign) the coefficient
of zK in the polynomial
Qa,s(z) = [(Zs - 1)]
.sS _
-- (az + (1 - a))N
This coefficient is also expressible as
L
L Z(-KIQsaS W)
where L is any integer greater than the degree of Qc,,s and ( is a primitive Lth root of
unity. Therefore, it suffices to show that for some No the following holds: whenever
N > No, for all choices of S and a and every complex number z with IzI = 1,
(C.8)|Qa,s(z)I < -r(S) N-I A.
We consider two cases for z. Let 9 = arg z.
Suppose 101 < N-1 /2 E. Then Iz - 11 < N(/ 2-e), from which
1) < sIz - 11 < sN-(1/2-e>
and then multiplying across all s E S, together with Iaz + (1 - a)| < 1, gives
the result.
9 Otherwise, 101 > N-1/ 2-E. As long as N is not too small,
Iaz + (1 - a)|12 = (1-a+acos) 2 +(asin 0) 2
= (1- a) 2 + a 2 + 2(1 - a)a cos 0
< (1-a) 2 + a 2 + 2(1 - a)a 1 N1- 2e
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z"- 1|1 z' (Z -
t=0
(this follows from cos 2 N- 1/2-E = 1 - sin 2 N-1/ 2-: > 1 - 1/4N- 2e)
< (1- )2 + ae2 + 2(1 - a I 1 8N1-2e:
_(1 -a)a
= 1 4N-2E
< 1 C,
where c' = (1 - a)a/4. Hence
|az + (1 - a)IN < (I - cN-(1-2e))N/2
= [( - c'N-(1 2e)) N -2e /2 N2e
< [exp(-c') 1/ 2] Ne
< )/2
as long as N is larger than some threshold that depends only on a, E, d. Since
also Iz' - 1| < 2 for each s E S, the bound (C.8) follows.
Lemma C.11 Fix a positive integer d. For any positive integer h, there exists a
partition of the set Z = {0, 1,... , 2hd - 1} into 2h subsets Zo, Z1,..., Z 2h-1 , of size
2 h(d-1) each, so that the following property is satisfied:
For any e > 0 and a c (0,1/2), there exists a threshold No such that for all
N > No all a G [a, 1 - a], and all integers K,
K-x
N-K+x
a
N; - P
1-a sez, ( K-xN-K+x
< 2h~d2+d-1)hNd(i-')
for any two sets Zi, Zj of the partition.
Proof: We first describe the partition. Consider each of the numbers 0,1,...,
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EP
xez,
N;
a
1-a )
2 hd - 1 written out as a binary string with hd digits. We assign each such number x
to a subset Zi as follows:
9 Divide the hd digits of x into h segments of d digits each;
e next, replace each segment with a 0 or a 1, depending whether the number of
l's in that segment is even or odd;
e finally, read the resulting h-digit string as a binary number i E {0, 1, ... , 2h --11
and assign x to Zi.
It should be clear that each Zi consists of exactly 2 h(d--1) values x.
Now let No be the threshold given by Lemma C.10, with the same c, a, d as in the
current lemma. Assume N > No, and let a E [G, 1 - a] be arbitrary.
Define
E(a, Zi, N, K) = P N;.
XEZi N- K +x 1 - a
It suffices to show that if the binary representations of i and j differ by just one digit,
then for all K,
|E(a, Zi, N, K) - E(a, Zj, N, K)I < 2 h(2d1)Nd(-). (C.9)
Indeed, since one can get from any i to any j by at most h single-digit changes,
applying (C.9) repeatedly will then imply
jE(a, Zi, N, K) - E(a, Z3 , N, K)J < 2 h d2+d1)hN-d( -) (C.10)
which is exactly the assertion of the current lemma.
Without loss of generality, i has a 0 in the (r + 1)th position from the right, while
j has a 1 in that position; all other digits in the binary representations of i and j are
the same. Then define three sets Z, Zi, Zj:
e Z consists of all values of x C Zi such that the (dr + 1)th, (dr +2)th, ... , (dr +
d)th digits from the right are all 0;
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Z4 consists of all numbers that can be represented as a sum of an even number
of elements of the set { 2 dr, 2 dr+1, ... , 2 dr+d-1}
e Z consists of all numbers that can be represented as a sum of an odd number
of elements of {2 ', 2 r+1 ... 2 d+d-1}
Then, Zi consists of numbers that can be represented as a sum of an element of Z'
and one of Zj, and for each such number, the representation is unique. Likewise Zj
consists of numbers that can be represented (uniquely) as a sum of an element of Z'
and one of Zj.
Applying the conclusion of Lemma C.10 with S = {2dr, 2d+1, ... , 2 dr+d-1}, and
using the easy bound r(S) < 2d(dr+d-1), gives the following: for any K,
Y, K-x a EK-x aEP(N N; l )-x P(N N;
xzz N-K+x 1a x E z N-K+x 1- a
< 2d rd1) N-i~. (C. 11)
Now replace K by K - y for each possible y E Z , and sum over all y. We have
E IP (\K-y-x a ) K-x 
a )
YEZxEZ ( N-K+y+ x 1- a EZ N-K+x 1-a
and likewise for Zj and Z-. Thus, summing (C.11) over the 2 (d-1)(h-1) choices of
y C ZO and then applying the triangle inequality gives
|E(a, Zj,N, K) -E(a, Zy,N, K)| < 2(-(-1 -2 d~-1N-n -2
i (d-1)(h-1)+d(hd-1) -d(!~E).
Since (d - 1)(h - 1) + d(hd - 1) h(d 2 + d - 1), (C.9) follows. O
D Assorted shorter proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
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(a) The argument is actually slightly more complex than that given in the main
text, because the alphabetical tie-breaking leads to different cases depending
on the parity of N.
If N is even, let the manipulator's preferences be ACB ... , and let the opponent-
profile P be distributed according to # = (1 B, 1 C) (only voters' top choices
matter). Then the manipulator cannot change the outcome except in the case
P = ($ B, E C), in which case strategically voting for C instead of A bene-
ficially changes the outcome from B to C. If N is odd, let the preferences be
ABC..., and let = (N1 B, i C). Then the manipulator is pivotal pre-
cisely when the opponent-profile is P = (N-1 B, N11 C), in which case voting
for B changes the outcome from C to B. In both cases, the probability of being
pivotal (2.3) is o-*y.
(b) First we prove the lower bound. Consider any small e > 0. Let the manipulator's
preference be ABC..., and consider a distribution # E A(C) of the other voters'
first-place votes such that B and C are each chosen with probability L +e, and
every other candidate is chosen with probabilityy- 12.
Consider susceptibility as formulated in (2.3), where the proposed manipulation
' is one that ranks B first, and the set C+ of desirable candidates is {A, B}.
Write the relevant expectation as
o- E [I(f( ',P) C+) - I(f(, P) C+)] P(P | N;). (D.1)
P
(We write > rather than =, since we are considering a specific distribution #
rather than the max.) Say that an opponent-profile P is relevant if B and
C both receive a vote share between 1/M + e/2 and 1/M + 3e/2, and every
other candidate receives less than 1/M of the vote. By Lemma 2.2(a), the
probability that the realized profile is relevant is ~ 1, so we need only consider
the contribution of the relevant profiles to (D.1). For any such profile (assuming
N is large enough), no matter what the manipulator does, the outcome will
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be either B or C. The relevant profiles that contribute to (D. 1) are exactly
the ones where the manipulator is pivotal in changing the outcome from C
to B - that is, the ones for which B receives exactly one less vote than C.
It follows from Lemma 2.2(b) that the total probability of these profiles is
(1/2) 1/r (i + E) N. (Here the lemma applies with B, C corresponding to
the indices i,j, and y = -1. Note that the definition of a relevant profile is a
set of linear inequalities on the vote shares.)
Thus we have
1 1
Taking E -+ 0 gives the lower bound in Proposition 3.2(b).
Now we prove the upper bound. For each value of N, consider the true prefer-
ence, manipulation, and belief # that attain the maximum in (2.3). (These may
vary depending on N, but we will not bother to make this dependence explicit
in the notation.) Suppose that, for a given N, the manipulator's true first choice
is Ai and the reported first choice is A,. This manipulation can be beneficial
only if it changes the outcome from Ak, for some k $ i, j, to A,. For each k, let
Sk, be the set of all N-profiles P such that f(Ai, P) = Ak and f(Aj, P) = Aj;
and let S-j = Ukzi,j Skj We wish to show that P(S_, I N; #) ,< NM/irN.
Now, consider again any fixed E > 0. For each k $ i, j, we have
max P(Sj | N; #) ~ 0. (D.2)
e: 4;>!(1+E)#k
Indeed, each opponent-profile P = (zi,..., xM) E Skj has Xj + 1, Xk ;> NIM,
and also xy = Xk or xj = 2k - 1. Consider such a profile P. Let p(Xjk) be
the conditional probability of realizing P, given that the components Xjk are
realized. By Lemmas C.2 and C.4,
xi pj I Oj+/( +k) --(xjx-#). (j ) 2/2P(X-jk)= P ( X Xj + k/G41%+ Ok) )<e(X~kO+k
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The squared expression in the exponent is bounded away from zero, while the
Xj + Xz factor is > N/M, so the upper bound goes to zero exponentially in
N. So, given any value of x jk, the conditional probability of realizing values
of xj and Xk for which the resulting profile is in Skj is bounded above by an
expression that decays exponentially in N. Hence the unconditional probability
of Skj satisfies this same exponential bound, and (D.2) holds.
On the other hand, the worst-case belief # cannot have P(S_,j I N; #) ~ 0,
since we already proved this probability satisfies a lower bound on the order of
1/N. Thus, as long as N is large enough, there must be some k* such that
#j < (1 + E)#k.. (This k* may not be unique, and may vary depending on N.)
Next, we claim that for any value of X-jk. there is at most one way of choosing
xj, Xk. (given the additional constraint E, x, = N) so that the resulting N-
profile lies in S_. Indeed, suppose for a contradiction that (xj, Xk*, X-jk*) E
S-j, and also (xj + s, Xk. - s, x-jk*) E Sj for some positive integer s. Then,
in particular,
f(xix + 1,Xk*,Xijk*) = Aj; (D.3)
f(xi +1, x + s,Xk* - S,Xijk*) = Aj 7 A, Aj. (D.4)
If s > 2, then the profile in (D.4) gives a (weakly) greater advantage for j
relative to 1 than the profile in (D.3) does, so if plurality rule chooses A3 in
(D.3) it should choose A, in (D.4) also, a contradiction. And if s = 1, then the
profile in (D.4) differs from that in (D.3) by a vote shift from Ak* to Aj, which
cannot change the winner from A, to A, - a contradiction again. Thus the
claim holds.
Consider any X-jk* such that there exist xj, Xk* for which the resulting profile lies
in S-,j. We will again bound the probability of realizing this profile, conditional
on X-jk*. For this pivotal profile, we must have Xj+k* 2 xj 2 (N + 1)/M - 1 >
N(1/M - E) (as long as N is large). The conditional probability of realizing
141
(Xj, Xk.) given Xzjk. is
p(z-jk.) - P zj j+k. -j(j 0
k. #0./(#% + #k*)
(i) If xz > (1 + 2e)Xk* then this probability p(Xzjk*) is bounded above by
an expression that decays exponentially in Xj+k. (by Lemma 2.2(a) and
#j < (1 + e)#k*). In particular, across all choices of zXjk* such that the
corresponding profile in Sj satisfies x > (1 + 2E)Xk*, the probability
p(Xzjk*) is bounded above uniformly by a quantity that decays exponen-
tially in N.
(ii) If x3 < (1 + 2E)Xk*, then (since we also have x + 1 > Xk*) we get Xj+k. >
N(2/M - &). Hence
p(X-jk*) < max P(x, y I x + y; a., ay).
x+y2N(2/M-3e)
x (1+2c)y
y<(1+2e:)x
For given x + y, the choices of x, y, ax, ay that attain the max are given by
Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, and we obtain
P(Xjk*) <K max P zy K; )
K>N(2/M-3e) K
with x = , y = K - x.2+ 2E
Denote the expression inside this maximum by j(K).
We have thus shown that the conditional probability of realizing (Xz, Xk*) form-
ing a profile in S_, given Xjk*, satisfies
P(Xjk*) 5 max{ce-AN, max j(K)}.
KN(2/M -3e)
(Here c, A are some positive values.) This inequality applies to the conditional
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probability of obtaining a profile x E Sgj, given X.jk*. So it also applies to the
unconditional probability of drawing a profile in S_,:
P (S- I N; #) < max{ce-AN, max j5(K)}.
K>N(2/M-3e)
Now, Lemma 2.1 gives
~(K) 1
27K ( l I (1+2E)-\2+2EF 2+2E/
Hence
P(S_ | N; #) < max ce-AN 27rN - - i +
(M 2+2f: 2+2e-
Clearly, for N large enough the square-root term dominates.
Finally, taking E -* 0 gives us the simpler asymptotic upper bound /M/-1rN,
which is what we wanted to show.
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
Given Proposition 3.2(a), we need only show o' ur -* Consider any true pref-
erence for the manipulator and proposed manipulation. For this proof only, label the
candidates so that the manipulator's preference is ABC, not necessarily correspond-
ing to the tie-breaking order. A manipulation from A to C can never be beneficial;
manipulation to B can be beneficial only when it changes the winner from C to B.
So we need to show that the probability of being pivotal from C to B is at most a*.
Let
SO = {(XA,XBXC) I XB = XC -1 XA},
S1 = {(A,XB,XC) I B X C XA +1}
The relevant set of pivotal profiles is contained either in So or Si (depending on which
of B, C wins a tiebreaker), so we just need to show that for any #, both So and Si
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are events of total probability at most o-*y.
Consider the # that maximizes P(So I N; #). Write # = (A, #B, c). We then
have #c > #A. Proof: Suppose not. Then
d
de[ IS N;4# --e,#B,#c +E)]
d N! (A-EIOB(C+fXZE-XBX)S A!XB!XC!B)N - E B (X #CC -~ eSc
dexA!xB!C (O C+E OA-E
(XA,XB,XC)SO
For E close to 0, the last factor in parentheses is always positive (since xc XA
throughout So). So changing the belief from (#A, #B, #c) to (#A - e, #5B, #c + E)
increases the probability of drawing a profile in So, contrary to the assumption that
the belief was chosen to maximize this probability.
Exactly the same reasoning applies for S1. Thus it suffices to show that each of
So, Si has probability at most o-* , assuming that the belief # = (#5, #5 , #c) satisfies
OA < #c. In particular, we may assume #A < 1/2.
We need to show four things:
(i) when N is odd, the probability of drawing a profile in So is at most o0-*;
(ii) when N is odd, the probability of Si is at most o-*;
(iii) when N is even, the probability of So is at most o-*;
(iv) when N is even, the probability of Si is at most o-*.
First consider (i), so N is odd. Then, for (XA, XB, XC) 6 So, we have XA even and
at most x2 = 2 [N/6], so
P(So I N;#) = E
XA even
O<XA Xmax
XA N; P XB N-xq5B
N-XA 1-A XC C
by Lemma C.2 (where #'/ = c = -C,). Since the relevant XB, xc are equal
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or differ by 1, Lemma 2.3 gives P(XB, XC I N - XA; #,# ') I N-2A, which in turn
is at most J~yrna by Corollary C.6. Hence, the above sum is at most
0 #
P N N; 1  N
N~x #A
P XA N; O*A 0
XA even N -A 1 - A2 <XA X2"
< P(0 N; (01 - 01 max) +
N 1 A - # X
XA #AL P L N; OI I a.
XA even N -x 1 - OA
In this last line, the first probability is (1 - #A)N, and the bracketed sum is the
probability that a binomial distribution with parameters N; #A produces an even
number of successes, which is (1 +(1 - 20A)N)/2 (Lemma C.3). Thus, the probability
of drawing a profile in So is at most
- -5A)(~ +1+ (1 -2A)N
h(#A) = (1 -#A)N *max) )N max(-* -ON A 2 0__A
Let us find the maximum of h on [0, 1/2] (since by assumption #A lies in this interval).
Differentiating gives
dh= -N [(1 - $A)N1 - Nmax) + (1- 20A)N-1 NmZ.
LO A Aj
This is negative if (1- 2 ) N-1 A* 
-I 20* _X _
1 - N xA
which holds precisely when #A is sufficiently small. Therefore h is initially decreasing
and then increasing, so the maximum occurs at one of the endpoints of the interval,
h(0) = a* or h max. + 2N -ax'
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The first of these is larger as long as o* 2 o-*g /2. Using the fact that N-xy" >
2N/3 and the bounds in Lemma C.5, we can verify that this always holds. Thus, we
have shown that the probability of drawing a profile in So is
P(So | N; #) h(#A) h(O) = o-*.
That takes care of (i).
Next we turn to (ii), where we consider the probability of drawing a profile in S1.
In this case, each such profile has XA odd and at most Xzax = 2 [N/6] + 1. Hence, by
similar calculations, the relevant probability is
A A (XB #B
P X N; P N - xA;
XA odd N -XA -- A XC C
<dP ( A N- OA max
LXA odd N - xA 1 - #A ^ X
The bracketed expression is the probability that a binomial distribution with param-
eters N; #A produces an odd number of successes, which is (1 - (1 - 2#A )N)/2 < 1/2.
(Remember that OA 1/2.) Therefore the probability of drawing a profile in Si is
at most u*- rax./2. This is less than o , again by straightforward use of the bounds
from Lemma C.5.
In case (iii), the relevant set of profiles again has XA odd and at most zm' =
2[N/6] + 1, so the reasoning used for (ii) applies again word for word.
Finally, in (iv), the relevant set of profiles has XA even and at most x" = 2 [N/6].
In this case the reasoning used for (i) applies again.
This covers all four cases (i)-(iv), so the probability that the manipulator is pivotal
is never more than o-*.
Proof of Proposition 3.5: Again, the tie-breaking assumption leads us to
split into cases depending on parity. First suppose M is even. Let the manipulator's
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preferences be A1A2 ... AM. Suppose the belief <p is
SA1A 2A 3 ...Am
SA 2A1A 3 ...Am
That is, all the other voters prefer Ai and A 2 , then the remaining candidates in numer-
ical order, but are evenly split between ranking Ai first or A2 first. The manipulator
considers manipulating by moving A2 to the bottom, thus reporting A1A3 ... AMA 2-
Regardless of whether the manipulator tells the truth or lies, A, will have a higher
score than A3, ... , Am, so the winner must be A, or A2. Suppose x of the other voters
rank Ai first, and the remaining N - x rank A2 first. The difference in scores between
Ai and A2 is (x+1)-(N-x) if the manipulator tells the truth and (x+M-1)-(N-x)
if he lies. Therefore, manipulation improves the outcome from A2 to A1 if
2x- N +I <0< 2x-N+M- 1
or equivalently
N - (M - 1) N - i
2 2
Otherwise, manipulation has no effect on the outcome.
Given that x has to be an integer, the possible values of x in this range are
[N/2 - K] for K = 1, 2,..., (M - 2)/2. For each such K, Lemma 2.1 tells us that
the probability that x = [N/2 - K] is ~ 12/irN. Therefore, the total probability
of being pivotal is ~ M 2 2/irN, and the result follows via (2.3).
Now suppose M is odd. The argument is essentially the same, except that we
have to consider different cases depending on the parity of N. If N is even, then we
consider exactly the same preferences, the same manipulation, and the same belief as
before. Again, the manipulator is pivotal if (N - (M - 1))/2 < x < (N - 1)/2. The
integer values of x in this range are N/2 - K for K = 1, 2, ... , (M - 1)/2.
If N is odd, then we reverse the roles of Ai and A2 throughout. Thus, the
manipulator's belief is the same as before, but his true preference is A2A1A3 ... Am,
and the proposed manipulation is A 2A 3 ... AMA1. Let x now denote the number
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of other voters who rank A2 first. Then the score of A2 minus the score of A1 is
(x + 1) - (N - x) if the manipulator tells the truth and (x + M - 1) - (N - x) if he
lies; in view of alphabetical tie-breaking, the manipulator is pivotal if
2x-N + 1<0< 2x-N+M- 1.
The integer values of x satisfying these inequalities are x = (N + 1)/2 - K for
K = 1,2, ... , (M - 1)/2.
So for both N even and N odd, the manipulator is pivotal when x = [N/2 -K for
some K = 1, 2, ... , (M - 1)/2. The total probability of this event is ~ M-1 2/wrN.
We next prove Lemma 4.8, the ancillary result en route to the local average lemma.
We use the notation f(#), fA (#) developed in Subsection 4.3 of the main paper.
Proof of Lemma 4.8: Put g(x) = fA (#1.
The proof is based on the following observation. Consider the definition (2.4) of
P, and take the partial derivative with respect to a parameter a (ignoring the fact
that our interpretation of (2.4) required ai + - - -+ ar = 1). We obtain
aP
( x1
Xi
Xr
ai
K; a
ar
=K - P
/
1xi -
x,
K - 1;
ai
a
ar
(D.5)
]I
On the right-hand side, xi has
Now consider the function
been replaced by xi -1 and all other
of x,
zj are unchanged.
fAi(4x) = P
f(P)=Ai CP N + 1;
The sum is over all (N + 1)-profiles P such that f (P) = A2 . Differentiating this sum
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a(1 - x)
ax
1 - a
;,J
Xi
\
term-by-term with respect to x, and applying (D.5), we obtain
d
d (fA(#)) = E (N -P(P- -/' I N; # i) - aN- P(P- >- N; #x)). (D.6)
f(P)=Ai
The interpretation of the P(P- >-' f...) term is that if P contains at least one -'
vote, then P- >-' is the N-profile consisting of P with a >-' removed, and otherwise
we simply interpret the whole term to be zero; similarly for the P(P- >|- - -) term.
Now (D.6) can be rewritten
fA(#)) = N P(PIN; #2)-  P(P I N; x).
Here the first sum is over N-profiles P with f(>-', P) = A , and the second is over P
with f(>-, P) = Aj. This in turn is equivalent to the difference given in the lemma
statement. l
We also include here the proof of the result in Appendix A. It is basically a routine
unwinding of definitions.
Proof of Proposition A.1: It suffices to show that for any symmetric equilib-
rium strategies of the voters, the following holds:
(a) if the planner chooses a voting rule f with 0(f) f then her utility is given by
minppgN+1 V(f (P), P);
(b) if she chooses f with (f) > E, then her utility is V.
Statement (a) holds because the voters will never manipulate. Specifically, suppose
the state is w C Q*. Then, o7(f) < -(f) < e. Consider a voter with utility function
u, manipulation cost E, and belief # about the types of the other voters. Composing
the strategy T of the other voters with 0 gives a probability distribution # E A(L),
so that other voters' actual reports are expected to be independent draws from 4.
Consider any manipulation >-'E L. From the definition of o-(f) we have
u(w(f, >', #)) - u(W(f, >-* (u), #)) os(f) < f < E.
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Equivalently,
U P , #0)) -e < U(w(f, >-* (n), )).
So the voter will choose to simply report the true preference >-* (u). Thus, in all
possible states w c Q*, each equilibrium strategy T of the voters will specify that
they always tell the truth. Then, whenever the voters' true preferences realize the
(ordinal) profile P, the planner's utility is V(f(P), P), regardless of the state. From
the maxmin specification of the planner's utility, claim (a) follows.
For (b), consider any f with -(f) > e. We know that there exist some preferences
>1,... , >-N+1 and reports ,..., >--N+1 such that
V(f(' 1 , ... , 'N+I)i 1, ... ,>-N+1) = V-
(This follows from the definition of V as the minimum value of V, and the fact that
f is surjective.) So our strategy will be to construct some state w C Q*, and some
types ti C T for the voters, such that each voter i has true preference >i but reports
>i in any equilibrium.
First we construct the state w, as follows. Fix a number a with e < a <
min{1,3(f)}. We first define ( : E x A(L) -> A(C) to be any continuous function
such that for all preferences >-, >-', >-"E E,
S( 2 , 1 , the top candidate in >-', with certainty if >- =>;
3 3 the bottom candidate in >-', with certainty otherwise.
This can be done, since we have only specified the values of ( at finitely many points.
Now, for the given voting rule f, we define w(f, A,) E (C) for all preferences
>- E 2 and all beliefs # C A(E), by
w(f, ,>-# ) = 5((>-,# ) + (1 -5) A1 .
That is, if the voting rule is f, then w chooses the output of ( with probability 5,
and otherwise just chooses the fixed candidate A1 as winner.
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For every other voting rule f' =f , any - E L and any # EA(L), put
W(f', >-, ) = wo(f', >-, #).
This completes the definition of w. It is straightforward to check that W is indeed a
continuous function: we need w(f, >-, #) to be continuous in #, but this follows from
continuity of (; and for each f' : f we need w(f', s,#) to be continuous in #, but
this follows from continuity for wo.
We check that w E Q*. Notice that under voting rule f in state W, each voter
cannot affect more than i probability mass of the outcome by changing his vote. It
immediately follows that
og(f) < < jf)
And for any other voting rule f', we have
w(f') = o (f') < (f')
by the assumption wo C Q*. Thus, the susceptibility bounds are satisfied, and W E Q*.
Next, for each voter i, we construct a type tj as follows:
" the utility function ui represents the preference >-j, and values the top candidate
at 1 and the bottom candidate at 0;
" the manipulation cost is E;
" the first-order belief about others' preferences is that every other voter
- with probability 2/3, has a utility function that represents >-i and has
range smaller than E; and
- with remaining probability 1/3, has a utility function that represents >i
and has range smaller than e.
(The first-order belief about others' manipulation costs may be arbitrary.)
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By the richness assumption, there exists a type ti C T having this basic type and
first-order belief.
Now we consider ti's equilibrium behavior in state w. First, in any equilibrium,
any voter whose utility function has range smaller than E always votes truthfully
(since his material gain from lying is less than E). Therefore, voter i's induced belief
# about others' behavior is that each other voter will report >-i with probability 2/3
and report 9 with probability 1/3. Then:
Sw(f, Sj, #b) is the distribution that chooses the candidate ranked first by >-i with
probability 5, and chooses A1 with remaining probability 1 - 5. Thereforefore,
if voter i reports 'i, his expected material utility is a + (1 - 5)ui(A1).
e For any >-'# >j, w(f, >'-, #) chooses the candidate ranked last by >-i with prob-
ability 5, and Ai with remaining probability 1 - 5. Therefore, i's expected
material utility from reporting any such >-' is (1 - 5)ui(A1).
Since a > E, voter i's unique best reply is to report ' .
Thus, in state w E Q*, the types ti,..., tN+1 of the voters have true preferences >-1
, ... , >N+1 but necessarily report >1,... ,>-N+1. This leaves the planner with utility
V(f(>'1,7... ., >'N+1- >-1, -NI Vi>+
her worst possible. Statement (b) follows. El
E Proofs for comparison of voting systems
Here we prove Proposition 3.6, giving lower bounds on the susceptibility of five voting
systems from [2].
Proof of Proposition 3.6: We give the proofs for the voting systems one by
one in order.
Black's system. This is just an embellishment of the construction given for the
Borda count, performed so as to ensure the nonexistence of a Condorcet winner (with
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probability close to 1). We first present the construction for M = 5. For readability
we refer to the candidates using letters A, B, C, D, E. Take small E > 0. Consider the
following belief of the manipulator: the other voters report
CDABE DEABC ECABD1
each with probability 1/12 + e;
CDBAE DEBAC ECBAD J
CABDE ABDEC ABECD1
each with probability 1/12 - e.
CBADE BADEC BAECD
Each other voter then:
" prefers C over D with probability 2/3;
" prefers D over E with probability 2/3;
" prefers E over C with probability 2/3;
" prefers C over A and B with probability 1/2 + 2E.
By Lemma 2.2(a), with probability converging exponentially to 1, each of these pair-
wise preferences will be held by a share at least 1/2 + E of opposing voters, so no
matter what the manipulator does we will end up with C - A, B, D; D -+ E; and
E -+ C. In particular, no candidate can then be a Condorcet winner.
Also, each other voter awards, on average,
* 40/12 - 10E points each to A and B;
* 36/12 + 4E points to C;
* 32/12 + 8E points each to D and E.
Using Lemma 2.2(a) again, we see that with probability exponentially converging to
1, candidates A and B will end up with higher scores than C, D or E, no matter what
the manipulator does.
So, neglecting events of exponentially small probability, we can focus on the re-
alizations where there is no Condorcet winner and only A or B can win whatever
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the manipulator does. Then, if N is even, let the manipulator's true preference be
ABCDE and consider the manipulation ACDEB; if N is odd, let the true preference
be BACDE and the manipulation be BCDEA. Exactly as in the proof of Proposition
3.5, the manipulation improves the outcome from the manipulator's second-ranked to
his first-ranked candidate with probability ~ 2/ 2/7rN, and has no effect otherwise.
This covers the case M = 5. For M > 5, construct a belief by supposing each
other voter ranks the first five candidates A 1, ... , A5 (= A, ... , E) at the top according
to the distribution above, and then has all remaining candidates in numerical order
after them. Then none of the extra candidates can ever be a Condorcet winner,
nor a Borda winner, since they receive lower scores than (say) A1. So again, with
probability converging exponentially to 1, the winner will be either A1 or A2 no
matter what the manipulator does. Let the manipulator's preferences and proposed
manipulation be as for Proposition 3.5; then manipulation succeeds with probability
[((M - 2)/2)] /2/irN by the same argument as before.
Copeland's system. We will give a construction supposing that M = 3K - 1,
where K > 3. If M > 9 is instead of the form 3K or 3K + 1, then we can modify the
construction by the usual method of appending the extra one or two candidates at
the end of everyone's preferences, and the same argument will apply. At the end of
the proof we will also show how to modify the construction for the remaining cases
M = 3,4,6, 7.
It will be convenient to depart from our usual notation for candidates and instead
let the candidates be called A, B, C1,... , CK, D1 ,... , D2K-3, where ties are broken
in that order. We will also let the D-candidates be numbered cyclically, so that
Di+(2K-3) = Di.
Let the manipulator's true preference be C1 ... CKD1 ... D2K-3AB. To describe
the belief #, we will not list out all the preferences that other voters may have, as there
are too many to list individually; instead, we will describe a process by which a random
preference is constructed. In this description, we will refer to choosing a random cyclic
permutation of the Di, which means an ordering of the form DjDj+1 ... Dj+2K-4,
where each possible value of j c { 1, 2,... , 2K - 3} is chosen with probability 1/ (2K -
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3).
* With probability 1/3, do the following: Begin with BA, then, for each i =
1,... , K, append Ci either at the beginning or at the end, independently each
with probability 1/2. Finally, attach a random cyclic permutation of the Di at
the beginning of the preference order.
" With probability 2/3, do the following: Begin with BA, immediately followed
by a random cyclic permutation of the Di; then successively append each Ci
either at the beginning or at the end, each with probability 1/2.
Whenever one candidate is preferred to another candidate with probability strictly
greater than 1/2 under this distribution, the usual application of Lemma 2.2(a) en-
sures that the former candidate majority-defeats the latter with probability ~ 1.
Thus, we can see that with probability ~ 1, all of the following majority-defeat rela-
tions hold:
" B-+A;
" Di -+ Di+I, Di+2 ,.. , Di+K-2, for each i;
* B, A --+ Di for each i;
" Di -+ Cj, for all i and j.
We henceforth assume that these relations hold. Moreover, for each Cj, each of the
other voters either prefers both A and B over Cj or prefers Cj over both A and B;
each case occurs with probability 1/2.
Each candidate Di majority-defeats exactly half of the other D-candidates and
all of the C-candidates, for a Copeland score of 2K - 2. Each of the C-candidates
is majority-defeated by all of the D-candidates and so has a score of no more than
K + 1 < 2K - 2. On the other hand, B defeats all of the D-candidates and A, and
so has a score of at least 2K - 2. So by alphabetical tie-breaking, no matter what
the manipulator does, either A or B must win.
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Call a candidate C, defeated if there are at least [N/2] + 1 other voters ranking
A, B above Cj. Let d be the number of defeated candidates. If the manipulator
tells the truth, then A majority-defeats all the Di and the defeated Cj, for a score
of 2K - 3 + d; B majority-defeats all the Di, the defeated C, and A, for a score of
2K - 2 + d. So B wins.
Now suppose the manipulator reports the ranking AC1 . .. CKD 1 ... D 2K- 3B. Say
that the manipulator is pivotal for C, if there are exactly [N/2] other voters ranking
A, B above C,. If the manipulator is pivotal for c candidates, then B still has a
score of 2K - 3 + d, but A now majority-defeats all the candidates for which the
manipulator is pivotal and so has score 2K - 3 + d + c. Thus, A wins if c > 1.
The probability of being pivotal for any given C is ~ /2/irN, and pivotality for
C, is independent of pivotality for Ck for j / j. Hence, the probability of being pivotal
for at least one candidate C is ~ KV2/irN. The lower bound for susceptibility
follows.
We still need to give the construction for the cases M = 3, 4,6, 7. For M = 6,
let the candidates be A, B, C1, C2, D, E, and let the true preference be C1C2DEAB.
The belief # is given as follows:
" With probability 1/3, do the following: Begin with BAE; successively append
C1 and then C2 either at the beginning or the end each with probability 1/2;
finally, append D at the beginning.
" With probability 1/3, do the following: Begin with BADE; then successively
append C1 and then C2 either at the beginning or the end each with probability
1/2.
" With probability 1/3, do the following: Begin with BAD; successively append
C1 and then C2 either at the beginning or at the end each with probability 1/2;
finally, add E at the beginning.
Now with probability ~ 1 we have the following majority-defeat relations:
e A-> D,E;
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* B - A,D,E;
* D -+ C1, C2, E;
* E-C 1,C2.
Then C1, C2 both have score at most 3 since they are majority-defeated by D and
E. Under truth-telling, A, B, D, E have respective scores 2 + d, 3 + d, 3,2, so that B
wins. Under the proposed manipulation, A, B, D, E have scores 2 + d + c, 3 + d, 3,2,
so that A wins if the manipulator is pivotal for either C1 or C2. The same argument
as before shows that this occurs with probability - 2 /2/7rN.
If M = 3, let the manipulator's true preference be CBA, and the belief # be
1/4 ACB, 1/2 BAC, 1/4 CBA.
With probability r~ 1, the resulting profile will have B -* A -> C. If exactly [N/2] of
the other voters have B >- C, then the manipulator is pivotal for this pair: Telling the
truth leads to C -* B, in which case A is the winner; manipulation leads to B -* C,
so that B wins, a more preferred outcome. If the manipulator is not pivotal, then the
manipulation has no effect. So the manipulation is successful when the manipulator
is pivotal, which happens with probability - V/2/irN.
Finally, for M = 4 or 7, we take the construction for 3 or 6, respectively, and add
an extra candidate at the end of everyone's preference ranking.
Fishburn's system. Assume M > 4, since the statement is trivial for M = 3.
We return to the usual numerical labeling of the candidates. Let the manipulator's
true preferences be A1A2 ... Am. As with the Copeland system, in order to describe
the belief #, we give a process for generating a random preference, and let # denote
the resulting distribution over L.
e With probability 2/3, we construct a preference as follows: Begin with A2 A1A3 ,
and then for each i = 4, ... , M in succession, randomly append Ai either at the
beginning of the existing ordering or at the end, independently with probability
1/2.
157
* With probability 1/3, we instead do the following: Begin with A2A1, then for
each i = 4, ... , M in succession, append Ai either at the beginning or the end,
independently with probability 1/2; finally, append A 3 at the beginning.
A preference - drawn according to this distribution has the following properties:
" With probability 1, A 2 >- A1 .
" With probability 2/3, A1 , A2 >- A3 -
" For each i > 4, with probability 2/3, A3 >- A,.
* For each i > 4, with probability 1/2, A 1 , A 2 >- Ai; and with probability 1/2,
A2,A 1 >- A,.
Let the proposed manipulation consist of moving A2 to the bottom of the ranking,
thus reporting A1A3 ... AMA 2. Let the utility u be 1 for A1 and 0 for every other
candidate, so the manipulator is concerned only with the probability of A1 winning.
As usual, with probability ~ 1, we have A 2 -+ A1 , A 1 -+ A 3, A2 -+ A 3 , and
A3 -- A, for all i > 4. We may assume these relations hold.
If the manipulator tells the truth, then for each i > 4, either A1 , A 2 both majority-
defeat Ai, or both are majority-defeated by Ai. In this case, A1 is covered by A2 , and
so cannot win.
Now suppose the manipulator lies. For each i > 4, if there are exactly [N/2]
other voters who report A2 > Ai, then the lie leads to A1 -+ A, -+ A2 in the resulting
profile. Say that the manipulator is pivotal for A, if this occurs. In this case, A2 no
longer covers A1. Notice that A3 also cannot cover A1, nor can any A, for j > 4,
since A1 - A3 -+ Aj. Hence, A1 is uncovered and so wins.
So the manipulation is successful whenever the manipulator is pivotal for any Ai,
i > 4. For each such Ai, the probability of being pivotal is ~ V2/rN. Moreover,
for distinct i, j > 4, our construction of the opponents' preferences assigned A, to
be ranked above or below A2 independently of Aj; as a result, pivotality for A, is
independent of pivotality for Aj. Consequently, the probability of being pivotal for
both A, and A, simultaneously is ~ 2/rN. So as N becomes large, the probability
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of being pivotal for more than one Ai becomes negligible compared to the probability
of being pivotal for any given Aj, and so the probability of being pivotal for at least
one Ai is asymptotically (M - 3) times the probability of being pivotal for any given
Aj; that is, - (M - 3) /2/IrN.
Minimax system. The argument here is similar to that used for Black's system
above, and for single transferable vote below, but we vary the beliefs # as N varies.
Doing so allows us to obtain a lower bound on susceptibility that converges more
slowly than N- 1/ 2 , but at the cost of requiring some additional computation.
For any given candidate Aj, we will use the term defeater of Ai to refer to any
candidate A3 achieving the maximum, over j =4 i, of the number of voters preferring
A, to Aj.
We first prove the bound for M = 4, with the candidates labeled A, B, C, D. Let
the manipulator's preference be ABCD, and take the set of desirable candidates in
(2.3) to be C+ = {A}. Consider the following belief #:
1
1 1
2 y
2 ~7
ACBD
ADBC
CBAD
DBAC
Let the proposed manipulation be ACBD.
In order to keep track of the consequences of manipulation, let the number of
other voters reporting each of the four preferences be w, x, y, z, respectively. Then,
the score of each candidate under truth-telling and under manipulation are as follows:
Truth Manipulation
A y + z y + z
B max{w + x+1,w + y, X + z} max{w + x +1, w + y +1, x + z}
C w+X+z+1 w+X+z+1
D max{w+x+y+1,w+y+z+1} max{w+x+y+1,w+y+Z+1}
(These values are obtained after performing obvious restrictions on the set of
defeaters for each candidate. For example, every voter who ranks either C or D
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above A also ranks B above A, so B is always a defeater for A, making the score of
A necessarily y + z. Likewise, A is always a defeater for C, and either A or B is a
defeater for D.)
We see that the only possible effect of manipulation is to increase the score of B
from w + y to w + y + 1. Hence, manipulation can change the outcome of the vote in
only two situations:
* Manipulation can change the outcome from B to A if it causes A and B to
have equal scores, and C's score is at least as high. This requires w + y >
w + X + 1, x + z; w = z - 1; and y < w + x + 1.
If w = z-1 then w+x+1 = x+z, so we actually need only x+1 < y w+x+1
and w = z - 1.
" Manipulation can also change the outcome from B to C. However, since both
B and C are undesirable outcomes, this case contributes nothing to the expec-
tation in (2.3).
Thus, we are left to estimate the probability that x + 1 < y w + x + 1 and
w = z - 1.
Write s for the sum w + z, and t for N.- s = x + y. We use Lemma C.2 to
decompose the probability of a profile (w, X, y, z) into the probability of given values
of s, t, times the probabilities of w conditional on s and of y conditional on t. Thus,
the probability we want becomes
s 2/VX (s-1)/2 1/2
P N; )x P( 1/2Sodd L t 1 - 2/ 5- (s +1)/2 1/2
t=N-s~
x P t; 1/2 (E.1)
1 <t<_++1 t - y 1/2
A lower bound for this outer sum is given by considering only the terms where VW <
s < 3VN. In this case, by Lemma 2.1, min, P((s - 1)/2, (s + 1)/2 | s; 1/2,1/2) ~
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2/37r N. Also, the probability in the inner sum of (E.1) is decreasing as a function
of y for y > t/2, so each such term is at least
P ( [(2t + s + 1)/41t - [(2t + s + 1)/4] t;
[t/2]
(t/2]
min
t=N-s
t-
[
min
N-3VN<t<N
1/2
1/2 ) [(2t+s+1)/41Hk=1 Ft/21 [t/2] + 1 - kFt/21 + k
([t/2]
( t-.
- (t/21
[t/2] 1/2
~2x e-6
Hence the expression in (E.1) is
2/V
1 - 2/N)
2
x x
37r x
> P
S Odd
. fN<s<3VN-
N;
N S
2/
1 - 2/ vN)I e-6x
To evaluate the bracketed probability sum, notice that if (s, N - s) follows a binomial
distribution M(N; 2/vN, 1 -2/V/N) then s has mean 2V'N and variance 2V'N-4 <
2V'N; by Chebyshev's inequality, the probability that it differs from its mean by more
than V/H is less than 2/V/H. Hence this probability sum is - 1. Consequently, the
probability that the manipulator is pivotal, given by (E.1), is
e-6 1
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> P
Sodd L
vN<s<3vN-
t=N-s
x -
[ VN-]]
N/3)
(st N; s+l14 _L e-6 27rN
>
1/2 t/2 - 31 14
1/2 ) /+1 
)[*]
Thus, the susceptibility is asymptotically bounded below by this quantity, as claimed.
Finally, if M > 4, simply modify the belief # above, the manipulator's true pref-
erence, and the proposed manipulation by appending each of the extra candidates in
order at the end of each ranking. None of the extra candidates can ever win (they all
receive a score of N), so the rest of the preceding analysis applies unchanged.
Single transferable vote system. Fix small E > 0. Let the manipulator's true
preferences be A 1A2 ... AM, and let the belief # be as follows:
2A-1+eA 1A2A3 ...
2TM +6 A 2 A 3 ...
2 M-2 - M2 2 A 3 A 2 ...
2 M-3 - M-2 E A4 A 2 A3 .-..-
2 2M - M22 A A2 A3 ...
1~ 2
M-2 M2E AMA 2A 3 ...
The end of each preference ranking (denoted by ... ) may be filled in arbitrarily. (In
case the pattern is unclear, the first 3 preference types are A 1 A 2 A 3 ... , A 2 A 3 ... , and
A3A2 ... , and then the remaining preferences - if M > 3 - are all of the form
Aj A2A3-....)
By the usual application of Lemma 2.2(a), for N large, we can focus on the
realizations such that for each preference ordering >-, the share of the population
reporting >- is within E/M 2 of the weight put on >- by distribution #.
In this case, the single transferable vote procedure follows one of two possible
executions. Either A1 or A2 is eliminated in the first round.
* Suppose A1 is eliminated first. Then the candidates A1 , A3, A 4, A, ... , AM
are eliminated in succession. Indeed, we can show by induction that at the
beginning of the kth round of elimination (k > 1) that candidates A2 and
Ak+, - - , AM remain. If this holds for some k, then A2 receives the votes
of the first k preference types of voters, thus getting a vote share of at least
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1 / 2 M-k + 2e - (k - 2)2E/(M - 2) - ke/M 2 > 1/ 2M-k. Ak+1 has a vote share at
most 1 / 2 M -k - 2e/(M - 2) + E/M2 < 1/ 2 -k , and each of the other remaining
candidates has vote share at least 1 / 2 m-k-1 - 2e/(M - 2) - e/M 2. Thus,
Ak+1 is eliminated next, and the voters who ranked Ak+1 first have their votes
transferred to A2, giving the induction step.
Thus, in this case, A2 ends up winning.
e Suppose A2 is eliminated first. Then the voters who ranked A 2 first have their
votes transferrred to A3. In the second round, A1 is eliminated, and the voters
who ranked A1 first have their votes transferred to A3. An induction identical
to the previous case now shows that A 4, A 5 ,.. , Am are eliminated in successive
rounds. Thus A3 ends up winning.
Consider a proposed manipulation of the form A2 A3 .... The manipulator is piv-
otal either when A1 and A2 receive the same number of first-place votes among the
other voters, or when A2 receives one more first-place vote than A1 . In both cases, if
the manipulator tells the truth then A 2 is eliminated in the first round, hence A3 ends
up winning; under the proposed manipulation, A1 is eliminated in the first round,
and A2 ends up winning. Hence, the manipulation is indeed beneficial.
By Lemma 2.2(b), we know each of the two pivotal scenarios happens with proba-
bility - (1/2)1 /r(1/2M1 + E)N. Therefore, the total probability that the manip-
ulator is pivotal is twice this quantity. We have thus shown
STV> 1
-N 
~j 27-1 +E)N'
Taking E -- 0 gives the result. l
F Analysis of the pair-or-plurality voting system
Proof of Lemma 3.7: For readability, we will refer to the candidates as A, B, C,
with the understanding that this does not necessarily represent the tie-breaking order
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Pareto efficiency is immediate: if all voters rank A above B, then B is not viable
and so cannot win. Hence we focus on monotonicity.
Consider a profile P at which some voter reports preference ABC. We need only
consider what happens when this voter changes her preference by transposing the
winner f(P) with the candidate ranked immediately above him.
If f(P) = C, and the voter changes his preference to ACB, this cannot change
the set of viable candidates, nor can it cause C to lose in a majority vote against
another candidate given that C previously won this pairwise contest. This leaves
only the case in which all three candidates are viable; in this case, the change can
only increase C's score and decrease B's (while leaving A's unchanged), so that C
remains the winner.
It remains to consider the case in which f(P) = B, and the voter changes his
preference to BAC. Let P' be the resulting profile. The change cannot affect the set
of viable candidates except by making A inviable. If this happens, A gets exactly K
first-place votes at P. Suppose that f(P') = C (otherwise f(P') = B and we are
done). Then, A, B, C are all viable at P, while only B and C are viable at P'.
We claim that B and C both have at least L first-place votes at P. If B has less
than L first-place votes, then C has at least N + 1 - K - L > (N + 1)/2 first-place
votes and so gets at least half the total points, giving f(P) = C, a contradiction. If C
has less than L first-place votes, then B likewise has more than (N + 1)/2 first-place
votes and so f(P') = B.
Hence, at P, all the points from voters ranking B first go to B, and all the points
from voters ranking C first go to C. Since there are K voters ranking A first, their
points go to B and C in the same quantities as rank B or C second, respectively. So
the outcome is effectively determined by a pairwise vote between B and C - exactly
the same as at P'. Thus f(P) = f(P'), a contradiction.
Thus we can assume that the same set of candidates is viable at P as at P'. Since
the change from ABC to BAC can only improve B's standing in a pairwise majority
vote, we only need to concern ourselves with the case where all three candidates are
viable at both P and P'.
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Let us consider then the effect of changing ABC to BAC on each candidate's score.
Let sA(A), sA(B), sA(C) be the number of points awarded to A, B, C, respectively,
from the voters ranking A first. Let us consider the effect of removing an ABC
vote on the vector SA = (sA(A), sA(B), sA(C)). If this leaves at least L total voters
with A as their first-place vote, the net change in SA is (-1, 0,0). Otherwise, sA(A) is
changed by -L/(L -K) and sA(C) is changed by L/2(L -K), so sA(B) is changed
by > -1 - (-L/(L - K)) - (L/2(L - K)) = (2K - L)/2(L - K). In short, the net
change in SA is of the form
L 2-L L
ASA = (-1,0,0) or (L±K' 2(L-K)'asA -,0,0) CI ~L - K' 2( L - K)' 2( L - K))'
(F. 1)
Now consider the effect of adding a BAC vote on the corresponding vector SB =
(sB(A), sB(B), sB(C)) of points from the voters ranking B first. If there are initially at
least L such voters, the net change is (0, 1, 0); otherwise, SB(B) changes by L/(L -K),
SB(A) changes by at most (L - 2K)/2(L - K), and sB(C) changes by at most 0. So
the net change in sB is
ASB = (0,1,0) or < L , , 0). (F.2)L-K 'L-K -)
Finally, when one voter's preference changes from ABC to BAC, the net effect
on the scores of the three candidates is given by the vector sum As = ASA + AsB.
From (F.1), AsA(B) ASA(A), and from (F.2), ASB(B) ASB(A); thus As(B)
As(A). From (F.1), ASA(B) ASA(C) - 1, and from (F.2), ASB(B) ASB(C) + 1;
thus As(B) > As(C). We conclude that the net change in B's score from P to P' is
at least as large as the net change in A's score or C's score. Since B was the winner
at the original profile P, then, B again wins at P'. So we have f(P') in this case as
well, as required.
The proof of Proposition 3.8 will make use of the following two lemmas.
Lemma F.1 Let XN, YN be a sequences of positive integers with (YN - XN)/N > e,
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where e > 0 is some constant; YN <N - XN; and XN -4 oo as N -> oo. Also let b be
a fixed positive integer. Then
max b P N; 1. (F.3)
"'" N<X<YN N - x 1 -
xa ( mod b)
(Here the maximum is taken for a fixed N, over all choices of integers a and proba-
bilities a.)
Proof: The sum of P(x, N - x | N; a, 1 - a) over all x congruent to a mod b,
without the restriction zN < x < N - XN, is equal to
-"i(a(i+ (1 - a))N (F.4)
i=0
where ( is a primitive complex b-th root of 1. (This can be checked by expanding
using the binomial theorem and cancelling terms where the powers of ( sum to 0, as
in the proof of Lemma C.3.) Fix any positive integers K, L. For a < K/N, then
Ex<L P(x, N - x | N; a, 1 - a) is asymptotically bounded below, for N - oo, by
the probability that a Poisson variable with parameter K takes on value at most
L. In particular, for any fixed K, choose L large enough so that the latter Poisson
probability is greater than 1-1/b, then we certainly have maxa<K/N ZX>ZN P(x, N -
x | N; a, 1 - a) < 1/b for N large enough, since eventually zN > L. Hence, for any
fixed K, we can restrict attention to a > K/N, and likewise a < 1 - K/N. In this
case, the term in the sum (F.4) corresponding to i = 0 is equal to 1, and all other
terms are bounded above in absolute value uniformly by e-AK for some constant A > 0
that depends only on b. So for each K, the left side of (F.4) is < (1 + (b - 1)e-AK)/b
for N large enough and all a E (K/N, 1 - K/N). Then, the maximum on the left
side of (F.3) is also bounded above by 1 + (b - 1)e-AK for all N large enough. By
choosing K arbitrarily large, we see that this maximum is < 1.
To see that it is > 1, simply take a = (XN + yN)/2N and apply (F.4) to obtain
Zx-a ( mod b) P(x, N-x | N; a, 1-a) -* 1/b, and note that the probability of realizing
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a value X < XN or x > YN is ~ 1 by Lemma 2.2(a).
FD
Lemma F.2 Let S be a set of profiles (x 1,..., x,) each
for some integer K. Then for any distribution a,
zE
(x1..,Xr)CS
-I,
P
X1
x 2
X 3
Xr
N; a
/
P
xi +
x 2 -
X 3
zr
1
1
of which satisfies X1, X2 > K,
V
Proof: We first prove the result for r = 2. In this case, taking N and a as fixed,
the expression h(x) = P(x, N - x | N; ai, a2) is unimodal as a function of x. Calling
its maximum x*, the specified difference is negative for x < x* and nonnegative
for x > x*, so the sum in the lemma statement is maximized when S is the set of
pairs whose xi-values are x*, x* + 1, ... , x* - K. In this case, the sum of differences
telescopes and the sum is simply h(x*) - h(x* - K + 1) < h(x*). It follows from
Lemmas 2.3 and C.7 that h(x*) < e1/12 / VqK. This completes the proof in the case
r = 2.
For the general case, let S' be the set of all values of the (r - 1)-tuple x' =
(xi + X2, X3 ,... , Xr) for (Xi,... , Xz) E S. For each such x' c S', let Sz' be the set of
pairs (X1, X2) such that (X1 , X2, . .. , X,) S.
By Lemma C.2, we can rewrite the sum in the lemma statement as as
(Xi,...,Xr)CS
X1 + x 2  ai + a2
X3 N; x3
Xr OZ r
P x1 +2; P IX1+2;)]
z 2 /32 ( 2 - 1 02
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ei1/12
(with #1 = 1/(a 1 + a 2 ) and #2 similarly)
af1 + aZ2
N; a3
ar
+2; P X1+2;
#2 X2 -1102
By the r = 2 case, the expression in square
whole sum is
ei./12
VW K~~~~ ~ ~ f= l 273.. r) S
brackets is at most e1/ 12/x/7K, so the
N-
a 1 + a 2
a 3
ar
Since the sum of probabilities is at most 1, we are done.
Proof of Proposition 3.8: We will prove the following claim: If A is an integer
such that L/K > A for each (sufficiently large) N, and K -- oo as N -> oo, then the
pair-or-plurality voting rule satisfies
POP <1
N ~L2 A -I grN(4- )
The desired bound will then follow by taking A -+ 00.
Our proof will make frequent use of the following observation: At any profile
where all three candidates are viable, if a candidate Ai wins, then Ai must have score
at least (N + 1)/3. For each A, / Aj, the voters ranking Aj first can contribute at
most K points to Aj, so there must be at least (N + 1)/3 - 2K > L voters ranking
Ai first. In particular, all the points from these voters are awarded to Aj; and even if
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Y- P
Xf'=(E1+2,X3, ... ,2r,)ES'
( E 
P X
(21,X2)ES, _- z 2
X1
z' I
we change one of their votes, the other such voters still award all their points to Aj.
Henceforth, as in the proof of Proposition 3.3, we will notate the manipulator's
true preference as ABC for readability; this does not necessarily correspond to the
tie-breaking order.
We first restrict the set of manipulations that need to be considered. With refer-
ence to (2.3), we have either C+ = {A} or C+ = {A, B}. In the first case, the manipu-
lator wishes to maximize the probability of A winning; by monotonicity (Lemma 3.7)
the optimal manipulation ranks A first, so we need only consider the manipulation
ACB. In the second case, the manipulator wishes to minimize the probability of
C winning; again by monotonicity, this is best done by ranking C last, so we need
only consider the manipulation BAC. So we need to show that in each of these two
cases, the probability that the manipulation succeeds (under the worst-case belief #)
is < [1/2 + 1/(A - 1) ]12/irN(4 - 1/4A2). (We will henceforth denote this expression
by AUB(N), for "asymptotic upper bound.")
First we consider the case of a manipulation from ABC to ACB. For any re-
alization of the opponent-profile, this manipulation cannot change the set of viable
candidates. If only one or two candidates are viable, the manipulation has no effect
on whether A wins or not, since it does not change the result of a pairwise vote be-
tween A and either of the other candidates. Suppose all three candidates are viable.
The manipulation cannot improve the outcome from C to A, by monotonicity; so we
need only consider whether it can improve the outcome from B to A. Consider any
opponent-profile P at which f(P, ACB) = A. By our initial observation, the voters
ranking A first assign all their points to A, at both (P, ABC) and (P, ACB). So the
manipulation from ABC to ACB actually can have no effect on any candidate's score
and thus no effect on the outcome.
This leaves us to consider manipulations from ABC to BAC. The manipu-
lation cannot improve the outcome from C to A, again by monotonicity, so we
need only show that the probability that it improves the outcome from C to B is
< AUB(N). Let S be the set of all opponent-profiles P such that f(ABC, P) = C
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and f(BAC, P) = B. We want to show that
E P(P I N; q) < AUB(N),
PES
where < is taken to be the belief that maximizes this sum.
If the manipulation does not change the set of viable candidates, and one or two
candidates are viable, then as in the previous case, manipulation cannot improve the
outcome from C to B. If the manipulation does change the set of viable candidates,
then it can only make A inviable: P must be such that all three candidates are
viable at (ABC, P) but only B, C are viable at (BAC, P). Then P contains exactly
K - 1 first-place votes for A. For B to win at (BAC, P), then B must have at least
(N + 1) - (K - 1) > L + 1 first-place votes. For C to win at (ABC, P), it must
also have more than L first-place votes, by our initial observation. Hence, at both
(ABC, P) and (BAC, P), all the voters ranking B or C first award all their points to
their first-choice candidate. But at (ABC, P), since A has exactly K first-place votes,
these voters each award one point to their second-choice candidate, so the outcome is
given by a pairwise vote between B and C - exactly as at (BAC, P). So the winner
is the same at both profiles.
Consequently, for every P E S, all three candidates are viable at (ABC, P) and at
(BAC, P). Since f (ABC, P) = C and f (BAC, P) = B, by our initial observation, P
contains at least L first-place votes for B and for C. Let w, x, y, z, respectively, denote
the number of ABC votes, the number of ACB votes, the number of first-place votes
for B, and the number of first-place votes for C in profile P.
Let SA be the set of pairs (w, x) such that there exist y and z with (w, x, y, z) C S.
For each such (w, x) there exists at most one such pair (y, z), by monotonicity; regard
y and z then as functions of (w, x). We can write the desired probability as
w aw
P X N; a2 P y + z; a~e z
(w,X,y,z)es P z N y+z; az/(ay + az)
yS+ z/(a+7+
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ES C
(W,X)ES^
w
x
N - (w +x)
a'
Nvi ax x
1 - (aw + ax)
P y(wX)N - (W + )
z(w, X)
with # = aY/(a + az).
Moreover, since
awarded to C from
jy - z| < K + 1.
(w, x) C SA, for the
the absolute difference between points awarded to B and points
the voters who rank A first is always at most K, we must have
We can use this to obtain a uniform upper bound, across all
second factor in (F.5). The bound we will use is
max P
f3;y,z zy+z>(2N-1)/3
ly-zl<K+1
y + z;
12
rN(4 
- 9,2)
(F.6)
where K is a number such that K/N < x, for each N. (Here the asymptotics are
with respect to N as usual.) To see that (F.6) holds, fix s > (2N - 1)/3 and
consider maximizing with respect to y, z, #, subject to the conditions y + z = s and
y, z < (2+3K')s/4, where W' is a number such that (K+ 1)/(2N- 1) W'/2. Note that
the condition y, z < (2+3')s/4 is implied by y+z = s and ly-z 5 K+1 < 3's/2, so
these new conditions are a weakening of the original conditions for the maximization
in (F.6). The maximum is given by 0 = y/s (by Lemma 2.3), and given this, the
maximum over y, z is achieved by making y as large as possible (from Lemma 2.4),
i.e. y = L(2 + 3')s/4]. From Lemma (2.1) we get
L(2 + 3K')s/4] 89K, 2 )
- [(2 + 3K')s/4] 1- # J rs(4
Plugging in s > 2(N - 1)/3, and noticing that r,' can be made arbitrarily close to K
for N large, gives us the upper bound in (F.6).
Now, L/K > A gives (K + 1)/N ;< 1/6A, so we can take K arbitrarily close
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(F.5)
to 1/6A in (F.6). To apply (F.6) to our problem we also need to know that the
inequality y + z > (2N - 1)/3 holds for all (w, x, y, z) C S. But if this is false, then
W + X > N/3 > L, so all the voters ranking A first award all their points to A, and
the winner is simply determined by plurality rule at both the profiles (ABC, P) and
(BAC, P). Since f(ABC, P) = C, C has at least (N + 1)/3 first-place votes; since
f(BAC, P) = B, B has at least (N - 2)/3 votes in P, giving y + z > (2N - 1)/3
after all.
Combining with our previous observation Iy - zj < K + 1 for (w, x, y, z) E S, we
see that the second probability factor in (F.5) is indeed a value of the maximand in
(F.6), so the bound (F.6) applies with an appropriate value of K. To determine such
a value, notice that L/K > A gives K/N < 1/6A, so we can take K arbitrarily close
to 1/6A in (F.6). Using this bound in (F.5) leads to
EP(P | N;0#) < (F.7)
PES
W aw
P N; a12
[(W)sa (N rN (4 - )
N- (w+x) aW+X _
This means we just need to focus henceforth on the first factor on the right side
of (F.7). If we can show that
W a I
P x N; ax < I + 1 (F.8)
, )+ 2 A - 1(WX)SA N - (w+ z) 1 - aW+X
then the upper bound in the proposition will follow from (F.7), and the proof will be
complete.
To further save on notation, we will henceforth write P(w, x) rather than write
out P(w, x, N - (w + x) | N; an, ax, 1 - aw+,); the extra arguments will be implied.
From now on we will assume that ties between B and C are broken in favor of B.
(The case where they are broken in favor of C is essentially identical.)
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Break the set of pairs of nonnegative integers (w, x), with w + x > K, into four
regions:
e R1 : w+x<Landw>x(1-2K/L)+K.
For (w, x) in this region, the scores of B, C associated with the true profile and
the manipulated profile are
(ABC, P):
(BAC, P):
K(L - w - x - 1) +y for B,
L-K
K(L - w - x) +Y+1 forB,
L-K
Thus, for (w, x) in this region, the manipulation increases B's score by L/(L-K)
and leaves C's score unaffected.
* R 2 : w +x < L and x > (w+1)(1 - 2K/L)+K. In this case, the scores of B, C
(ABC, P):
(BAC, P):
y for B,
y + 1 for B,
K(L 
- w - x- 1) + z for C
L-K
K(L-w-x)+ 
z for C.
L-K
Thus, for (w, x) in this region, manipulation increases B's score by 1 and C's
score by K/(L - K).
9 R 3 : w + x < L, w < x(1 - 2K/L) +K and x < (w+1)(1 - 2K/L)+K. In this
case, the scores of B, C are
(w + x + 1 - K)Lf(ABC, P) : w+1- 2(L-K)+y for B,
(BAC, P) : w- xK)+y+1 for B,2(L - K)
(w + x + 1 - K)L forC
2(L - K)
x (W+ - )L+z for C.
2(L - K)
Thus, for (w, x) in this region, manipulation has no effect on the difference
between B's and C's scores, so it cannot change the winner from C to B:
SAn R3 =0.
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z for C
z for C.
are
o R4: w + x > L. In this case, the scores are
(ABC, P): y for B, z for C
(BAC, P) : y + 1 for B, z for C.
Thus, for (w, x) in this region, manipulation increases B's score by 1 and leaves
C's score unaffected.
Let T be the set of all pairs (w, x) such that w + x > K and N - w - x is odd.
We know that the maximum probability of drawing (w, x) E T is - 1/2, by
Lemma F.1. Our strategy will be to show that the probability of (w, x) E SA and the
probability of (w, x) E T are close.
We begin by showing that the probability of (w, x) E R1  SA and the probability
of (w, x) E R1 nT are close.
First consider the probability that
(w) E R1 n SA and (w + 1,x) c R1 n SA. (F.9)
Notice that if [K(L - w - x - 1)/(L - K)] = [K(L - w - x)/(L - K), then (F.9)
cannot occur. Indeed, (w, x) E R1 n SA means that for suitable choices of (y, z),
K(L - w - x - 1) but K(L - w - )
L-K L-K
which means that [K(L - w - x)/(L - K)J + y = z - 1. Then [K(L - w - x)/(L -
K)] +(N-w-x) must be odd (since N-w-x = y+z). Likewise, (w+1, x) E RinSA
requires [K(L-w-x-1)/(L-K)J +(N-w-1-x) to be odd. But these expressions
cannot both be odd if LK(L - w - x - 1)/(L - K)J = [K(L - w - x)/(L - K)].
Let ( K -- 1) KL v)
V= v [K(L ]< [K(L.
L-K L-K
Thus, the probability that (F.9) arises is at most the probability that w + x E V,
given that (w + x, N - (w + x)) is drawn from M(N; a,, + ax, 1 - (a, + ax)). Write
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cxv = cw ± ax.
Since (L - K)/K > A - 1, it follows that of any A consecutive integers, at most
one can be in V.
Now, we claim that for any set V with this property, there exists a such that
EP ( N; <; P ( N; av
vV N -v - av K<v<N-K N-v 1 - avV=a mod A-1
(F.10)
Indeed, choose a to be the value of v E V for which bP(v, N - v | N; av, 1 - a,)
is maximized. Since this latter expression is unimodal in v, for any two consecutive
elements of V that differ by more than A -1, either the lower element can be increased
by 1 or the higher element can be decreased by 1 in such a way that the expression
on the left side of (F.10) is increased. We thus replace V by a new set for which
the left-hand side of (F.10) is higher than before. This operation cannot be repeated
forever; when it terminates, it must be that every two consecutive elements of the
current set differ by A -1. The resulting set clearly satisfies (F. 10), and so the original
set V did as well.
By Lemma F.1, the right-hand side of (F.10) is < 1/(A - 1). Hence, the same
holds for the probability of (F.9), since w + x E V is a necessary condition for (F.9).
Notice that
P (K< P +
(w,x)E R~nsA X (w,x)ER 1 fnT
w W + 1
P -P +
(w,x)ERlnSA\T
(w+1,x)ERnT\SA
P +
(w,x)ER1nSA\T X
P.
(w,x)ER1nSA\T
(w+1,x)(RinT
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The second sum on the right-hand side is at most ei/12//2rK, by Lemma F.2 (notice
that (w, x) E R1 ensures w > K). The third sum consists of those pairs (w, x) satis-
fying (F.9), which have a total probability < 1/(A - 1), by the preceding argument.
For the fourth sum, notice that if (w, x) E Ri \T then (w +1, x) E T, so the only pairs
counted by this sum are those for which (w + 1, x) V R1 - that is, w + 1 + x = L.
By Lemma C.7, these pairs have a total probability < ei/ 12 /rf.
The bounds ei/ 12 /VirK, e1/12 / 2wL both go to 0 as N -+ oo, and thus we get
I: P - E P W. (F. 11)
(w,x )E R~nSA ( (w,x) ER nT x)
This takes care of R1 SA for now. Next let us perform a similar analysis for pairs
(w,x) E R2O SA.
Consider the possibility that
(w,x) E R2f SA and (w,x+ 1) E R 2 SA. (F.12)
If (w, x) E R 2 f SA, then for suitable choices of (y, z),
K(L-w-x-1) K(L-w-x)
L-K 
- L-K
This means that
[K(L-w-x-1)1 = [K(LW-c)1 =-w -x.
L-K L-K =y z 1
Hence, FK(L-w-x)/(L-K) +(N-w-x) must be odd; and if (w, x+1) E R2flSA,
then [K(L - w - x)/(L - K)1 + (N - w - x - 1) must be odd. These quantities
cannot both be odd, however. So we see that (F.12) can never occur.
Thus, we can perform an analysis for the probability of (w, x) E R 2 f SA that is
entirely analogous to what was done for (w, x) E Ri n SA, but our life is now simplified
by the fact that (F.12) has probability zero (unlike its counterpart (F.9)). The result
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E P (
(w,X)E R2nSA (
( i1/12 T1/12
P < + -0.
(w,x)inR2nT x)
Next we turn to R 3. Since R 3 f SA = 0, we simply have
P = 0 < P .
(w,x)ER3nSA xJ (w,x)ERanT (
(F.13)
(F.14)
Finally, we claim that R4 n SA C T. Check: if (w, x) E R 4 f SA, then y < z but
y + 1 > z, so integrality implies y = z - 1, and hence N - w - x = y + z is odd. So
it is immediate that
E) P <
(w,X)E R4nS A ( x
(F.15)E, P .
(w,X) ER4nT x)
Finally, using the fact that every (w, x) c SA must lie in one of the regions
R1, .. ., R 4, we can combine (F.11), (F.13), (F.14), (F.15):
4 /
E I: P
4 W'~=1(55~ R 1 n-A
< E E P +
i=1 (W,X 6 RinT )
< ~ 1:P
(w,x)ET x
1 1
'~' 2 A-I
Thus, we have proven (F.8). Combining with (F.7), as previously mentioned, gives
the result.
LI
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EP W
(W,X)ESA ( x
G Proofs of lower bounds
The proofs of the results from Section 4 are in this appendix (except for results that
are proven in the main text). We present the proofs in the same order that they are
sketched in the text.
Proof of Theorem 4.5: For any two candidates A, B, let K*(A; B) be the
maximum number K such that f(K A, N+1-K B) # A. By unanimity, K*(A; B) <
N+ 1.
Let us first assume that there are three candidates - which we may, by relabeling,
call A, B, C - such that
f (1 A, K B, N - K C) # A for all K. (G.1)
Note that this also implies f(K B, N + 1 - K C) $ A for all K (otherwise, change
one of the B or C votes to A, and monotonicity implies that (G.1) is violated).
Write K* for K*(B; C). Also write K* for the maximum value of K such that
f (1 A, K B, N - K C) $ B.
We have
f(K B, N + 1 - K C) =B for all K > K* (G.2)
by definition, and
f(K B,N+ 1 -K C) B for all K < K* (G.3)
since otherwise monotonicity would imply f(K* B, N + 1 - K* C) = B, a contradic-
tion. By similar arguments,
f(1 A, K B, N - K C) = B for all K > K*; (G.4)
f(1 A,K B,N - K C) $ B for all K <K*. (G.5)
Notice that K* > K* - 1, since otherwise f(1 A, k* + 1 B, N - k* C) = B and
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f(K* B, N + 1 - K* C) / B would violate monotonicity. We split into three cases:
(i) Suppose K* = K* - 1. Let the manipulator's true preference be any ordering
with A ranked first and B last; let the proposed manipulation be a vote for
C; and let the manipulator's belief be # = (aB B, (1 - aB) C) with aB =
K*/N. Since the other voters all vote for B or C, (G.2)-(G.5) imply that the
manipulator cannot affect whether B wins, unless the realized opponent-profile
is (K* B, N - K* C), in which case a vote for A leads to B winning and a vote
for C leads to B losing. So considering the definition (2.3) of susceptibility with
C+ =C\{B}, we have
0- > P(K* B, N - K* C | N;
which is > o-* by Lemma 2.4.
(ii) Suppose K* = K*. Let the manipulator's true preference be any ordering with
A ranked first and B second; let the proposed manipulation be a vote for B; and
again let the manipulator's belief be # = (aB B, (1 - aB) C) with aB = K*/N.
From (G.1) and the observation following it, no matter whether the manipulator
votes for A or B, A cannot win. Again, (G.2)-(G.5) imply that the manipulator
cannot affect whether or not B wins, unless the realized opponent-profile is
(K* B, N - K* C) in which case a vote for A leads to B losing and a vote for
B leads to B winning. So considering (2.3) with C+ = {A, B}, we again have
> P(K* B, N - K* C | N; #) >o-*.
(iii) Suppose K* > K*. Let the manipulator's true preference be any ordering with
C ranked first and B last; let the proposed manipulation be a vote for A; and
let the belief be # = (aB B, (1- aB) C) with aB = (K* + 1)/N. Once again, the
manipulator cannot affect whether or not B wins, unless the opponent-profile
is (K B, N - K C) for some K with K* < K < K*, in which case a vote for C
leads to B winning and a vote for A leads to B losing. Considering (2.3) with
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C+ = C \ {B}, we again have
Te
O,>( P(KB,N-KC|N;$)>P(K*+1B,N-K*-1C|N-p)>o-*.
K=K*+1
This completes the proof of the inequality in case A, B, C can be chosen so that
(G.1) holds.
Now suppose no such A, B, C exist. Choose A, B, C so that f(1 A, K B, N -
K C) = A for K as large as possible. By assumption, there also exists K' such
that f(1 C, K' B, N - K' A) = C, and by maximality K' < K. If K < N, then
monotonicity implies f(N - K' A, K' B, 1 C) = A, a contradiction. Therefore K =
N, so that f(1 A, N B) = A. Again by assumption, there exists K" such that
f(1 B, K" C, N - K" A) = B. If K" < N then monotonicity implies f(1 A, N B) =
B, a contradiction. So K" = N, or f(1 B, N C) = B. By monotonicity again,
f(N B,1 C)= B.
Suppose the manipulator's true preference ranks C first and B last; let the pro-
posed manipulation be a vote for A, and let the belief be that everyone else votes
for B with probability 1. Then a truthful vote for C leads to B winning, while ma-
nipulation leads to A winning, hence (taking C+ = C \ {B}) we have susceptibility
0 = 1.
This proves that the inequality o > ,u always holds.
It remains to study the equality case. This proof roughly follows the above case
analysis but requires further splitting into subcases. We wish to show that the in-
equality is strict if f is not a majority rule. So there is a profile at which strictly more
than half the voters vote for some candidate - say C - but some other candidate
wins - say B. We may assume B and C are chosen so as to maximize the number
of voters voting for C with B winning.
By monotonicity, B still wins when all the non-C votes are replaced by B's, and
it follows that K*(B; C) < (N - 2)/2. Let A be an arbtirary candidate distinct from
B and C. Define K* as before. We review the cases from the preceding analysis,
making amendments as needed. Note that assumption (G.1) was only used in case
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(ii).
* In case (i), the same argument as before applies. Since K* < (N- 1)/2, Lemma
2.4 implies that the inequality at the end of case (i) holds strictly.
* In case (ii), if (G.1) holds, then the analysis goes through as before and again
the final inequality holds strictly.
Suppose (G.1) fails. Then we have f(1 A, K B, N - K C) = B whenever
K > K*, and f(1 A, K B, N - K C) = C whenever K < K* because the
extremal choice of B and C implies that C wins whenever at least N + 1 - K*
voters vote for C. Hence, the failure of (G.1) can only happen for K = K*:
f(1 A, K* B, N - K* C) = A. By monotonicity, we then have
f(J A, K B, N +1 - J - K C) = A for all K < K* J + K - 1 > K*.
(G.6)
And the extremal property of B and C implies that
f(J A, K B, N+ 1 - J - K C) = C whenever J+K-1<K*. (G.7)
If K* > 1 then (G.6) and (G.7) imply that we can use the triple (B, A, C)
instead of (A, B, C): this triple has the same value of K*, but falls into case (i),
from which the proof is complete.
Finally suppose K* = 0. Then we have f(1 A, 1 B, N-I C) = B; f (1 A, N C) =
A (and by monotonicity f (K A, N+1-K C) = A for all K > 1); f (1 B, N C) =
B; and f(N + 1 C) = C. Let the manipulator have true preference ranking C
first, B second, and A last; let the proposed manipulation be a vote for B, and
let the belief # be 1/N A, (N- 1)/N C. If the realized opponent profile is that all
others vote for C, then truthful voting leads to C winning, while manipulating
leads to B winning. For any other possible opponent-profile, telling the truth
leads to A winning, and at least when the opponent-profile is 1 A, N - 1 C,
manipulation leads to B winning instead. It follows by taking C+ = C \ {A}
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that
0- > P(1 A,N- 1 C N;#) > *
* In case (iii), if K* < (N - 4)/2, then the final inequality in case (iii) becomes
strict, again by Lemma 2.4. So we may assume K* > (N - 4)/2 > 0.
If f(1 A, K* B, N - K* C) = A, we again have (G.6) and (G.7), so that just
as in case (ii) above, we can replace the triple (A, B, C) by (B, A, C), and end
up in case (i), for which the proof has been completed. (Note that this uses the
assumption K* > 0.)
Finally, suppose f(1 A, K* B, N - K* C) / A. We also have f(1 A, K* B, N -
K* C) # B by the assumption of case (iii).
As before, the extremal property of B and C implies f(1 A, K B, N-K C) = C
for K < K*. In this case, consider the same preferences, belief, and proposed
manipulation as in the original analysis for case (ii). If the realized opponent-
profile is (K B, N - K C) for K < K*, then C wins regardless of whether the
manipulator votes for A or B. Otherwise, a vote for B will ensure that B wins,
while a vote for A will fail to ensure an outcome in C+ = {A, B} if the realized
opponent-profile is (K* B, N - K* C). Hence (2.3) with C+ = {A, B} gives
o- > P(K* B, N - K* C l N;q#) > -*.
This shows that o > o-* in every possible case.
Next we proceed to the proof of Theorem 4.4. This proof makes reference to proof
techniques from Theorem 4.7, which was given in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 4.10: For each K = 0,... , K, let J(K) be the highest
value such that f(PK) = Aj, or J(K) = J - 1 if no such value exists. By (i) and
(iii), f(PJK) = Aj for J < J(K) and = Ai for J > J(K). Also (iii) ensures that
J(K - 1) < J(K) + 1 (whenever these quantities are defined).
Choose integer values 0 = K0 , K 1, K 2 ,..., K, = K, where any two successive Ki
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differ by at most 40VN/r, and with r < Nr/20. Certainly this can be done, as
long as N is sufficiently large.
Now, by (iv), J(0) = J, while by (v), J(K) = J - 1. Therefore
J(0) - J(K) > j - J > ,sN.
Therefore, there exists some i E {1..., r} such that
J(Ki_1 ) - J(Ki) > 'N> 20bK.T
Put
J(Ki_ 1) + J(Ki)
2N
Ki_1 + f-N 1--i >24,
Ki - f2NV
52= min K ,-7
N
J2 >'
1- - 62 >"
It is straightforward to check that #1 and #2 are legitimate probability distribu-
tions (that is, all entries are nonnegative); the only nontrivial part is Ki - 2 > 0
which follows from Ki - Ki_ 1 > J(Ki_ 1) - J(Ki) > 201W.
We will show that
(G.8)
and
(G.9)
Suppose that the K-profile P = (x >-, y >-', z >-") is drawn according to IID(#1).
If the inequalities
x > J (G.10)
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#2 =
fAj (#1) > 3/4
fAi(#2) > 3/4.
(G.11)
(G. 12)x + y KI- 1 + J(Ki_ 1)
are satisfied, then we must have f(P) = A1 , using f(J(Ki_ 1)
>") = Ai and the monotonicity relation (iii). Notice also that if
x < (3J(Ki- 1) + J(Ki))/4 (G. 13)
(G.14)K -1 + 4
are satisfied, then (G.12) will automatically hold.
Now we apply the same Chebyshev argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.2. We
have (x, N-x) ~ M(N; -y, 1-X), so (G.10) and (G.13) are satisfied unless Ix-E[x]|
(J(Ki- 1) - J(Ki))/4, which happens with probability
Var(x)
(J(Ki )-J(Ki) 2
N/4
(5\ N)2
1
100
Likewise, (y, N - y) - M(9; J1, 1 - 61), to (G.11) and (G.14) are satisfied unless
|y - E[y] I % 29, which happens with probability
Pr(ly - E[y]|> 2N-) < Var(y)( 2N) 2
N/4 1
2N 8
We conclude that (G.10), (G.11), (G.13), (G.14) are all satisfied - and hence f(P) =
A3 - with probability at least 1 - 1/00 - 1/8 > 3/4. This gives (G.8).
Similarly, suppose that the N-profile P = (x >-, y >-', z >-") is drawn according
to IID(#2 ). If the inequalities
x <7
y < Ki
(G.15)
(G.16)
(G.17)x + y > Ki + J(Kj)
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J(Ki_ 1) - Ki_1
>- Ki-1 >-' 9 -
Pr |zx - E[x]| I2 J(Ki-1) - J(Kj)
are satisfied, then we must have f (P) = Aj, using f(J(Ki) + 1 -, Ki s',N -
J(K) - Ki - 1 >-") = Ai and the monotonicity condition (iii). (Note that we cannot
have J(Ki) + Ki = N, because then f(J(Ki) >-, Ki >'-, 0 >-") = Aj, together with
f(N - K ,K -',0 >") = Ai from (v), would give a contradiction to (iii).)
Notice also that if
X > (J(Ki_ 1) + 3J(K2 ))/4 (G.18)
y> K - 4VN (G.19)
are satisfied, then (G.17) will automatically hold.
If J2 = (Ki - 2N)/N, then exactly the same Chebyshev arguments as before
give that (G.15), (G.16), (G.18), (G.19) are all satisfied - and hence f(P) = A -
with probability greater than 3/4. Otherwise, we necessarily have X + y = N so that
(G.17) is always satisfied, and then the same arguments show that (G.15), (G.16) are
both satisfied with probability greater than 3/4. In either case, then, we get (G.9).
Now that (G.8) and (G.9) are proven, we use Lemma 4.9 to complete the argument.
Notice that #2 - 1 = A(>-' - >-"), where
Ki Ki_1  40
N N -/7r
By (ii), preferences >-' and >-" rank Ai and Aj in the same way. If they both rank
A above Aj, then let C+ be the set of candidates weakly preferred to Ai under >-".
Lemma 4.9(a) gives
f A(#2) - YA (41) < NAo-. (G.20)
AEC+ AEC+
By (G.8) and (G.9), the left-hand side of (G.20) is at least 3/4 - (1 - 3/4) = 1/2, so
1 < <_o-  z7o-.
If >-' and >-" both rank Aj above Aj, then let C+ be the set of candidates weakly
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preferred to A- under >-'. Lemma 4.9(a) gives
E A (A1) N02 -< f Go)
AEC+ AEC+
and we again arrive at 1/2 < VHN(40/1 r)o-. Thus in either case we have
o- ;> r'gV-1/280
which is the promised result.
Proof of Theorem 4.4: We first suppose there are just three candidates,
C = {A, B, C}. For every K, we have f(K ABC, N - K BCA) E {A, B} by Pareto
efficiency (and moreover it is B when K = 0 and A when K = N). Moreover, by
monotonicity, if this expression equals A for some K then it also equals A for all
higher K. So, writing
K ABC
KAB= max K f -(=B],
I (N - KBCA A
we have f(K ABC, - K BCA) = B if K < KAB and A if K > KAB. Likewise
define
K BC A
KBC =max K f - =KCB,
N-KCAB
K C AB
KcA =max K f ( =A,
N - KABC
K CBA
KcB =max K | f - BAC B
K BAC
KBA =max K f ( =A,
1 N - K ACB
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KAC = max K f ( K ACB
N-K CBA
We now have two cases.
(i) KAB + KBC + KCA + KCB + KBA + KAc > 7/2.
In this case one of the three quantities KAB + KBA, KBC + KCB, KCA + KAc
is greater than 7N/6. Without loss of generality we will assume KCA + KAC >
7N/6, which is the case shown in Figure 4.4.
Let
As before, f(K
Then one of the
K* =max K f ( AB
(N - K ACB
CAB, - K ACB) = A for K < K
following two inequalities must hold:
=A
and = C for K > K*.
KCA-K*> N12
We assume henceforth that the first inequality holds (otherwise, the argument
is the same with A and C reversed).
Now we apply Lemma 4.10 with
>-= CAB, >-'= ACB, >- "= ABC,
J=K* +1 J = KCA,
1
Ai= C, A 3 =A.
The condition - J > KN is evidently satsified (as long as N is large), so we
need to verify conditions (i)-(v) of the lemma. (i) follows from Pareto efficiency.
(ii) is immediate. (iii) follows from monotonicity. (iv) is the definition of KCA
(and our monotonicity observation earlier). (v) is the definition of K*. Hence,
the lemma applies, and o- is bounded by a constant times N- 1/ 2 . This takes
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KAC -(N -K*) >. 12
= - C .
care of case (i).
(ii) KAB + KBC +KCA+KCB +KBA+KAc < 7S/2.
In this case one of the quantities KAB + KBC + KCA, KCB + KBA + KAC is at
most 7N/4. Without loss of generality we will assume
KAB +KBC +KCA < 7N (G.21)
-4
We can now focus our attention on the ABC - BCA - CAB simplex.
We will also assume for now the inequalities
89
KAB +KBC,KBC +KCA,KCA +KAB> - . (G.22)90
Afterwards we will come back to address the (easier) case where one of these
inequalities is violated.
An outline of our argument is illustrated in Figure G.1. In the top-left panel,
the dots marked on the edges of the simplex are the profiles (KAB ABC, N -
KAB BCA), (KBC BCA, N - KBc CAB), and (KCA CAB, N - KCA ABC).
The assumption KAB+KBC+KCA 7N/4 ensures that the downward-pointing
triangle in the figure has side length at least N/4. Consider the profile at the
center of the triangle, and without loss of generality assume that the winner
there is A. Then consider the smaller downward-pointing triangle (shown in the
bottom two panels). Using monotonicity we can show that at each profile in
the smaller triangle, f must choose either A or B. If f chooses A at the center
of the smaller triangle, then consider the shaded trapezoid in the bottom-left
panel of Figure G.1. By monotonicity arguments, f chooses either A or C at
each profile in the trapezoid, and chooses A near the left edge and C at the right
edge. Then we can apply Lemma 4.10 to this trapezoid. If instead f chooses B
at the center of the smaller triangle, then we consider the parallelogram shown
in the bottom-right panel, and similarly apply Lemma 4.10.
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ABC
BCA CAB
Figure G.1: Proof of Theorem 4.4 (case (ii))
189
Now we begin the proof properly. Let Po be a profile with
xO ABC (N + KAB + KBC - 2KcA)/3 ABC
Po= yo BCA (N +KBC + KCA - 2 KAB)/ 3 BCA
zo CAB (N + KCA + KAB - 2 KBC)/3 CAB
where the approximation means that we add or subtract at most 1 to each
component to ensure xo, yo, zo are integers. Inequality (G.21), together with
(G.22), ensure that xO, yo, zo are all positive. We have f(Po) = A, B, or C.
Without loss of generality, suppose henceforth that f(PO) = A.
Now take
-s - t ABC
T= s-BC A s < yo,t < zo, s +t > KCA}.
t C AB
Note that any profile P C T for which t = zo is obtained from P by changing
some BCA votes to ABC, so by monotonicity f(P) = A. Consequently, we
cannot have f(P) = C for any P E T: if f( -s-t ABC, s BCA,t CAB) = C,
then by monotonicity f(N - s - zo ABC, s BCA, zo CAB) = C, but this profile
is also in T and we showed that A must win there, a contradiction. Hence,
f(P) c {A, B} for all P E T.
Let P1 be a profile with
x 1 ABC (7N + KAB+ KBC - 8KcA)9 ABC
= y1 BCA ~0 (N - 5 KAB + 4KBc+4KcA)/9 BCA
z1 CAB ( + 4 KAB - 5KBc + 4KcA)/9 CAB
This profile is the "center of the smaller triangle" in Figure G. 1. Again, one can
verify that all components are positive. Moreover, P1 G T: all of the relevant
inequalities reduce (up to negligible rounding error) to KAB+KBC+KCA 2N,
which is true by (G.21). Therefore, f(P) E {A, B}. We have two cases.
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If f(P) = A, then we will apply Lemma 4.10 with
= ABC, BCA, CAB,
_ ~1 --
J = x1, J N - KcA - 4, 0= 4, K=y1- (N-KcA-4-xl),
Ai = A, Aj = C.
The required inequality J - J > iN follows directly from (G.21). We proceed
to verify conditions (i)-(v) of the lemma.
To verify condition (i), suppose for contradiction that f(J ABC, K BCA, N -
J - K CAB) = B for some J < J <J and 0 < K < K. By monotonicity,
f(J ABC, yi BCA, N - J - y1 CAB) = B also. (Note that K < K yi;
and this profile is well-defined since (G.21) and (G.22) imply J + y1 < N). But
since J > x1 , f(P) = A and monotonicity imply f(J ABC, y1 BCA, N - J -
y1 CAB) = A, a contradiction. Thus condition (i) of Lemma 4.10 holds.
Condition (ii) is immediate. (iii) follows from monotonicity given (i): if f(PJK)
= A then f(PJ+1,K-1) = A by monotonicity, and f (PJ+1,K) cannot equal C be-
cause then monotonicity would require f(PK) = C, so f(PJ+1,k) = A instead.
(iv) follows from the definition of KCA. And (v) holds because each of the rel-
evant profiles Pjx lies in the set T (checking the relevant linear inequalities is
straightforward), hence f(Pjg) = A or B; since we have already ruled out B
with condition (i), we must have f(Pj,-) = A for each J, and condition (v) is
satisfied. This checks all the conditions to apply Lemma 4.10, and we conclude
that o- is bounded below by a constant times N~11 .
If on the other hand f(P) = B, then we will apply Lemma 4.10 with
>= BCA, Y'= CAB, >"= ABC,
1 -
J=yi, J = yo - 4, K =R = zi,40
A = B) A=A.
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Again, the requirement J- J > riN follows from (G.21), so we proceed to verify
conditions (i)-(v).
If f (J BCA, K CAB, - J - K ABC) = C for some (J, K), then by
monotonicity we also have f (J BCA, zi CAB, N - J - zi ABC) = C. ((G.21)
and (G.22) ensure this is a valid profile.) But this profile lies in T, so we
should have f(J BCA, z1 CAB, N - J - zi ABC) E {A, B}, a contradiction.
This shows that condition (i) is satisfied. Condition (ii) is immediate. (iii)
follows from monotonicity given (i): if f(PJK) = B, then f(PJ+1,K-1) = B
by monotonicity, and we cannot have f(PJ+1,K) = A since then monotonicity
would imply f(PJK) = A as well, so we must have f(PJ+1,K) = B. (iv) follows
from N - 7 > KAB (which in turn follows from (G.21)). Finally, f(PjK) =
f(P) = B, so f(Pjkg) = B for all J (by condition (iii)), verifying (v). So we
have checked all the conditions, and Lemma G.21 applies. We again conclude
that o- is bounded below by a constant times N-1/ 2.
This completes the proof of case (ii) of the theorem as long as (G.22) is satis-
fed. It remains to address the case where (G.22) is violated. Without loss of
generality, we assume that
KCA + KAB < N.90
Then we can apply Lemma 4.10 with
-= ABC, >'= BCA, "= CAB,
1 --J = KAB +, ~- N - KcA - 1, -= , K = N - KAB - 1,
Ai = A, Aj = C.
It is clear that J - J> Kj-N as long as N is large, so we check (i)-(v).
For (i), suppose f (J ABC, K BCA, - J - K CAB) = B for some J, K
with J > KAB + 1. By monotonicity, f(J ABC, N - J BCA) = B also.
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This contradicts J > KAB. Then (i) follows. (ii) is immediate. (iii) holds by
monotonicity: if f(PJK) = A, then f(PJ+1,K-1) = A by monotonicity directly;
and f(PJ+1,K) = C would imply f(PJK) = C by monotonicity, a contradiction,
so from (i) we must have f(PJ+1,K) = A instead. (iv) follows from the definition
of KCA, and (v) follows from the definition of KAB. Thus all the conditions hold
and once again Lemma 4.10 assures us that o- is bounded below by a constant
times N1 /2 .
This completes the analysis of cases (i) and (ii). We have had to apply Lemma
4.10 with only finitely many values of K, so if we simply let c be the smallest of the
corresponding values of c(r,), then we have o > cN"1/2 in every subcase (as always,
assuming N is sufficiently large).
Finally, the foregoing analysis assumed that C consisted of just three candidates.
If there are more than three candidates, then let A, B, C be any three of them, and
restrict attention to (N + 1)-profiles (and beliefs) at which each voter ranks A, B, C
higher than any other candidate, with the remaining candidates all ranked according
to some fixed order. By Pareto efficiency, only A, B, or C can win at any such profile.
Then, all of the preceding analysis carries through directly, with the preferences ABC
replaced by ABC..., BCA replaced by BCA..., and so forth.
Next, we round out Subsection 4.5 by supplying the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Let ci be the constant given by Lemma C.8. Take
A, B, C to be any three different candidates. We consider two possibilities.
(i) Suppose there exists some K such that f(K B, N + 1 - K C) V {B, C}. Let
S G {1, .. ., N} be the set of all such values. Let a be the value given by Lemma
C.8 for the set S. Put <p = (a B, 1 - a C). The conclusion of the lemma can
be written as
Pr (f (C, P) {B, C}) - Pr (f (B, P) {B, C}) > ,
IID(#) ID(#) N
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where the probabilities are over opponent-profiles P drawn according to IID(#);
or equivalently,
Pr (f(B, P) C {B, C}) - Pr (f(C, P) c {B, C}) > '
IID(#) IID(#) N (G.23)
If the manipulator's true preference ranks C first and B second, then consider
the manipulation to reporting C, with the top-set C+ = {B, C}. The left side
of (G.23) is < o-, by (2.3). So we get o- > ci/N in this case.
(ii) Suppose that f(K B, N + 1 - K C) E {B, C} for all K. Assume that o- <
1/(N + 1) (otherwise we are done). We will first show that there exists exactly
one value of K such that f(1 A, K B, N - K C) V {B, C}.
For any a C [0, 1], consider (2.3) for a manipulator with true preference B... C,
considering a manipulation to A, with belief # = (a B, 1 - a C) and C+
C \ {C}. We get
N Ka
EP N;
K=0 N -K 1-a
I~ A
I fK B C C+
N-KCj
K + 1 B
-IN - K C+ ]
< 0-
1
<N +l'
Now integrate over a from 0 to 1, using the well-known identity f (NaK(1 _
a)N-K da = 1/(N+ 1). (The identity can be proven by showing that the integral
is equal at two successive values of K, since the difference of the integrals at K
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and K ± 1 is N+ J)aK+1(1 - a -)N-K I = 0.) This gives
1 A
KB
N-KC
EC+ _-I f K G C+
1
+K l<N±+1I
Applying (2.3) for a manipulator with true preference A ... C, considering a
manipulation to B, gives the same inequality with the left-hand side negated.
Hence, after multiplying through by N + 1, we get
N
EI f
K=0
1A
KB
N-KC
N K + 1B
C -(I f K #C <1.
K=) N-K C
The left side is an integer, so it must be zero.
Subtracting both of the sums from N + 1, we get the simpler equation
N
EI f
K=0
1 A
K B
N-KC
N
=C -(I f
K=0 (
K+1B
N-KC ) =C) =0.
Thus, the number of profiles with one A vote and all other votes B or C, such
that C wins, equals the number of profiles with all B or C votes, and at least one
B vote, such that C wins. This is in turn equal to the total number of profiles
with all B or C votes, such that C wins, minus one (since f(N + 1 C) = C by
unanimity).
By the same argument with B and C reversed, we see that the number of profiles
with one A vote and all other votes B or C, such that B wins, equals the total
number of profiles with all B or C votes, such that B wins, minus one.
Adding these two quantities, and using the fact that f(K B, N + 1 - K C) E
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E LN 1I
K=0 +1 Cf
{B, C} for all K by assumption, we see that there are exactly N profiles of the
form (1 A, K B, N - K C) at which either B or C wins. Hence, there is exactly
one profile of this form at which some other candidate wins, as claimed.
Let K* be the unique value for which f(1 A, K* B, N - K* C) ( {B, C}.
Now let KB be the minimum value such that f(KB B, N-KB C) = B. Let KC
be the maximum value such that f(KC B, N - KC C) = C. If f were simple
over B, C, we would have KB = Kc +1; but we no longer have this assumption.
Instead, we will show that KB and KC are both close to K*, and therefore close
to each other; this in turn will allow us to repeat the argument from the proof
of Theorem 4.7.
Let S = {K | f(K B, N+1 - K C) = C}. Let ac ;> Kc/N be the value given
by Lemma C.8 for this set. Assume that o- < ci/3N (otherwise we are done).
Consider a manipulator with belief #c = (ac B, 1 - ac C), preference A ... B,
manipulating to C. We will write P[K) rather than P(K, N - K I N; #c) to
save on notation. The manipulation cannot decrease the probability of B by
more than o-, hence
N11A
N 1AK B
ZP[K] I f KB =B -I f =B
K=0 N +1- K C
N-KG
< . (G.24)
Similarly, a manipulator with the same belief and preference A ... C, manipu-
lating to B, cannot decrease the probability of C by more than o-, hence
1 A
N K+1IB cl
SP [K] I f K B =C -1I f = C < 3*.
K=0 K N - KC 3N
(G.25)
Now add (G.24) and (G.25). Notice that the f(1 A, K B, N - K C) terms add
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up to cover each possible value of K exactly once, except for K = K*. Thus
we get
N
1 -P[K*] - P[K] x
K=O
K B
If
N (N+1-KC
< 2c 
.
3N
=B) +I (f ( K+1BN+1-KC)
But the remaining terms on the left side come under control because
I (f( K B
L +-N+1-K
N
=ZP[K] 1-I f
K=0 L
=B)
KB
N+1-K C
+I (f
) (N-KC)
I f K+1 B C
N-K C
N KB
=1+Z [P[K-1]-P[K]]I =C
K=0 N+1-K C
<1-
N
where the second equality comes from reindexing the sum, and the final inequal-
ity comes from Lemma C.8.
Combining with (G.26) gives
1 - P[K*] - 11 - < 3
or, finally,
P
K*
N - K*
N-
ac Cl
1-ac 3N
(G.27)
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=C
(G.26)
NK
(7P[K]
K=(
=C) +
Now combining (G.27) with Lemma C.4 gives
c1 3 NN(c-K*/N)2
3N
from which
K*
ac 
- N
in N - ln(c1/3)
N
As long as N is sufficiently large, the right-hand side is < N-1/3 . So we can
conclude
K c < acN < K* + N 2/3 .
Now, exactly the same argument with the roles of B and C reversed leads to
the conclusion that
KB K* - N2 /3
Therefore, we have
Kc - KB < 2N 2 /3 . (G.28)
This is the assertion that KB and Kc are close to each other, as promised.
(Notice also from the definitions that KB Kc + 1.)
From here, we will assume that f has susceptibility o- < 1/N and obtain a
contradiction, following the same steps as for Theorem 4.7. As long as N is
large enough, we may assume that KB < 2N/3 (otherwise KC > N/3, so just
switch B and C). Let
#1 = (ai B, 1 - a, C) Kc + V2with a, = min{ ,1}.N
Whenever more than Kc voters vote for B and the rest vote for C, B wins; so
the same Chebyshev argument as before gives f(# 1) = (-y B, 1 - 71 C) where
7y1 7/8. Let
#2 = (a 2 B, 1 - a2 C)
KB- \2N
with a 2 =max{ ~ 0},N
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and obtain f(# 2) = (72 B, 1 - 'Y2 C) where Y2 < 1/8.
Write 1 - 2= A(B - C). On account of (G.28), we have
A =ai - a 2 < 2v/2g-11 2 + 29-1/ 3 < 3V-1/3
as long as N is large. Again taking co to be the constant from Lemma 4.9, we
have
coNAo < 3coN-1/
3  1
8
as long as N is large. Exactly as before, we now define #3 = #1 + A(A - B) and
#4= #1 + A(A - C), and apply Lemma 4.9 to each of the pairs connected by
thick lines in Figure 4.5, obtaining constraints on the values of f(#3) and f(# 4)
until we reach a contradiction.
Finally, we give proofs of the ingredients for Theorem 4.1. We begin with Lemma
4.11.
Proof of Lemma 4.11: Let v denote the four-way difference on the left-hand
side of (4.7).
Put
W2 >3-4 f >
Apply Lemma 4.9(b) twice to the difference represented by wi: once letting C' be
the set of candidates A $ A , Aj such that (Wi)A > 0, and once letting C' be the set
of candidates A 4 Aj, A, such that (wi)A < 0. We obtain
E (wi)A 2coNaou < 2coTc.
A#Ai,Aj
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Likewise,
( |(w2)J 2coN-u.
A54Ai,Aj
Then, since v - w2 , we get
> Ivl < 4cN-R. (G.29)
Now put
a >-1 a >-1
W3= f 3-3 -f #-4 ,
a >-2 ae >-2
W4 = #3 >3 - f 4 -4
Using v = W- w4, analogous computations give
Z IVAI 4cNu. (G.30)
A#Ak,Ai
Now if {Ai, Aj} is disjoint from {Ak, Al}, then (G.29) and (G.30) immediately
lead us to EAC vAl < 8coNo- which is stronger than (4.7). Otherwise, {Ai, Aj} and
{Ak, Al} have one element in common - say Ai - in which case (G.29) and (G.30)
give EA$Ai |VA I 8coNo-. Since the sum of the components of v is zero, we also have
|VA I< 8coNu, and (4.7) follows.
We now prove the three main lemmas that combine to give the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 4.12: Suppose the conclusion does not hold. Then the same
reasoning as in case (i) of Theorem 4.7 gives a distribution 4 such that
Pr (f(CAB,P) = C) - Pr (f(CBA,P) = C) > c
fID(#) IID() N
If we consider a manipulator with true preference CBA, manipulating to CAB, with
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top-set C+ = {C}, then this gives us - > ci/N, contradicting the given.
Proof of Lemma 4.13: Define the following vectors in RM:
x ABC ...
y BAC...
z BAC...)
x ABC...
y ABC...
z BAC...
(we write e.g. (x ABC...,y BAC..., z BAC...) rather than (x ABC...,y +
z BAC...) to aid readability; no confusion should result)
x ACB...
y BAC...
z BAC ...
x CAB...
y BAC...
z BAC...
x CAB...
y BAC...
z BCA...)
x CAB...\
y BAC...
z CBA...
-T(
x ACB...
y ABC...
z BAC...
x CAB...
y ABC...
z BAC...
x CAB...
y ABC...
z BCA...
x CAB...
y ABC ...
z CBA...
By applying Lemma 4.11 repeatedly, we get
|vi - v21 16coNo-;
Iv3 - v4 1 5 16coNo;
|V2 - v 3 1 16coNo;
|v4 - v5 l 16coN-.
201
V1f
V2=f(
V3 = f
V4 = f
V5 = f
O_
Adding these and using the triangle inequality gives
|v1 - v 5 | 64coNo-.
Next, define
v'=IT(
x' ABC ...
y BAC...
z' BAC... )
x' CAB...
v = Z y BAC...
z' CBA...
Then the above reasoning also gives
x' ABC ...
y ABC ...
z' BAC ...
x' CAB...
y ABC ...
z' CBA ... 1J
Iv' - V1 < 64coNo,
and hence we obtain
I(v - V') - (v5 - v)I 128coo-.
Now define
x CAB...
W1 = y BAC ...
z CBA...
x CAB...
W2 =zf y BCA...
z CBA...
x CAB...
W3 =f y CBA...
z CBA...
)
x'CAB...
-Z y BAC ...
z' CBA...
x'CAB...
-f y BCA...
z' CBA...
x' CAB...
-I y CBA...
z' CBA...
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(G.31)
I.
Then Lemma 4.11 gives
jwi - w2 1 16coNo-; |w2 - w31 < 16coN-,
so by the triangle inequality,
|Wi - w 3 1 32coNo-.
However, w 3 = 0, because our assumption (4.8) implies that both f(---) values in
the definition of w3 are just C with probability 1. Thus we actually have
wit 32coNo-. (G.32)
Similarly define
W4 = (
W5 
= f
W6(
x CAB...
y ABC...
z CBA...)
x CAB...
y ACB...
z CBA...)
x CAB...
y CAB...
z CBA...
Lemma 4.11 gives
-i(
-'C
-'C
x' CAB...
y ABC...
z' CBA...
x' CAB...
y ACB...
z' CBA...
x' CAB...
y CAB...
z' CBA...
|w4 - W5 1 16coNo-,
|w5 - W6 < 16coN-,
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)
and as before we actually have w6 = 0, so we conclude
1w41 32c0 NR. (G.33)
Notice now that v5 - v' = Wi - w 4, so (G.32) and (G.33) give us
|v5 - v5| < 64coNo-,
and combining this with (G.31) we obtain
lvi - v'| 192c 0 No. (G.34)
This is exactly what we sought to prove. l
Proof of Lemma 4.14: We proceed by considering the behavior of f near the
endpoints of the ABC... - BAC ... edge, showing that f cannot be very close to
linearity.
Given f, let M denote the supremum of the left-hand side of (4.11), over all choices
of X, y, z, x', z'. We consider two cases.
(i) There is some K < such that f (K BAC..., - K ABC ... ) $ A. In
this case, as long as N is sufficiently large, we have
- 1- K/S ABC ... R- K ~ 1- K|NfA < 1-P N;
K/N BAC... K KI
< 1-NTy
< 1
f2N
by Lemma 2.4 and the asymptotic behavior of au. Therefore by taking x =
1 - K/N, y = K/N, z = 0, and noting f(x + y ABC..., z BAC...) =A by
weak unanimity, we get
1
(V)A 2-
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It follows that for any choices of x', z' > 0 with x' + z' = 1 - K/N,
(vI)A <-
N2NV
+ M.
In particular, for any positive integer r < L2VN], we may take x' = 1 -
rK/N, z = (r - 1)KN to obtain
_ (
(1 - rKN) ABC.
rK/N BAC...
If we apply this inequality for r = 1, 2,
-fA
1
2N
(1- (r - 1)K/) ABC
(r - 1)K/N BAC... )
+ M.
... ,r = L2vfNj and telescope, we obtain
fA
(1- TK/N) ABC...
TK/N BAC... ) 1 ABC...0 BAC...
The left side cannot be lower than 0 - 1 = -1, so
-1 < T -;
which leads to
1M>N
1
1 (
+ M)
A/2 - 1
(ii) For all K < \/NN/2, f(K BAC..., N - K ABC ... ) = A. Then apply Lemma
C.9 with c = 1/6 to conclude that if an N-profile P is drawn IID(a BAC ... , 1-
a ABC...) for any a < 1/61K, then the probability that f(P) 74 A is at most
1/N, as long as N is sufficiently large.
Let s be an integer with 6\/K < s < 7\1N. Then taking x = 1 - 1/s, y = 1/s,
z = 0, and again using f(x + y ABC... , z BAC .. .) = A by weak unanimity,
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) 12N +M) .
1)
we get
1
(V)A >-~. N
So for any choices of x', z' > 0 with x' + z'= 1 - 1/s, we have
1
(VIDA > - M.N
In particular, for any r = 0, ... , s - 1, we can take x' = (s - 1 - r)/s and
z= r/s to obtain
- 1 -(r +1)|s ABC... _ 1- rs ABC ... 1
f A (- fA ) ~> M.(r +1)/s BAC ... r/s BAC... N
Summing for r = 0,... , s - 1 and telescoping gives
0 ABC... - 1ABC... 1
fAt I -f S M 1 .
1 BAC ... /0 BAC... / N
Using weak unanimity, the left side equals 0 - 1 = -1, so
-1 s ( - M)
from which
1 1 1
M> ~>
s N "-yV/
In both cases (i) and (ii), we showed that M was bounded below by a function of
N that is asymptotically equal to a constant times i/11i, which is exactly what the
lemma claims.
Now we give the proof of Theorem 4.6. Essentially, we just need to replace Lemma
4.14 with a corresponding statement giving a sharper bound for simple rules:
Lemma G.1 There exists some absolute constant c3 , independent of N, with the
following property: As long as N is large enough, for any f that is simple over A and
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B, there exist some nonnegative x, y) z, x', z' with
x ABC...
y+z BAC..()
x+y ABC...
z BAC...
x' ABC ...
y+ z' BAC.. ) x'+ y ABC.z' BAC...
Proof: Let K* be the threshold such that f(K ABC...,N - K BAC...) = A
iff K > K*. Just as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, assume that K* < N/2 (otherwise
switch A and B), and put
#1 = (a1 ABC..., 1 - ai BAC...)
42 = (a 2 ABC...,1 - a 2 BAC...) w
with K* + 2Nafi = ~
ith a2 = max{K* - 2
N
By simplicity, f(#1),f(2) both put positive weight only on A and B, and by the
same Chebyshev argument as in Theorem 4.2, f(#1) puts probability at least 7/8 on
A, while f(# 2 ) puts probability at most 1/8 on A.
Next put
#3 = (a3 ABC...,1 - a 3 BAC...) with a3 = 2ai - a 2.
Since a3 > ai, the same Chebyshev argument gives that f(#3) puts probability at
least 7/8 on A (and the remaining probability on B). We now have
|f(#1) - f(#2)| 2 3/2,
If (43) - f(#1)| 1 1/4.
Now take
x = ai, y = a 2 - a 1 z = 1 - a 2 ,
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(7 (G.35)
SC 3.)
,0 .
X = a3 , z'= 1 -a 1 .
The expression on the left side of (G.35) reduces to
- -- 3 1 5|(f (#1) - f(#2)) - (f (#3) - f(#1)) - - - -2 4 4
which proves the lemma. L]
Proof of Theorem 4.6: As usual, it suffices to assume N is large enough so
that Lemma G.1 applies. Assume A, B, C are chosen so that f is simple over A and
B. Let co, ci, c3 be as in Lemmas 4.12, 4.13, G.1. Either o- 2 ci/N, and we are done;
or else Lemma 4.12 applies, in which case (4.10) and (by simplicity) (G.35) apply;
combining these gives o- > c3/192coN. L
H Construction for quickly-decaying susceptibil-
ity
We provide here the construction of a tops-only voting rule that attains susceptibility
on the order of N- with r > 1/2, as required by Theorem 4.3. The actual con-
struction is more elaborate than the approximate random dictatorship sketched in
the main paper, so we first give a more detailed overview.
The main idea behind the construction is to subdivide the simplex of vote profiles
into blocks as illustrated in Figure H.1. Within each block, we then assign winners
A1 , ... , Am to the various profiles, in proportions that correspond to the position of
the block in the vote simplex.
More specifically, in order to avoid creating especially large opportunities for ma-
nipulation near the edge of the vote simplex, we need to focus on viable candidates
at each vote profile, as in the construction of the pair-or-plurality system in Subsec-
tion 3.3. Roughly speaking, each candidate needs to get more than some threshold
number of votes to be considered viable; the threshold will be taken to be (asymptot-
ically) some constant A times N. Then, for each set C' of candidates, we consider the
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Figure H.1: Sketch of the construction for Theorem 4.3
subspace of vote profiles in which the viable candidates are precisely the members of
C', and carve up this set of profiles into blocks, depending on how many votes each
viable candidate receives. All blocks have equal size S along each of the dimensions
corresponding to a viable candidate.
For any given block, we define a weight for each viable candidate by subtract-
ing AN from her vote total. We then assign each viable candidate to some profiles
within the block, so that the fraction of profiles assigned to a given candidate is ap-
proximately proportional to her weight. Within the block, we use Lemma C.11 to
determine exactly which profiles are assigned to each candidate so that the difference
between a candidate's relative probability and her weight is kept small.
Consider now the susceptibility of a voting rule defined in this way, with blocks of
size S. When the manipulator changes his vote, this affects the distribution over real-
ized vote profiles in two ways: it changes the distribution over blocks, and it changes
the distribution over profiles within each block. By considering the distribution within
each block, we show that the distribution over winning candidates equals the distri-
bution is pinned down by the distribution over blocks to within order SdN-(d-2)/2
(ignoring constant factors). Here d is the value used in applying Lemma C.11. We
also show that the change across blocks affects the distribution over candidates on the
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order of S-1/dN-1/ 2 . Hence, our construction gives an upper bound for susceptibility
that is approximately on the same order as max{SdN-(d- 2 )/2 , S- 1/"N- 1/ 2}. In order
to achieve the fastest possible rate of decline in susceptibility as N -+ 00, we choose
d = 6 and S ~ N 9/37 , with the resulting rate of decline N 20/37 . We will henceforth
use these numbers for concreteness. 9
Proof of Theorem 4.3: We first give the exact construction of the voting
system. Fix constants A, p with 0 < A < 1/M and 0 < p < 1 - MA. Also fix a with
0 < a < min{A/3, p/3, (1 - MA - p)/(M + 1)}.
For each value of N, choose integers SN, LN, RN such that
S N - 2 6h for some integer h and N9/ 3 7 < SN 26 /37
" LN ~AN;
e RNSN ~ pN.
We will henceforth refer to these as S, L, R, with the dependence on N implicit.
Verbally, we refer to them as the block size, viability lower bound, and number of
blocks (in each dimension).
A block label is a sequence consisting of M- 1 or fewer (possibly zero) nonnegative
integers, whose sum is at most R.
Given a profile P = (xi Ai, ... , XM AM), we compute a corresponding block label
BL(P) by the following algorithm:
1. For each i = 1,... , M, if x < L, put Ai = 0. Otherwise, put Ai = L(xi -
L)/SJ + 1.
2. Let t be the smallest index such that Ai + ... + At > R. Notice that t must
exist, since
A1 + - -- + Am 1 + + xM - ML (1 - MA)N 1 - MA
R RS RS yL
91t is possible to achieve faster rates of convergence through minor improvements on the con-
struction, but we do not bother doing so here, since we have not found a construction showing that
the exponent -1 in Theorem 4.2 is tight.
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Then define BL(P) to be the (t - 1)-term sequence (A1,.. ., At_ 1).
Given a block label A, we define the corresponding block as BL-'(A), obtained
by inverting the above procedure. For each candidate Ai we construct a lower bound
x and an upper bound Ti on the number of votes: If A = (A 1, . . . , At_ 1), then
" if i < t - 1 and Ai = 0, put z. = 0 and Y = L - 1;
" if i < t - 1 and Ai > 0, put xi = S(Aj - 1) + L and 2 = SAi + L - 1;
" fori=t, put xi=S(R-EAj)+Land i =N+1;
e fori>t,putzj =0andi= N+ 1.
Then one readily checks that BL 1 '(A) is the set of all (N + 1)-profiles of votes
(Xi, ... , XM) such that zi xi < Tj for all i.
We also define weights W(A), for each block label A and each candidate Aj: if
A = (A1 , ... , At_1 ) then
* for i < t - 1, Wi(A) = Ai/(R + 1);
* for i = t, Wi(A) = 1 - Z, Aj/(R + 1);
e for i > t, W(A) = 0.
Thus we always have Ej Wi(A) = 1.
We further modify these weights by rounding down to integer multiples of 1/ 2h:
for each i < M, define the rounded weight W(A) = L2 W(A)]/2h, and put WM(A) =
1j- E1 1 W (A).
Let S = 2 6h, and let Z = {0, 1,... , 26h - 1} be partitioned into 2 h subsets
Zo,..., Z 2 h- 1 according to Lemma C.11. For each block label A, we let gA be any
function from {0, 1,... ., 2 h -} -+ C such that IgA'(Ai)| = 2hW (A) for each candidate
Aj. Thus, the proportion of values of y on which gA takes the value Ai equals the
rounded weight of Ai.
Finally, we are ready to define the voting rule f. Given a profile of votes, P =
(xi A1 ,... , xm AM), we define f(P) as follows:
211
* Let (A,..., At- ) = A = BL(P) be the block label.
" If every term Ai is zero, then let f(P) = At.
" Otherwise, consider the smallest i such that Ai > 0. Let
Xi = (xi - L) - S * .
Then si is an element of Z. So Yi c Z. for exactly one y. Put f(P) = gA(Y).
This defines the voting rule. The statement of Theorem 4.3 promised that it
would be Pareto efficient and tops-only. Tops-onliness is clear from the construction,
so we should check Pareto efficiency. Evidently we must check that f(P) is always a
candidate who gets at least one vote in profile P. If every term Ai of the block label
BL(P) is zero, then At > R > 1 so that xt > 0. Otherwise, notice that whenever Ai is
a candidate with Ai = 0, then W(A) = 0, and so gA(y) # Ai for all y. Consequently
we cannot have f(P) = Ai for any such i. Thus, f(P) must be a candidate Ai for
whom Ai > 0, implying xi > 0.
Our remaining task is to prove the susceptibility bound. The proof of the bound
is based on two claims. Let f be an arbitrary small positive constant.
Claim I. There is a constant c, such that the following holds. For all distributions
# E A(C), all candidates Aj, Aj,
Pr4(f(Aj, P) = Aj) - E Pr,((Aj, P) G BL-1 (A))Wi4(A) < cN- / -E.
A
Here the Pr-(... ) expressions refer to probabilities concerning the profile (A,, P),
given that P is formed by having each of the N other voters drawn independently
from #.
Claim II. There is a constant crr such that the following holds. For all distribu-
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tions # e A(C), and all candidates Aj, Aj, Ak,
Z Pr((Aj, P) E BL-'(A))Wi(A) - ZPro ((Ak, P) C BL-'(A))Wd(A)
A A
< cIIN-( 20/ 37 -e). (H.1)
We shall prove these two claims, then show how this quickly completes the proof
of the theorem.
Proof of Claim I. We rewrite the expression inside the absolute value as
[Pro((Aj, P) E BL-'(A) and f(Aj, P) = Aj) - Pro((Aj, P) E BL1(A)Wi(A))].
A
For each block label A consisting of zeroes, the relevant difference is zero. (If t - 1
is the length of A, then Wt(A) = 1, while wi(A) = 0 for i # t; and f takes the value
At throughout BL-'(A).) So we can restrict to the sum over A having a nonzero
component.
For each candidate Ak, k < M, let ek,t be the set of all block labels A with length
t - 1 such that A, = 0 for all 1 < k, but Ak > 0. It suffices to show that there is a
constant c', independent of #, such that
E [Prg((Aj,P) E BL-1 (A) n f1 (Ai)) - Pr((AjP) E BL'(A))Wi(A)]
AEEk,t
< c'N-(/3-) (H.2)
First consider any distribution # such that #t < a. If P ~ IID(#), then the
number of votes received by candidate At in P has expectation #$N < aN and
variance #t(1 - #t)N < aN, so by Chebyshev, the probability that At's vote count is
at least 2aN is < 1/aN. Consequently, the probability that (Aj, P) gives At at least
2aN + 1 votes is < M/gN. Notice that at every profile in any block A E ek,t, we
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must have At 2 1 from which xt > L > 2&N + 1. Thus
S Pro((Aj, P) C BL-1(A)) M/gN. (H.3)
AEEk,t
But both probabilities on the left side of (H.2) are bounded above by the sum in
(H.3), hence (H.2) holds in this case (with the appropriate choice of c').
Similarly, consider any distribution 4 such that #k < a. Because every block
A E 6k,t must have Ak 1, from which any profile in such a block must have
Xk L > 2qN + 1, we can follow the same argument to show that (H.2) is satisfied
again.
This means we can henceforth restrict to distributions # such that
#t > a and #k k a.
For any #, let I be the highest index such that #1 2 q; thus 1 > t.
Consider any block A = (A1 ,... , At_1) E Ek,t. For each s = 1,... , M, define
bounds I, ,, as in the computation of BL-1 (A) above. Consider any given values
x, with x, < XS < T., for each s 74 k, 1; write X3 k1 for the vector of such values.
Define [x-k1] to be the set of all profiles having the specified number of votes for each
candidate A,, s $ k, 1.
We further break down the left-hand side of (H.2) by summing over different values
of Xkl. Define notations
fl 1 (A, aXkl) = Pro ((Aj, P) E BL-1(A) n [X 1] fn f-'(Aj))
Ul2(A, x-kl) = Pro ((Aj, P) E BL-1(A) n [X{ I]) -W(A).
Then in the left-hand side of (H.2), the first expression is EX-kl f 1 (A, Xkl) (where the
sum is over all possible vectors Xkl), and the second expression is Z U H 2(A, X-kl).
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Thus, (H.2) is equivalent to
[iH1(A,X-zkt) - fl 2 (A, X-kl)] <'N (.4)
AEEk,t
X-kL
We prove this by breaking into several cases depending on the choice of A and
X-kI. We first deal with cases that have low probability, so that their contribution
to the sums of 111, 12 in (H.4) is small; and then we can deal with the substantive
case where we actually make use of the elaborate construction behind f within each
block.
(i) First, for each s :A k, 1, consider choices of X-kl that have Ix, - #8N > ceN/M.
The probability that (A,, P) gives candidate As such a number of votes is at
most the probability that P gives A. a number of votes within aN/2M of #,N.
By the usual Chebyshev argument, this probability is < 4M 2 /aN.
Since EA 1 (A, x-k) < Pro ((Aj, P) c [xuk1]), the sum of Il1 (A, Xzk) over all
A and all Xkl with Ix. - # 81NI > aN/M is at most 4M 2/aN. Similarly, the
same holds for 12. Thus, all the pairs (A, Xkl) for which Ix, - #,Nj > aN/M
make a total contribution to the left side of (H.4) that is bounded above by a
constant times N- 1.
(ii) Next, consider choices of A that have I(S(Ak - 1) + L) - #kNI > aN/M. If
(A,, P) is in such a block BL 1 (A), then the number of votes for candidate Ak
is between xk = S(Ak - 1) + L and yk = SAk + L - 1. For N sufficiently large,
this means that the number of votes for Ak in P is more than (q/2M)N away
from #kN. Again, this occurs with probability < 4M 2/gN.
Since EXk, Il 1 (A, Xkl) < Pro((Aj, P) E BL- 1(A)), and similarly for r12, the
pairs (A,X kl) for which I(S(Ak - 1) + L) - #kN| > aN/M make a total con-
tribution to the left side of (H.4) that is bounded above by a constant times
N- 1.
From this and the previous bullet point, we see that in proving (H.4) it suffices
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to restrict attention to pairs (A, Xkl) for which
Ix - #sN| 5 N/M for all s # k, 1; (H.5)
|(S(Ak - 1) + L) - $kN| < N/M. (H.6)
That is, the contribution of all other pairs to the sum in (H.4) is negligible.
(iii) We will show that (H.5) and (H.6) imply
II, (A, Xkt) - 12(A, Xzk1)| c"N-(48 /37 -')Pr4((Aj, P) c [X-kl]) (H.7)
where c" is a constant not depending on #, N, or Xzkl.
We proceed by first showing that BL-1(A) n [zX-k] contains exactly 2k - lk + 1
profiles. That is, for every choice of Xk with k5 k -< Xk, there is exactly one
choice of x, such that the profile (Xk, X1, z.kl) is in BL- 1(A)n[X-k]. The relevant
choice of x, would of course be xz = Xk+1 - Xk, where Xk+1 = N + 1 - Esok,l Xs,
so we just need to check that this value of x, always lies between the bounds x_
and Y1.
There are two cases for the lower bound:
- If 1 > t, then xi = 0. We have
z = N+1- EXs -Xk
sAk,l
> N+1-Z(psN+N/M)- k
s#k,l
> ($k - $I)N - (M - 2)aN/M - SAk - L
> (Ok + $ N - (M - 2)qN/M - (S - L +4 kN + |MN) - L
= piN - (M - 1)qN/M - S
> aN/M - S
> 0
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as long as N is sufficiently large.
- If 1 = t, then x = S(R - Est A,) + L. We also know, by definition of 1,
that <p < a for each s > t, so (H.5) implies x. < q(1 + 1/M)N for each
such s.
Let v be the constant 1 - a(M + 1) - (MA + p) > 0. We have
,= N+1-ZXs
s~t
> N+1-( Y-
s<t
> N+1-Z(SAs
S<t
E(l + 1/M)N
s>t
+L- 1)-a(M+1)N
> N(1- g(M+1))-SEAs-(M-1)L
s<t
=(MA+p~t)NSZA,-ML+L
S<t
> ML+RS-SZAs-ML+L
s<t
(when N is sufficiently large)
= S(R-ZAs)+L.
s<t
Thus the lower bound is satisfied when 1 = t as well.
As for the upper bound, in both cases, , = N + 1. Then
x=N+1-( ZXs-k N+1
s#k,j
so the upper bound is always satisfied.
Thus BL-1 (A) n [Xzk1] contains exactly Xk - _k + 1 = S profiles.
For each profile (Xk, X1, zX_), we will explicitly write out the probability of this
profile being the realized value of (A,, P). Specifically, let (Xz, X, Xzl) be
identical to (Xk, XI, X-k) except that the j-component has been decreased by
1. (There is no more succinct way to write this without breaking into cases
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dependinding whether j = k, j = 1, or neither.) Likewise put X-+t = -I+ x,
and #k+l = #k +# 1 and #_k1 for the vector of other components of #. Then the
probability of achieving (Xk, XI, X-k) is
xk
xk+ Nk+I i\xk #k/k+lP g N; # = PN; P5k) K xi±l;
1x-k # xl- #i/#1'kI /0 kI I
Xk1
by Lemma C.2.
For succinctness, write
4 ~ _0 +tN k+1
ZikI 0-k1
for the first factor, which is independent of Xk, and
Xk Okl#k+l
P(xk ) = P xk+l)
xk±V - Xk
for the second factor.
Let x- = Xk or x - 1 (depending whether j = k or j # k). Then the possi-
ble values of xk corresponding to profiles (Xk, XI, X-k) c BL-1 (A) n [x-kl] are
exactly the numbers x- +z, for z E Z. (Recall we defined Z = {0, 1,.. , S- 1}.)
Now, we have #k/#k+ 2 #4 o, and likewise #1/k+1 > Q. We also have
Xk+l - #k+N - aN - 1 (using (H.5)) > aN - 1, a lower bound that grows
linearly in N.
Consequently, we can apply Lemma C. 11, with d = 6. As long as N is greater
than some absolute threshold No, we have the inequality for any two values
Yy E0 {I,1...,72h - 1
S P(xi + z) - 5 (x-+ z) <; 241hN-6(!-n). (H.8)
z+Z ze<21
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This inequality is the key step in the proof of Claim I; it was for this reason
that we needed to use the sets Z,, in constructing f.
Since h < In(N) < N'/ 3 for large N, and
2 41h = S 4116 (constant) -N 23 / 74 ,
we can simplify the right side of
Z(1k + z)
zEZy
-
zEZyr
(H.8) to give
P(zk + z)
Next, sum over all choices of y' E {0, 1, ... , 2' - 1} and use the triangle inequal-
ity. Since 2 h = S1/6 > N 3 /74 , we obtain
P(x- + z)
zEZy
2 6h_ 1
- E (4O +
z=0
z) (constant) -N ).
Sum again over all y with gA(y) = Aj, and then also divide by 2h. The right-
hand side has been multiplied by VVj(A)/2h < 1, and so we get
<_ (constant) - N( E) (H.9)
(after simplifying the exponent on the right side).
Now we return to the definitions of Hi and 112. Notice that H, (A, X-k1) is the
sum of the probabilities of profiles (Xk, X1) X-kl) c BL- 1 (A) n [zaXk] on which f
takes the value Aj. Writing f^(rk) for f(Xk, Xk+ - k, Xkl), we have
HI,(A,X k) = /3P(x + z).
z:f(lk+z)=Ai
219
(constant) -N 74
E
YE9A 1 (At)
zEZy
P4k + Z) - WV(A) k(+
z=o
z)
Moreover, by assumption Ak > 0, while A, = 0 for all 1 < k. Therefore, the
construction of f on the block BL- 1 (A) implies that f^(1k + z) = A, if and only
if z E Z. for some y such that gA(y) = A2. That is,
U1i(A, x_ c) = #P(X- + z).
yCg '(Aj)
zczy
Meanwhile, 11 2 (A, Xkl) is the sum of the probabilities of all profiles in BL-'(A)fn
[X-kl], regardless of the corresponding values of f, multiplied by W (A). This
can be written as
2 6h-1
U2(A,~~ za)= #(zI + z) -W(A).
z=O)
Now we see that multiplying (H.9) by # gives
IH1(A,x zkl) - r 2 (A, x)1 (constant) -# - N-0.
Since /= Prp((Aj, P) E [2Xki], we see that this is exactly (H.7), as promised.
This completes the main goal of item (iii). Before leaving this case, however,
let us consider what happens when we hold fixed X-Lk and sum over A. If
BL-1(A) n [xk1] = 0, then Hl(A, x-kl) = fl2(A, Xzkl) = 0, so these choices of A
will contribute nothing to the sum on the left-hand side of (H.4). How many
block labels A make a nonzero contribution, i.e. satisfy BL-1 (A) n [Xz1j # 0?
Suppose A is such a block label, with length t - 1. For each s < t - 1 except for
s = k, the value of A, is uniquely determined by the constraint x. <x x, V".
(Recall that 1 > t.) This determines every component of A except for Ak, and
so we get at most R + 1 such block labels.
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Now we are ready to complete the proof of (H.2). Consider the sum
E[fl1(A, X_ k) - U2(A, z._I)]
AcEk,t
X-kL
on the left side of (H.2). Each term of the sum is indexed by a pair (A, X3kl). Again,
we can consider only terms with BL- 1 (A) n [x-] =,A 0, because the other terms are
all zero.
All the terms for which X-Yk violates (H.5) have a total sum whose absolute value
is bounded by a constant times N'1 (this was case (i)). All the terms for which A
violates (H.6) have a sum that is again bounded by a constant times N-1 (this was
case (ii)). For the remaining terms, we apply case (iii). Consider any X-kl satisfying
(H.5). Sum over all A that satisfy (H.6). Using (H.7), and our previous observation
that at most R + 1 choices of A make a nonzero contribution to the left-hand side,
we get
E
AcEk,t
A satisfies (H.6)
[H1l(A, x-kI) - U2 (AIxk)]I
" (constant) -N- Pro ((Aj, P)
" (constant) - N- Pro((Ay, P)
E [X-k] ) - (R + 1)
E [x-kl])
since R + 1 < (constant)
obvious fact that
- N28/37 . Summing over all choices of X-kI, and using the
E
Xki satisfies (H.5)
Pro((Aj, P) C [xI]) < 1,
we obtain
E
AEEk,t satisfying (H.6)
x-kl satisfying (H.5)
[IH1(Ajxut) - fl2 (A,X.k)] (constant) -N-(2-').
These three cases together cover every possible pair (A, X-kI). So, adding them
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together, we obtain (H.4). We already saw that (H.4) was equivalent to (H.2), so we
have proven (H.2) and the proof of Claim I is complete.
Proof of Claim II. Rewrite the asserted bound as a sum over all N-profiles P:
( Pro(P)WV(BL(Aj, P)) -3 PrO(P) WV(BL(Ak, P)) < c1 N-( 20 / 37 -e)
P P
or equivalently
P (P I N; <) [iW(BL(Ay, P)) - NW (BL(A,, P))] < ciN-(2 0 /3 7 e). (H.10)
P
Notice that the P term on the left side can only be nonzero if (Aj, P) and (Ak, P) are
in different blocks. In fact, it is necessary not only that these two terms be in different
blocks but that these blocks have different rounded weights for A. We will bound
the left side of (H.10) by bounding both the probability of drawing a P for which
BL(Aj, P) and BL(Ak, P) have different rounded weights for Aj, and the amount by
which these rounded weights can differ.
Specifically, we will show
PrrD(4,f)(W (BL(Aj, P)) $ W(BL(Ak, P))) < (constant) -N~(1/2-e) (H.11)
and
W (BL(Aj, P)) - Wi(BL(A,, P)) < (constant) -N-3/7 4  for each P. (H.12)
First, we prove (H.11). Without loss of generality we may assume j < k.
Define A1,..., Am from the profile (A3 , P) following the block label algorithm,
and put A = (A 1,..., At_ 1 ) = BL(Aj, P). Similarly define A' ... , A' from (Ak, P),
and put A' = (A',..., A',_1 ) = BL(Ak, P). Notice that A, = A' for each s, except
possibly if s = j or s = k, in which case we may have A' = Aj - 1 or A' = Ak + 1,
respectively.
We consider all the cases in which W(A) $ W (A'). There are several possibilities,
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depending whether the lengths t, t' are different or equal.
(a) It may be that t < t'.
(b) It may be that t > t'.
If t = t', then we must have j < t and 14/ (A) # W, (A'), or else k < t and
Wk(A) $ Wk(A'): otherwise, W,(A) = W,(A') for all s. Thus we have just two
remaining possibilities:
(c) j < t and W, (A) $ Wj (A').
(d) k < t and Wk(A) Wk (A/).
We will deal with each of these cases in turn, and show that the probability of
each one is bounded above by a constant times N-(/2e>
(a) If t < t', then Ai+---+At > Rbut A'+---+A' < R. This canonlyhappen if
j < t, A = Aj - 1 and A1 + - - -+ At = R + 1. We will estimate the probability
of these latter two equalities jointly occurring, for any fixed value of t > j.
Write (Aj, P) = (xi A1,..., xm AM) as usual. To have A = Aj - 1 we must
have xi = L+ A3S exactly. We claim that we need only worry about values of xj
that are within 2N1//2  n N of #jN. Indeed, using Lemma C.4, the probability
of realizing any given value of xj outside this range is at most
-N- (2N- 1 / 2 /n-N) 2  -2lnN _ -2e 2e -N ,
so the total probablity of realizing all such xj is at most N-1.
We may also assume that a < #3 < 1 - a. For if #3 < a andx. y <#N +
2N1/ 2 ln N, then x < L (as long as N is large enough); and if #j > 1 - a and
zy ;> pyN - 2N1/2f1_nN, then zy > L + RS > L + AjS (again for large N).
The number of possible values of x = L + AjS that are within 2N1/ 2v/niN of
#5N is at most a constant times N'/S/In N/S < Ni/ 2 +E/S. Moreover, for each
such value, the probability of realizing it is at most a constant times N- 2 ,
223
by Lemma C.7. (Note that x < L ~ AN and N - xz < N - (L + RS)
(1 - A - p)N.)
Therefore,
PTIID(<p)(j = L + AS) (constant) N6/S.
Now, conditional on the value of xi = L + A S, the remaining terms xj are
distributed multinomially (by Lemma C.2). What is the probability that A1 +
- -- + At = R + 1?
As long as Aj < R + 1, we are looking for the probability, under the specified
multinomial distribution, that
E AS=R+1-Ai.
1<s<t
Consider any realization of the profile for which this occurs. If we let F be
the set of indices s (1 < s < t, s 5 j) such that A, > 0, then we also have
sEr As = R + 1 - A, > 0.
Consider any possible choice of the nonempty set F not containing j, and es-
timate the probability that EsEr As = R + 1 - Aj, conditional on the value of
zj = L + AjS. Since |x, - L - S(As - 1)| < S for each s E F, the desired event
can happen only if
( zS - (|r|IL + S( R + 1 - Aj -|T|F)) < |F| - S.
sEr
This requires that the sum EsEr XS - which is binomially distributed - should
lie between the lower bound
|FIL + S(R +1 - Aj - Fl) - FIS
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and the upper bound
IFIL + S(R +1 - A, - FI)+ iIS.
The lower bound is at least
FIL + S(1 - 2M) > -N2
when N is large, and the upper bound is at most
IIL+S(R+ 1 +M) < ML+ RS+ (M+ 1)S
<1+ A + N
2
when N is large. Therefore, each realization of Eer x, has probability bounded
by a constant times N-1 2 by Lemma C.7, and so their total probability is at
most
(2|J'I -S + 1) - (constant) - N-
Summing over all possible sets 17 (there are certainly at most 2 M-1 possibilities),
we see that
PrIID(4) (As = R+ 1 - Ai
\ser
for some set F,j OF xj =L+
< (constant) -S - N-11 2  (H
for each fixed choice of Aj < R + 1.
Therefore,
PrIID(+) (A1 + .- -+ At = R + 1 | = L + AjS) (constant)-N-1/2
for each fixed choice of A, < R + 1.
.13)
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AS)
Finally,
PrIID()(A =Aj+ and A, +--.+At =R+1)
< EPrIID(#)(xj = L + AjS and A,+ -+ At = R +1)
Aj
<( Z PrIID(p) (X= L + AjS) x
Aj<R+1
PrIID(#)(Al + + At= R + 1 Ixj = L + AS))
+PrIID(p)(xj = L + (R + 1)S)
< E PrTIID($)(Xj = L + Aj S) - (constant) -N-1/2S
Aj<R+1
+(constant) - N 112
< (E PrIID(p)(Xj = L + AjS)) (constant) -N-1/2S
Aj
+(constant) - N-112
< (constant) - (N'/S) -N-1 2S + (constant) -N-112
< (constant) - N-
This shows that the total probability of case (a) is at most a constant times
N-(12e
(b) If t > t', then A1 + - - -+ At, < R but A'1+ - + A', > R. This can only happen
ifk<t, A' Ak +1 and A'1+ + A', = R + 1. From here we proceed exactly
as in case (a), with A and A' interchanged, and with the role of j played instead
by k. We thus see that the probability of case (b) is also at most a constant
times N-(/2 e)
(c) Suppose j < t. If W47(A) # WVj(A'), it must certainly happen that W(A) 7
W (A'), which requires A3 74 A (since j < t). As in (a), this requires A' = A - 1
and xj = L + A, S exactly. Also as in (a), we need only worry about values of xj
that are within 2N'/ 2 /ln N of <pN, because the total probability of all other
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values of xj is at most N- 1. Note that
|xj - #5NI < 2N1 2 IlnN
is equivalent to
pj N-L <
S
However, A' = Aj -
2N1/ 2 inN
S
1 implies W (A') = Wj (A) - 1/(R + 1), and therefore
2hWy(A') = 2hW(A) - .
For the rounded weights to differ, 1j (A') / 1, (A) or equivalently
(2hW,(A)J / L2hW (A)],
it must be that
h 2^K < 2hW (A) < K + 1
for some integer K. Writing this in terms of Aj, we have
K < 2hlA
~R+1 K +R+1I
Now, for each integer K, we get exactly one choice of Aj that satisfies this.
Moreover, the difference between two successive such values of Aj is at least
I / J > [(constant)2h/(R + 1)-~
.N/S
-SJ = L(constant) - N 53 '74].
S1/6
For N sufficiently large, this is bigger than the width of the window in (H.14),
since the latter is
2N 1/ 2 ,/inN < N'/22 ~
Therefore, for N sufficiently large, there is only one possible value of Aj - say
A* - that falls in the window (H.14) and allows W(A) $ Wj(A').
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(H.14)
We also know that a realization of this case requires A, > 0 (since A' = Aj -1),
and A < R (since j < t). Thus, using the same arguments as in case (a),
(L + A*S)/N is bounded strictly between 0 and 1, and so the probability of
realizing x = L + A*S is bounded by a constant times N-1/ 2.
In summary: for case (c), to happen, either (H.14) must be violated, which
happens with probability at most N-1 ; or we must have xz = L + A*S for
a specific value 0 < A; < R (although this value may depend on <p), which
happens with probability at most a constant times N-1 2 . This shows that the
total probability of case (c) is at most a constant times N-1/ 2.
(d) For this case to happen, we must have Ak = A' - 1. From here we proceed
exactly as in (c), with the roles of A and A' interchanged, and the role of j
played by k.
This covers all four cases (a)-(d), completing the proof of (11.11).
Next we prove (H.12). We retain the notation A, A', and so forth from the proof
of (H.11). We regard j, k, P as fixed, and prove that (H.12) holds for every possible
choice of i = 1, .. . M,
Suppose i < min{t, t'}. We have three cases:
" If i $ j, k, then W(A) = Ai = A' = W(A') and so W(A) = Wi(A').
" If i = j, then either Ai = A' and so W(A) = W(A') again, or else A' = Ai - 1.
In the latter case,
21h S1162hW (A) - 2hW (A') - < (constant) -/ < 1
R + 1 N/S
for large enough N; hence
0 < L2hWi(A)J - [2hWi(A')J < 1
and so
Wi(A) - W(A') = L2W(A)] - L2W(A)
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lies between 0 and
1 31
= S < (constant) - N
* If i = k, then either Ai = A' or Ai = A' - 1, and we proceed as in the previous
case.
Suppose i > max{t, t'}. Then we have W(A) = 0 = W(A'), so W(A) = W (A').
If t = t', then we have shown that (H.12) holds for every i / t. By the identity
W(BL (Aj, P)) - W (BL(Ak, P))) = 1 - 1 = 0 (H.15)
we conclude that (H.12) holds for i = t as well.
This leaves us only to deal with the case t $ t'. Suppose that t < t'. As in case
(a) of the proof of (H.11), this implies j < t, A' = Aj - 1 and A1 + -- -+ At = R +1,
whereas A' = A, for every s < t, s 4 j. Hence Al + + A' = R, and then A' = 0
for all t < s < t' (because otherwise we would have A' + - + A' > R contradicting
the minimality of t').
The above analysis showed that (H.11) holds for every i < t and i > t'. Moreover,
since A1+---+At= R+1, we have
W(A) =1 t-R R+1'
while also W(A') = A'/(R + 1); and so the same logic used for the case i < t shows
that (H.11) holds for i = t also. And if t < i < t' then W(A) = 0 = W(A'). Thus,
(H.11) holds for every i / t. By (H.15), it holds for i = t' as well.
This covers the case t < t'. The case t > t' is identical, with the roles of A and A'
interchanged and k in place of j.
This completes the proof of (H.12). Now we can prove (H.10). Let Q be the set
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of all N-profiles P for which W(BL(Aj, P)) # W(BL(Ak, P)). We have
ZP(P I N;p) [W (BL(Aj, P)) - i(BL(A, P))]
P
= P(P I N; 4) [WV(BL(Aj, P)) - W (BL(Ak, P))]
PEQ
3
Pr!D(4)(P G Q) - (constant)- N-7
by (H.12)
(constant) -N-("E)-
by (H.11).
This gives (H.10), and so Claim II is proven.
Completion of Proof of Theorem 4.3. Suppose the manipulator has belief #
and considers a change in his vote from Aj to Ak. We show that this manipulation
can change the probability of any candidate Ai winning by (asymptotically) no more
than a constant times N-( 20/ 37 -e). We have
= Aj) - E Pro(Aj, P)
A
$ crN~(20/ 3 7 -E)
by Claim I;
E Pro ((Aj, P)
A
E BL-(A))W(A) - EPre((Ak, P) E BL-1 (A))Wi(A)
A
$ c 1rN-( 20 / 37 -E)
by Claim II;
Pro((Ak, P) E BL-1 (A))W(A) - Prp(f (Ak, P) = Aj) $ crN-(2013
A
by Claim I again. The triangle inequality then gives
IPro(f (Aj, P) = A ) - Pro (f (Ak, P) = A)I < (2c1 + c1 1)N~( 2 0 / 3 7-e)
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7-E)
Proe(f (Aj, P) E BL-'(A)) i(A)
The theorem follows, with (say) r, = 20/37 - 2f.
F]
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Chapter 3
The Efficiency-Incentive Tradeoff
in Double Auction Environments
Abstract
We consider the tradeoff between efficiency and incentives in large double auction
environments with weak budget balance. No mechanism simultaneously gives agents
perfect incentives to be truthful and ensures first-best efficiency, but a planner de-
signing a mechanism may be willing to compromise on either of these dimensions for
improvements along the other. She would then naturally wish to find where the pos-
sibility frontier lies with respect to incentives and efficiency. We make inroads on this
question: our main result locates the frontier to within a factor that is logarithmic in
the size of the market.
Thanks to (in random order) Alessandro Bonatti, Xiao Yu Wang, Ruitian Lang, Glenn Elli-
son, Parag Pathak, Rakesh Vohra, and Juuso Toikka, as well as an anonymous referee, for helpful
comments and advice.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Economists have known since Akerlof [2] that private information can prevent markets
from reaching efficient outcomes. Moreover, the results of Myerson and Satterthwaite
[24], among many others, show that this inefficiency is not specific to competitive
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markets but rather is unavoidable under any possible mechanism for allocating goods.
However, some mechanisms lead to more severe inefficiency than others, and so the
natural next question is what second-best mechanism achieves outcomes that are
as efficient as possible. A large literature addresses this question in many different
settings.
Customarily, the mechanism design literature assumes that agents optimize per-
fectly. In particular, applying the revelation principle, it is standard to take as a
given constraint that each agent's best possible strategy should be to truthfully re-
veal his private information, and then describe the optimal mechanism subject to this
constraint.
However, in practice, human decision-makers are not perfectly strategic, or at least
do not perfectly optimize the material payoffs that are usually modeled. Accordingly,
a planner could offer a mechanism asking agents to report their preferences, in which
reporting truthfully is not exactly optimal, but the incentives to behave strategically
instead are small. The planner might then expect that agents will report truthfully,
rather than go to the trouble of figuring out how to strategically manipulate the
mechanism. This notion leads to a tradeoff between incentives and efficiency, and
motivates a quantitative examination of the tradeoff.
The present paper makes initial inroads into quantitatively studying this tradeoff,
in the specific context of large double auction environments with quasilinear prefer-
ences and weak budget balance. This is one of the most widely studied economic
environments for mechanism design, and can be viewed as an analytically convenient,
stylized model of an exchange economy.
By studying the incentive-efficiency tradeoff, we bridge two branches of theoretical
research on mechanisms for large markets. On one hand is the literature, going back
to Roberts and Postlewaite [26], showing that in large exchange economies, under the
competitive equilibrium mechanism, the incentives for strategic misreporting of pref-
erences (assuming other agents are truthful) go to zero. On the other hand is a recent
literature studying exact equilibria of large markets and showing that the inefficiency
goes to zero [15, 16, 27]. In particular, part of that latter literature [12, 28] takes a
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mechanism design approach and identifies the optimal rate at which any mechanism
can converge to full efficiency as the market becomes large. However, no previous
work has explored the space in between these branches, looking for compromises be-
tween perfect efficiency and perfect incentives. If it turned out that large gains in
efficiency could be achieved at the cost of a very small relaxation of incentives, that
would cast a new light on the existing convergence-rate bounds. Conversely, if this
were not possible, the existing impossibility results would be strengthened.
Our modeling framework is fundamentally non-equilibrium-based, intended to
study design of market institutions for agents who are not perfectly familiar with
their environment. Indeed, our basic motivating assumption - that agents do not
effortlessly know how to manipulate to their advantage - would be difficult to jus-
tify in an equilibrium model. On the other hand this assumption is reasonable for
describing plenty of exchange in real-world markets. The typical shopper at the gro-
cery store is unlikely to think about the demand curve of other shoppers for a pint
of strawberries, or to know how he might profitably deviate from pure price-taking
behavior so as to influence the prices he faces - or to even want to bother thinking
about how he might go about strategically deviating.
To explore quantitatively the tradeoff between incentives and efficiency, we need
ways to measure both. As in the second chapter of this dissertation, we work in a
direct revelation framework, where a mechanism asks each agent his value for the
good being exchanged, and determines trades accordingly; and we take a worst-
case approach to the definition of incentives. The susceptibility to manipulation of a
particular market mechanism is the largest amount of expected utility any agent could
possibly gain by reporting his value strategically instead of truthfully; the maximum
is taken over all possible beliefs about the distributions from which other agents'
behavior is drawn. Likewise, we also use a worst-case measure for inefficiency: it is
the largest value, over all possible distributions of agents' valuations, of the expected
shortfall in surplus realized by the mechanism compared to the first-best (assuming
that agents report truthfully). 1
'We measure inefficiency using the allocation of goods, not the sum of the agents' utilities. These
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Our worst-case methodology is appropriate for a planner choosing a trading in-
stitution to be used in the future, when she does not have clear priors over agents'
valuations or their strategic behavior, and wants to be sure that her mechanism will
perform well. (The second chapter of this dissertation fleshes out in detail a posi-
tive model of such a planner's choice of mechanism, showing how our measurement
methodology fits in.) In addition, when defining susceptibility, note that we take the
worst case over beliefs: there is no presumption that agents know the true distribution
of others' behavior. This is in keeping with our non-equilibrium framework, in which
agents may not accurately know the details of their environment.
Two mechanisms in the existing literature represent polar cases with respect to
the efficiency-incentive tradeoff. On one end is the k-double auction, a version of the
competitive mechanism; where the goods are given to the traders whose (reported)
values are highest, and trades take place at a market-clearing price. This mecha-
nism achieves first-best efficiency if traders are truthful, but does not provide perfect
incentives for truthfulness. On the other end is McAfee's [22] dominant-strategy dou-
ble auction, which provides perfect incentives, but may fail to realize (at most) one
profitable trade.
Our results, presented in Section 3, describe the asymptotic behavior of suscepti-
bility or inefficiency as the number of agents becomes large. We consider environments
in which buyers' valuations are independently drawn from one distribution, sellers'
valuations are independently drawn from another distribution, and these two distri-
butions are not too dissimilar. More precisely, the distributions have densities that
differ everywhere by at most some fixed ratio. Then the k-double auction has suscep-
tibility on the order of 1/vN, and McAfee's double auction has inefficiency on the
order of 1/V7, where N represents the size of the market. Our main result (Theo-
rem 3.3) shows that both mechanisms are close to the possibility frontier: There is a
constant c such that any mechanism has either susceptibility or inefficiency at least
c/(v'N log N).
measures are different if the mechanism runs a surplus. Our measure implicitly assumes that the
surplus can be paid to someone outside the mechanism.
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The assumption of similar distributions is necessary. If we allow the buyers'
and sellers' valuations to come from arbitrarily different distributions, then the lower
bound on susceptibility or inefficiency does not go to zero as the market grows (Propo-
sition 3.4).
In Section 4, we address a possible "consequentialist" critique of our methodology:
Perhaps a planner designing mechanisms should not be concerned with incentives for
strategic manipulation per se, since agents might manipulate in a way that does not
adversely affect the outcome of the mechanism. Instead, she should be concerned with
the inefficiency that will result from manipulation. It turns out that our results with-
stand this critique, as long as we make reasonably conservative assumptions about
how agents might try to manipulate. Specifically, we allow that agents may attempt
any manipulation that gives them a sufficiently large gain in expected utility (they
will not necessarily find the optimal manipulation), and we consider the inefficiency
that may result. In this formulation, instead of a tradeoff between efficiency under
truthfulness and incentives for truthfulness, we have a tradeoff between efficiency
under manipulation and the planner's confidence about agents' cost of strategic be-
havior. Only a little extra work is needed to reformulate our main results in these
terms.
In addition to the results themselves, the method of proof for the lower bounds
merits attention. We use a straightforward variation on a standard proof of the
impossibility of attaining both first-best efficiency and perfect incentives. That proof
uses the usual integral formula derived from the envelope theorem to compute the
utility that each type of each agent would need to receive, and verifies that the
total surplus in the market is not enough to provide that utility to each agent. We
introduce error terms into the proof, representing inefficiency and susceptibility to
manipulation. By continuity, the same contradiction is still reached if the error terms
are sufficiently small; we simply track them explicitly to find out how large they need
to be to avoid a contradiction. Some care is needed in working the error terms into the
integral formula: it turns into a discrete approximation, and one needs to choose the
approximation points appropriately. However, the fact that we can readily adapt a
243
standard argument to obtain our results is encouraging, since it suggests that similar
methods can be applied to study tradeoffs involving incentives in other mechanism
design domains.
1.2 Literature review
The question of incentives for truthfulness in large markets can be traced back to
Roberts and Postlewaite [26], who showed that the benefits from misreporting one's
demand function in an exchange economy (under the Walrasian mechanism) go to
zero as the economy is replicated. More recent work in the market design literature
gives similar results for matching mechanisms [3, 14, 17, 18], argues that this property
makes the mechanisms suitable for use in practice. A variety of other literature has
also considered mechanisms with small incentives to manipulate [7, 11, 19, 20, 21, 23,
29], but without looking at the possibility frontier between these incentives and other
properties of the mechanism, as we emphasize here.
In contrast to this approach, much of the recent work on double auctions has
assumed that agents perfectly optimize - thus imposing Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
with given valuation distributions - and examined either behavior in specific mech-
anisms or the design problem of finding the optimal mechanism. Several relevant
papers studied rates of convergence to perfect efficiency. In the model of Rustichini,
Satterthwaite, and Williams [27], equilibrium behavior in the k-double auction leads
to inefficiency tending to zero as the market grows, at rate 1/N. McAfee's dominant-
strategy double auction [22] also attains rate 1/N. Satterthwaite and Williams [28]
showed (for the uniform distribution) that any mechanism has inefficiency of order at
least 1/N, so that the the two mechanisms just described are asymptotically optimal,
to within a constant factor. (These results appear to contradict our Theorem 3.3
below, which implies worse rates of convergence. The discrepancy arises because we
allow for a broader class of value distributions.) There is also recent work on large
double auctions with interdependent values, e.g. [25]. However, our focus here is on
environments with private values.
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2 Model
2.1 Elements
We consider double auction settings with unit capacity, private values, and quasilinear
utility. Thus, there are N sellers who each have a good to sell, and N buyers who
each would like to buy a good. Write bi for the value of the good to buyer i, and si for
the value to seller i. These values are normalized to lie in [0, 1]. We write pb, p, for
profiles of buyers' and sellers' valuations, (bi)i=1,...,N and (si)=1.N, and P = (Pb, PS)
for the profile of all 2N agents' valuations. Then pb. denotes the profile of valuations
of all buyers except the ith, and Psi similarly.
We focus attention on direct mechanisms. (This, and other assumptions, will be
discussed in Subsection 2.2.) Thus, a mechanism elicits each agent's valuation, and
determines an allocation of the goods (possibly probabilistic) and expected trans-
fer payments as a function of the reported valuations. Formally, a mechanism is a
collection of 4N functions,
M = (pI, P1, tl, tii=1,...,N
where
[Oj2 __4 [0, 1]p, p A : 0,7 1]2N
denote each agent's probability of exchange (i.e. p' is buyer i's probability of receiving
a good, and pf is seller i's probability of giving up a good); and
i i [0, 1]2N
denote the net payment made by each agent. We require the functions pb, pi, t , iV to
be measurable. We also impose the feasibility conditions
pP) p (pP)
A
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for every profile of valuations P E [0, 1 ]2N
We do not allow the mechanism to run a deficit, but we do allow a surplus; thus
we impose weak budget balance:
t (P)+ ts(P) > 0
tj
for all P. (With deficits allowed, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism [9, 13] would
achieve full efficiency in dominant strategies, so the tradeoff between efficiency and
incentives would be uninteresting.)
If the profile of reported valuations is P, then the utilities of buyer i and seller i,
respectively (relative to not participating in the mechanism), are
U(P) = bip (P) - t (P), Uf (P) = -sipi(P) - ts(P).
In addition to feasibility and weak budget balance, we also require mechanisms to
satisfy ex post individual rationality:
U(P), U(P) > 0
for all profiles P and all i. Note that individual rationality and weak budget balance
imply that the transfers t (P), t (P) are bounded.
In the operation of a mechanism, we assume that the buyers' valuations are drawn
independently from a distribution Fb on [0, 11, and the sellers' valuations are drawn
independently from a distribution Fs. We will in general not presume these distri-
butions are known, either to the planner or to the agents, but rather allow a set F
of possible pairs (Fb, FS). We will assume that for all possible pairs, Fb, FS are rep-
resentable by bounded density functions on [0, 1]. Our results would be unchanged
(and indeed simpler to prove) if we allowed for atoms in the distributions, but by
requiring continuity we make clear that atoms are not driving the results. We will
sometimes write fb, fS for the respective density functions.
The utility achieved by buyer i when the reported profile is P but his true valuation
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is bi is
U5(Zlbi) = bip (Z) - t (P).
Similarly define
Uf (Pjs2) = -sip'(P) - t'(P).
We define the susceptibility to manipulation of a mechanism M as the strongest
possible incentive faced by any agent to misreport his valuation. Formally, for a given
set F of distribution pairs, the buyer-susceptibility is
7 = sup i(E(FbFs)[Ui(O, P P"|b)] - (FbFs)[U(Pbi)]
ii,bbA,(F ,FA) F1)M iT b,-[U
where the supremum is over buyers i, true valuations bi E [0, 1], possible reports
bi c [0, 1], and distribution pairs (Fb, F) C F. The expectations are with respect to
other agents' reported types, where we assume other buyers' reports are drawn from
Fb and sellers' from F" (all independently). Similarly the seller-susceptibility is
o= sup (E(Fb,F) [JSb,Pisis)] - E(Fb,F)[UZ(Psi)]).
i,sj,sij,(Fb,F5)
The susceptibility is then
o- = max{orb, o-"}.
The motivating story behind this definition is simple: Suppose a planner knows
that agents face a psychological or computational cost of at least e to behaving strate-
gically. If the planner chooses a mechanism whose susceptibility is known to be less
than e, then agents will not bother to behave strategically and instead will simply
report their true valuations. This is discussed in more detail in the preceding chapter
of this dissertation, which also shows how the above definition of susceptibility is
equivalent to one in which players are allowed to be uncertain about the distribution
pair (Fb, F*).
We define the inefficiency of a mechanism using an analogous worst-case formula-
tion. For any profile P of valuations, define the first-best welfare WFB(P) to be the
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sum of the N highest valuations, and the welfare WM(P) achieved by the mechanism
as EZ bip!(P) + Ei si(1 - p (P)). Note that
W M (P)= [ZUb(P) +( Uis(P) + t (P)+( ts P +
The second bracketed expression is the surplus accrued by the mechanism; we im-
plicitly assume when computing welfare that this surplus can be paid to an outside
agent. The third expression is independent of the choice of mechanism, so it does not
affect the shortfall relative to first best, WFB(P) - WM(p).
The inefficiency of M relative to F is then defined as
sup (E(Fb,Fs)[W FB(P) - WM(P),(Fb,Fs)
where the supremum is over (Fb, FS) C T, and the expectation is with respect to
valuation profiles where each bi is drawn from Fb and each si is drawn from FS (in-
dependently). In particular, this definition of inefficiency assumes truthful reporting;
we will address this issue in Section 4. Also, the definition is absolute (not normal-
ized by the size of the market), though our results could just as well be formulated
in terms of relative inefficiency.
We will be mainly concerned with a set of distribution pairs F in which the
buyers' and sellers' value distributions are not too different. Specifically, let A > 1 be
an exogenously given constant; then define FA to be the family of distribution pairs
(Fb, FS) whose densities satisfy fb(x)/A < fs(x) Af b(X) for all x C [0, 1]. (As a
special case, A = 1 means that the buyers' and sellers' values are drawn from the
same distribution.) Our main results apply to FA. However, we will also consider
the set Fo, of all possible pairs (Fb, F8 ) of distributions representable by bounded
density functions on [0, 1].
Note that we have not required mechanisms to be anonymous - that is, to treat
all buyers and all sellers identically. Formally, a mechanism M is anonymous if, for
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all profiles (bi, si) and all permutations 7rb, 7rS of {1,.. , N}, we have
pb(bati), brb(N), S(1), . . . , S s(N) p b(j)(b1, - - - , N, 1 . . . , SN)
for each i, and similarly for the functions p , t , tq. However, to study the inefficiency-
susceptibility frontier, it is enough to consider anonymous mechanisms. Indeed, if M
is any mechanism with susceptibility o- and inefficiency q, we can define an anonymous
mechanism M by randomly permuting the buyers and the sellers and then applying
M: that is,we define
p^ (b, bN, 81, - ,) SN N[ 2 b)-I()( . . . , bb(N), S3,7r(1 ), . . .
and define s, ti, t likewise; these comprise the mechanism M. Then M is an average
of (N!)2 mechanisms, all of which (by symmetry) have gains at most o- to any agent
from manipulating and all of which have an expected welfare loss at most 7 relative
to the first-best, so the same is true of M. Thus we have an anonymous mechanism
whose susceptibility and inefficiency are at most those of M.
Given this, we will henceforth restrict attention to anonymous mechanisms with-
out further comment.
2.2 Discussion
There are a couple of assumptions implicit in the above modeling framework which
call for elaboration. Our restriction to direct mechanisms really entails two assump-
tions: first, that each agent's strategy depends only on his valuation (and no other
information); second, that the strategy space can be taken to be the space of valua-
tions, with honest reporting as the default behavior of agents who do not strategize.
The second assumption is actually not a serious restriction. We view double
auction environments as a stylized model of competitive markets, and truthfulness as
a metaphor for price-taking. This seems a natural assumption about default behavior
(especially for inexperienced participants). But more generally, we could take an
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indirect-mechanism approach, allowing a mechanism M to specify any strategy space
for each player, together with probabilities of trade and transfers as functions of the
strategy profile, and a specification of a default strategy for each player (possibly
mixed) that depends on that player's valuation. By a straightforward variation of the
usual revelation principle, M could be converted into a direct mechanism M', where
default behavior consists of honest reporting, and where M' has the same inefficiency
as M and susceptibility no higher than M (it may have strictly lower susceptibility,
due to the elimination of strategies in M that were not default strategies for any
type). Since we are concerned only with the inefficiency-susceptibility frontier, it
suffices to focus on direct mechanisms as we have done above.
The assumption that players' behavior depends only on their valuations is more
serious. This assumption invites the critique of Bergemann and Morris [6] that a
planner could potentially do better by designing a mechanism in which agents also
condition their strategies on their beliefs about other agents' behavior. If we were to
formulate the mechanism design problem in full generality taking this into account,
a direct mechanism would have agents report their full types, where a type consists
not only of a valuation but an entire belief hierarchy (including beliefs about any
parameters relevant to agents' manipulative behavior - see the discussion in Section
4 below).
However, recall that we have chosen to make no assumptions about the correctness
of agents' beliefs about others' behavior. The appropriate worst-case measure of
inefficiency in this framework would specify that for a mechanism to have inefficiency
at most q, the expected welfare loss relative to first-best should be at most q for
every possible distribution of buyer and seller types, regardless of whether or not
their beliefs reflected the true distribution. With such a definition, it turns out
that our results would remain valid even in this more fully-specified setting. This
is because the proofs of our lower bounds rely only on a single "true" distribution
pair (Fb, FS) when analyzing the incentive to misreport, and so these lower bounds
actually hold for the subset of the type space on which it is common knowledge among
the agents that values are drawn from this (F6, F). On this subset, two types of a
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given agent differ only in their valuation, so assuming that agents report only their
valuations is without loss of generality. (However, the proofs do analyze inefficiency
using distributions other than the fixed (F, FS), so it is crucial that the definition
of inefficiency allows the "true" distribution to be different from the one that agents
believe to be correct.) Thus the critique of [6] does not bind here. The formal details
of this argument would be notationally involved and not relevant to the main point
of this paper, so we omit them.
We should also comment here on the interpretation of the individual rationality
constraints, which we have written in an ex post form. These can be thought of as
normative constraints on acceptable mechanisms. They can also be viewed in positive
terms, if agents have the opportunity to renege after the mechanism has operated.
However, this latter interpretation is less tidy: as pointed out by Compte and Jehiel
[10], the proper formulation of such a constraint is as a veto constraint, which not
only requires ex post individual rationality but also imposes stronger incentive con-
straints - agents should not be able to benefit by misreporting their valuation and
then potentially vetoing the outcome depending on the realizations of other agents'
types. This distinction turns out to be immaterial for our results, however: our neg-
ative results under individual rationality still hold a fortiori under the stronger veto
constraint, and it can be checked that our positive results also hold, since the relevant
mechanisms (the McAfee and k-double auctions) satisfy the veto constraint.
Alternatively, using a richer type space as outlined above, in which strategies
reflect an agent's full type, would allow us to instead use an interim version of the
individual rationality constraints - each agent has nonnegative expected utility from
participation - in which case the positive interpretation would be straightforward.
Our lower bounds would still hold with these weaker constraints rather than the ex
post constraints, again for the reason that the proofs invoke the constraints only for
agents whose beliefs coincide with the true distributions (F, FS). Again, we omit
the details.
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2.3 Polar mechanisms
We now describe in precise terms our two polar mechanisms. We will content ourselves
with verbal descriptions, rather than tediously write out all the algebraic expressions.
For any k E [0, 1], the k-double auction (described e.g. in [27]) is as follows. For
any profile P of 2N reported valuations, sort them as v(i) > V( 2 ) - - - V(2N), and
define the price p* = kv(N) +(1 - k)v(N+1). Allocate the goods to the agents with
the N highest valuations. (If there is a tie at V(N), ration uniformly at random; ties
are not really important since they occur with probability zero in our model.) Every
buyer who receives a good pays p*, and every seller who sells a good receives p*.
It is clear that this mechanism satisfies feasibility, budget balance, and individual
rationality, and that it achieves inefficiency of 0.
McAfee's double auction, from [22], is a bit more complex. The rules are as follows.
Sort the buyers' reported valuations in decreasing order, b(i) 2 - -- > b(N), and the
sellers' in increasing order, s(l) - - - s(N). Also define b(o) = S(N+1) = 1 and
b(N+1) = s(o) = 0 for convenience. Let k be the highest value satisfying b(k) s(k);
this is the efficient number of trades. We have 0 < k < N. Define the price p* =
(b(k+1) + s(k+1))/2.
If p* C [s(k), b(k)], then have the k highest-value buyers buy the good from the k
lowest-value sellers at price p*. (Again, break ties uniformly at random.) Otherwise,
note that k > 0, and have the k - 1 highest-value buyers each receive a good and
pay b(k), while the k - 1 lowest-value sellers each sell their good for price s(k). The
mechanism thus carries out k-I trades and earns a budget surplus (k-1) (b(k) -S(k)) >
0.
This mechanism is again feasible, weakly budget-balanced, and individually ratio-
nal. It has been established that reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy for all
agents in this mechanism [22, Theorem 1]. Therefore, it has a susceptibility of 0.
3 The efficiency-incentive tradeoff
We can now properly introduce our results on the efficiency-incentive tradeoff.
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The results are illustrated in Figure 3.1, where the gray region represents the
(inefficiency, susceptibility) pairs (7, o-) attained by some mechanism. The frontier
must be convex, as shown in the figure: If mechanism M has inefficiency ?7 and
susceptibility o, and mechanism M' has inefficiency 7' and susceptibility o', then for
any a C [0, 1] we can take the convex combination (1 - a)M+aM' (defined by taking
corresponding convex combinations of the pib, p,, tb, t functions), and this mechanism
has inefficiency at most (1 - a) + a?' and susceptibility at most (1 - a)o- + au'.
inefficiency
Figure 3.1: The possibility frontier
For the main results, we consider the class of distribution pairs F\, in which some
similarity is imposed between the buyers' and sellers' value distributions. We give the
approximate locations of the two polar mechanisms, which lie on the two axes of the
possibility set, at a distance of order 1/ vN from the origin. On the other hand, we
identify a point lying below the possibility set (indicated by the star in the figure),
whose coordinates are of order 1/(vW log N). Thus, these results together pin down
the location of the possibility frontier to within a factor that is logarithmic in the size
of the market.
If we look at the class of distribution pairs .Fo, where the distribution of buyers'
values can be arbitrarily different from the distribution of sellers' values, then a
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similar picture applies but on a different scale: the lower bound on inefficiency or
susceptibility (the star point) does not go to zero as the market becomes large. This
will be shown in Subsection 3.2.
3.1 Main results
We first bound the inefficiency attained by the McAfee double auction, over FA. As
the number of agents grows, the inefficiency shrinks on the order of N- 1/ 2. More
specifically:
Proposition 3.1 There is a constant c such that the McAfee double auction has
inefficiency at most c/vfN on F. (The value of c depends on A.)
The calculation is routine, but rather lengthy, so we leave it for Appendix A.
For a quick overview: Inefficiency is at most the value of the least valuable trade; a
change-of-variables argument implies that this value is no greater than the probability
that the least valuable trade involves of a buyer with value above x* and a seller with
value below x*, for a suitable (fixed) x*. For this to happen, in turn, it must be that
either (a) the number of agents with values above x* is close to N, which happens
with probability on the order of N- 1/2 by a law-of-large-numbers argument; or (b)
when all 2N agents are arranged from highest value to lowest, there is a long run of
consecutive buyers or consecutive sellers, which happens with probability decreasing
exponentially in the length of the run.
We can also bound the susceptibility of the k-double auction; it is also on the
order of N-'/2 . This is because the probability that any given misreport is pivotal -
that is, that it advantageously changes the market price - is of order at most N-1 /2 ,
by a central-limit-theorem argument.
Proposition 3.2 There is a positive constant c such that the k-double auction has
susceptibility at most cN-1/ 2 . (Again, c may depend on A.)
Proof: Consider a buyer with value b, reporting a false value b. We may assume
b < b, since reporting b> b can never be profitable: holding fixed the realizations of
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other agents' reports, such a misreport cannot decrease the price, nor can it change
the buyer's outcome from not receiving a good to receiving one, unless the trade
occurs at a price higher than b.
Moreover, again holding fixed the other agents' reports, the misreport can only
be beneficial if is pivotal - more specifically, if exactly N - 1 other agents report
values higher than b. Indeed, if more than N - 1 other agents report higher values,
then the misreporting buyer gets no good and hence utility zero; if fewer than N - 1
other agents report higher values, then the misreport has no effect on the price at
which he trades.
Since the buyer's realized utility is always between 0 and 1, his expected gain from
misreporting is at most the probability that exactly N - 1 other agents report a value
greater than b. Letting J be the number of other buyers whose values are less than
b, we can express this probability as a sum over possible values of J:
(N - 1) ( F)F N-J(1 - F((N))NJ(1 
- Fs( ))j. (3.1)
J=o
We finish by invoking Lemma A.2 in Appendix A. If Fb(i) 1/2, then using
1y) < ( c), the expression in (3.1) is
(NN N
2E ) F(b)JFs()NJ(1 - Fb(b)NJ(1 - F(b))J
J=o
which, according to the lemma (with rs = 1/2, say, and K = 0), is at most cVA/N
for some absolute constant c. This certainly implies the desired bound on the buyer's
probability of being pivotal.
If Fb(b) > 1/2, then using (N) ), the expression in (3.1) is
5 2 F (b)mF"(b)N-J(1 - F())N-1-J(l -
J=O +
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and by a change of variable, this is
= 2 (1 - F(b))N-J(1 - Fb -JF"(b)JFb' N-J+1
J=1 )()
which, again according to the lemma (with K = 1), is at most c A/N for an absolute
constant c.
This shows in both cases that the buyer-susceptibility of the k-double auction
satisfies the bound. The argument for seller-susceptibility is identical.
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Having established these estimates for the two polar mechanisms, we can proceed
to our main result: a lower bound showing that the two polar mechanisms are close
to the optimal rate of convergence of inefficiency or susceptibility as the number of
agents becomes large.
Theorem 3.3 There exists a positive constant c such that, on F1, every mechanism
has either inefficiency at least c/(/N log N) or susceptibility at least c/(v/ log N).
Of course, the same bounds a fortiori hold for any FX, A > 1.
The idea behind the proof is as follows: Consider the incentives facing a given
agent - say, a buyer - when he believes the other agents' values are drawn from a
distribution with mass concentrated near 0 and 1. Let Pb(b) be the probability that
the buyer gets a good when his value is b (and he reports truthfully). Let Vb(b) be
the expected utility he attains if his value is b. Similarly define PS(s) and U'(s).
Suppose the mechanism were to have inefficiency and susceptibility zero. Then the
first-best allocation would determine P b and P" completely. In turn, these determine
the functions Ub and U3 via the familiar integral formula coming from the envelope
theorem (up to a constant, which is bounded below by individual rationality). These
expected utility functions are not consistent with weak budget balance - there is
not enough expected surplus in the market to give all agent types the needed utility
levels.
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Let pb* V* U , U'* be the functions obtained in the above calculations assuming
zero inefficiency and susceptibility. With a small amount of wiggle room, we know
only that pb and p have to be close to p'* and pS*, and in turn that U , Us have to
be close to U , U . Requiring the agents' expected utility levels to be far enough
-b* -s*from U , U to avoid exceeding the total surplus in the market then leads to a lower
bound on either inefficiency or susceptibility.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: It is enough to prove the result for N sufficiently large;
we can then adjust the constant c to ensure the result holds for small N as well.2
Suppose that the number c is such that some mechanism M has susceptibility o-
and inefficiency y both less than c/(V'N log N). Our goal is to show that c must be
larger than some absolute constant. Specifically, we will show that c > 1/7000. (This
is far from best possible, but we are not concerned here with fine-tuning constants.)
Thus, suppose that c < 1/7000, and seek a contradiction.
Let y be a sufficiently small positive number. At several points in the course of
the proof, we will use the fact that -y is smaller than various functions of N, y, and c.
Rather than writing out explicit bounds here, we will simply assume without further
comment that all needed bounds are satisfied (there will be only finitely many of
them, so this assumption is safe).
Define the density function f by
1/2-y, 0 < x < y;
f(x)= 0, Y < X < 1 - Y;
1/2-y, 1 - y < x < 1.
Let F be the corresponding cumulative distribution function. We focus on the in-
centives facing a given agent when all other agents' reports are independently drawn
from F.
2 To be precise, this requires knowing that for each small N, either inefficiency or susceptibility
must be bounded away from 0. By continuity arguments, it is enough to show that there is no
mechanism with inefficiency and susceptibility both 0. This can be proven e.g. by using revenue
equivalence to show that any such mechanism would have to be equivalent to a VCG mechanism,
which always runs a deficit; see [31].
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Step 1 (buyers). As in the sketch above, let pb(b) be the probability that buyer
i receives a good, when his value is b. (By anonymity, this is independent of i.) In
this first step, we use efficiency to show that Pb is close to its first-best value.
However, because we are working with continuous distributions, efficiency in ex-
pectation imposes no restrictions on pb(b) itself for any single value of b. Instead, we
need to talk about averages. Accordingly, for 2 < b < 1 - ^, define
- (b) = j b(b) db'.
We will show that p"(b) is approximately bounded below b times 1/2 minus a
constant times q/b. Specifically, for any b > 3 -y/2 ,
1 167p (b) > - b - (3.2)
-2 b - 3-y/2'
To show this, suppose otherwise, so that
' b -, -bp (b) > 77. (3.3)
Define a density function g by
gXx)= y> 2 21
0 otherwise.
Define the density h(x) = (1 - ) f(x) + (k) g(x). Let G, H be the distributions
associated with g, h.
Suppose that we draw all 2N agents' values independently from H. This is equiv-
alent to generating values as follows: we mark each agent as an F-type or G-type
agent, randomly with probability 1 - or y respectively, and then draw the valu-
ations from F or G accordingly. Let E denote the event that there is exactly one
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G-type buyer and no G-type seller. We have
Pr(E = - 1- - 1 - - > -. (3.4)PrE) N I N N N ~16
Conditional on E, the G-type buyer receives a good with probability Pi(b).
On the other hand, conditional on E, all F-type agents have values distributed
uniformly on the set [0, 7y] U [1- , 1]. In this case, the probability that at least half the
F-type agents have values in [0, -y] is 1/2, by symmetry. Thus, conditional on E, we
have probability at least 1/2 that the G-type buyer is among the top N values, and
the next lower value is at most -y. In particular, conditional on E, there is probability
at least 1/2 - -b(b) that the G-type buyer is among the top N values but does not
receive a good, and the next highest value is at most -/. When this occurs, there is
an efficiency loss (relative to first-best) of at least b - 3.
Therefore, conditional on E, we have an expected efficiency loss (relative to first-
best) of at least (j - -'(b)) (b - 3). Since Pr(E) 2 1/16, we have an unconditional
inefficiency of at least ( - p(b)) (b - L). But this amount is greater than q by
(3.3). We have a contradiction. Therefore, (3.2) must hold.
In fact, we have the simpler bound
1 32yb(b) 2 2 ,  (3.5)
(as long as -y < 647/3). Indeed, (3.2) implies (3.5) for b > 3 -y, and for b < 3-Y the
right side of (3.5) is negative, so the inequality holds trivially.
Henceforth we will only need this latter bound.
Step 2 (buyers). We next construct a discrete approximation for the standard
integral formula, leading to a lower bound on the utilities of buyer types with high
values. Specifically, we will show that buyers with values in the interval [1 - -Y, 1]
must, on average, achieve utility at least 1/2 - 1/20vNW.
To this end, let t (b) be the expected payment by buyer i, when his value is b, and
other values are drawn independently from F. Again, this is independent of i. Let
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Ub(b) = bp-b(b) - 1(b) be the expected utility achieved by a buyer with value b.
Take K =[log NJ. Define buyer values bo, bi,... , bK by
bj= (1 - .
\ 2/ 2 0 v--
(The subscripts here simply index the values; they do not denote different buyer
identities.) These buyer values will essentially serve as the interval endpoints in our
approximation to the integral formula. However, instead of using these values exactly,
we will need to average over small perturbations of the values. This is because our
available bounds on probabilities of trade apply to the averages Pb, not to Pb for any
single type.
Define p to be the ratio of successive bj's:
b- 1_1 2 1/K) _ 2
P =bj+1 1/20 v/N '
and note that
p < (20v)1/K < 2 02/log N (J)2/ log N 2 0 2/ log N < 3 (3.6)
(as long as N is large enough, as usual).
Now, by definition of o, for any r E [-7/2, -y/2], a buyer of type bj + r (for any
j) cannot benefit by more than o- from misreporting as type bj+ 1 + r.
Consider any such r . We have
Ub(by + r) = (bj + r)Pb(bj + r) - tb(by + r)
> (bj + r)pb(bj+1 + r) - ib(bj+1 + r) - o-
- F (bj+1 + r) + (bj - bj+ 1)pb(bj+ 1 + r) - o-
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for each j. By combining these inequalities for each j we get
K-1
7b (bo + r) Ub(bK + r) + (bj - bj+1 bj+1 + r) - Ko-
j=0
K-1
> Z(b - bj+1)p (bj+1 + r) - Ku
j=0
where the last step is by individual rationality.
Now average over [--y/2,y/2]. For each j, we know from (3.5) that
1
-
S bfb~bj+ + r) dr
_-2
1 32r/
2 bj+1
Therefore,
- U (bo +r) dr > -bj+1) dr] - Ko-
j=O
K-1
> E (bj
j=0
-bj+ 1 ) 2 32 C
= (bo-bK) (
7-
2
1
2 0[ V}
-K(p- 1)(32r/) -
1)2 - (log N)
C
64 C
\64 log NJ
1 1 70c
2 40'/ VK
1 1
2 20O/H
(3.8)
(The fourth line uses (3.6), and the sixth uses the assumption c < 1/7000 < 1/2800.)
Now, to wrap up this step of the proof, consider the expected utility accruing
to buyer i, when all agents' values are drawn independently from F (and all agents
report truthfully). With probability 1/2, buyer i has a value in the interval [1 - -y, 1];
and conditional on being in this interval, buyer i's value is uniformly distributed on
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(3.7)
C
Pf(bj+1 + r )
the interval. Therefore, buyer i's unconditional expected utility is at least
11 )1 1
2 \2 ~20 / 4 040VH
Steps 1, 2 (sellers). The analysis up to this point has focused on incentives for
buyers. However, exactly the same calculations can be performed with incentives for
sellers. We briefly outline the arguments. Let PS(s) be the probability that a seller
with value s sells his good, when all other agents' values are independently drawn
from F. Define
+(s) = (S') ds'.
2
We can use the same efficiency arguments as before to obtain a counterpart to (3.5):
1 32r (39)
2 1-s
Now define T"(s) be the expected net transfer paid by a seller with value s, and let
U'(s) = -,s(s) - is(s) be the expected utility such a seller attains. Define K as
before, and define the seller values sO,..., SK by
2 2 0 f
As before, for any r E [--/ 2 ,-/ 2])
U'(sj + r) > U'(sj+ + r) + (sj+1 - Sj)p"(sj+1 + r) - o-
for each j. Summing over j, averaging over r C [-i, j, and applying (3.9), we
obtain
1 2 -S1 1 70c 1 1
- U (so +r)dr> N> - 2 VN
Finally, as with the buyers, we conclude that when all agents' values are independently
drawn from F, each seller's expected utility is at least 1/4 - 1/40VN.
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Step 3. To complete the proof, we use the lower bound on each agent's utility from
Step 2, compare to the total expected surplus available, and obtain a contradiction.
The lower bound of 1/4 - 1/40s/N obtained at the end of Step 2 holds for each
of the 2N agents, and therefore the expected surplus generated by the mechanism -
that is, the expected sum of the agents' utilities - is bounded below as
(3.10)i 2
On the other hand, due to weak budget balance, the surplus at any profile P
satisfies
U (P) + Us (P) bip1(P) - sipi(P) < WFB(p) Z Si. (3.11)
Let's bound the expectation of the first-best welfare WFB. Each agent's value
is either in [0, -y] or in [1 - -y, 1], independently with probability 1/2. Letting K be
the number of agents with high values, we can bound the first-best by summing over
possible values of K:
E[WFB (P)] 2N 2N 2( ( [min{N, K} 1 + (N - min{N, K}) - y]
K=0
2N
< NY + 2) ( 1 2N min{N, K}.
K=O
Break the sum into terms with K < N - [v'N/4] and K > N - [N/4J,
rearrange, and then use Lemma A.3 from Appendix A (a crude central-limit-theorem
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approximation) to bound from below the probability that K < N - Lv/N/4J:
N- [vN/4
K=O
2N
= Ny+ E
K=0
< N 1 +N-
20
2
KA
) N ,12N
K J2
2N
+ E
K=N-LvlN/4] +1
N , 2 1 2 N7) (1)-N
N--[vR|4J 2N
K=KO
K=0
- N- ()
2N) 1 2N.N
K) 2 -
J 1 2N V4j
2) 4
This bounds the expectation of WFB(p).
The expression (3.11) also involves a Z si term. But since each seller has expected
value N, the expectation of this sum is simply N/2. Consequently, (3.11) implies that
the expected surplus is less than
N VN
2 20
Comparing with (3.10), we have a contradiction, which completes the proof.
0
3.2 Unrestricted distributions
We now show how the results change when no restrictions are imposed on the pair of
distributions - we use the full class 1Fo, rather than FA
Trivially, the McAfee double auction has inefficiency at most 1 (since it omits at
most one desirable trade), and the k-double auction has susceptibility at most 1 (since
no agent can ever achieve utility greater than 1). Thus, it is possible to achieve zero
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E[WFB ()]
1 v/ N
4 4
inefficiency or susceptibility and a constant, independent of the market size, along
the other dimension. The following result shows that it is not possible to do better:
Proposition 3.4 There exists a positive constant c such that, on JFo, every mecha-
nism has either inefficiency or susceptibility at least c.
The argument is somewhat similar to that of Theorem 3.3, but simpler. Since the
proof is relatively brief, we will not bother explicitly breaking it into steps.
Proof: We will give a proof with c = 1/128. So suppose for contradiction that
some mechanism M has susceptibility a and inefficiency r/ both less than 1/128. Let
y be a positive number, chosen to be very small; as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we
will not bother being explicit about the bounds needed on y.
Let the distributions Fb, F be given by the densities
P(X) 1/7, 1 - 7 < X < 1;
0, 0 < x < 1-
PX 1/h, 0 < X < 7
0, -/ < < 1
Also let Gb be the distribution with density
0 otherwise,
and take Hb(x) = (1 - I) Fb(x) + (1) G'(x). Drawing a buyer's value from Hb is
equivalent to designating the buyer as Fb-type or Gb-type, with probabilities 1 - N
or 1 respectively, and then drawing the value from Fb or G6 accordingly.
Suppose all buyers' values are drawn from Hb and all sellers' values are drawn
from F. Let E be the event that there is exactly one Gb-type buyer. By calculations
similar to (3.4), we have
1
Pr(E) ;>-.
4
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Whenever E occurs, the first-best allocation assigns all the goods to the buyers,
and any failure to assign a good to some buyer entails an efficiency loss of at least
(1/4 - -y) - (y) 2 1/8. In particular, if r is the probability that the Gb-type buyer
ends up with a good (conditional on E), we have
1 1 -w7
r/ > Pr(E) - (1 - 7r) -> -8 32
from which
3
7r > 1 - 32r/ > .
4
Now let pb(b) denote the probability that a buyer receives a good, when he reports
b and all other agents' reports are drawn from (F", FS). The above implies that the
average of p"(b) with respect to Gb is at least 3/4:
1 3
-P6(b) db > -.
4-
Let U"(b) be the utility attained by a buyer with value b, when other agents'
reports are drawn from (Fb, FS).
For any r E [0, y], a buyer of value 1 - r cannot benefit by more than a by
misreporting as value 1/4 - r. And so, as in Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.3, we
have
_U (b -r) > U (r) + (~)(!r)-.
Averaging over r E [0, -y] gives
1 f -
7- Ub)bdb
1 J- -b 3 1 4p
31
* - - "(b)db+ -o(b)-db -
4 7 _
* 3 4 Pbb db] -o-
9
-- 01
- 16
1
2
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Now finally suppose all agents' values are drawn from (Fb, F8 ). Each buyer's
expected utility from the mechanism is (1/i) f U b(b) db, which is greater than 1/2,
by the above calculation.
By identical arguments, each seller's expected utility is also greater than 1/2.
But this means that when all agents' values are drawn from (Fb, FS), the total
expected surplus generated by the mechanism must be more than 2N -1/2 = N. Since
it is never possible to generate a surplus of more than N, we have a contradiction.
E
4 A consequentialist approach
The exposition so far has focused on incentives for truthful reporting. This follows a
substantial literature that treats strategyproofness as a basic normative criterion for
evaluating mechanisms (see [5] for a survey, and [4] for a succinct summary of sev-
eral justifications). However, others [6, 8] have raised the criticism that truthfulness
should not be an end in itself; rather, what matters is the outcome that occurs as a
result of any manipulations. In particular, in the double auction environment, there
is an unambiguous objective available to a planner with such a "consequentialist"
philosophy - namely, the efficiency of the realized allocation of goods - and so it is
especially natural to frame the design problem in terms of this objective.
Fortunately, it turns out that there is a close connection between our formulation
of the efficiency-incentive tradeoff and an alternative formulation that focuses on
outcome efficiency. To motivate the latter formulation, imagine a planner who wants
to ensure an allocation within y of the first-best welfare, and who is uncertain not
only about the distributions (Fb, FS) but also about the agents' strategic behavior.
Thus, the planner wants to ensure that no matter what manipulations the agents
perform, welfare is always within q of the first-best (in expectation over realizations
of the agents' types).
To describe the planner's problem, we must specify how she expects agents to
manipulate. As sketched in Subsection 2.1, we presume there is a computational
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cost of at least e to behaving strategically, so the planner is confident that agents
will not manipulate if they cannot gain more than e expected utility by doing so.
What if they can gain more than E? We could assume that agents will choose the
manipulation that is optimal (with respect to their beliefs), but this would stray
from our motivating notion of inexperienced, boundedly-rational agents. Instead we
will take a more agnostic approach: agents may potentially make any misreport that
would gain at least E expected utility.3
We formalize this approach as follows. Given a mechanism M, a class F of
distribution pairs, and a minimum manipulation cost E, define the manipulation set
for each possible buyer's valuation bi E [0, 1] as
Wb(bi; E) = {bi} U
{bi | E(Fb,Fs) [Ui'(bi, Pf!i, P*|bi)] - E(FbF [U(bi, P'., Ps)] >
for some (Fb, F*) E F}.
(This is independent of i, by anonymity.) This set represents the set of all valuations
that the planner believes a buyer might report, given that his true valuation is bi.
Note that we always include bi: no matter what the mechanism is, we allow for the
possibility that strategizing is so costly that the buyer just tells the truth. Similarly,
for each seller's valuation si we define
Ws(si; E) = {sj} U
{si | E(Fb,F)[US(Psi, Pisi)] - E(Fb,Fs)[Uis(Pb, s , P* )] 6
for some (Fb, Fs) c F}.
From the planner's point of view, each buyer's true valuation and his report are
drawn from a joint distribution Hb on [0,1] x [0, 1], independently across buyers. We
say that such a joint distribution Hb is possible if it places probability 1 on the set of
3 In the preceding chapter of the dissertation, we gave a positive model that effectively assumes
the planner considers any misreport to be possible if she is not certain that the agents cannot gain
more than E. The model here is more refined.
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pairs (b,b) such that b E Wb(b; e); and similarly for joint distributions HS of sellers'
valuations and reports.
The planner's measure of inefficiency is given by the worst case over all possible
joint distributions Hb and H'. For any profile P of true valuations and P of reports,
define the realized welfare WM (P IP) as 4j bip;(P) + >4 si(1 - p (P)). Then define
the consequentialist inefficiency of the mechanism M (with minimum manipulation
cost e) as
= sup (E(Hb,H")[WFB(P) - WM(PIP)]),
(Hb,HS)
where the expectation is over true profiles P and reported profiles P obtained by
drawing each (bi,bi) ~ H b and each (si, si) ~ HS independently, and the supremum
is over pairs such that
* Hb is possible for the buyers,
" Hs is possible for the sellers, and
" the marginals Fb of Hb and F of H' on true valuations satisfy (Fb, F-) E F
The value of q' of course depends on e. The higher e is, the smaller the manipulation
sets are, the smaller the set of (Hb, HS) over which the sup is taken, and so the smaller
is consequentialist inefficiency. Note also that the consequentialist inefficiency 7c is
always at least as large as the truthful inefficiency 77.
This leads to our main definition: we say that a mechanism M has a (o, 7) conse-
quentialist tradeoff on the class of distribution pairs F if, for any manipulation cost
e < o-, the mechanism's consequentialist inefficiency on F is at least q. This expresses
the tradeoff faced by a planner: she must either be willing to assume that agents have
a manipulation cost at least o-, or accept an allocative inefficiency of at least q.
With these definitions behind us, we can proceed to convert our results into the
consequentialist framework. Our earlier results were of the form
for a given class of distribution pairs 7, every mechanism either has inef-
ficiency greater than [bound/ or susceptibility greater than [bound].
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We would now like to have results of the form
for a given F, every mechanism has a ([boundj,[boundf) consequentialist
tradeoff.
To make this leap, we focus on misreports that are not too small. The intuition
is as follows: Suppose a mechanism makes a buyer of value b willing to misreport
as a value b, and b is far from b - say b < b for example. Then when all other
agents report values in between b and b, the mechanism cannot distinguish whether
the buyer reporting b actually has value b (in which case efficiency would imply that
the buyer should not get the good) or actually has value b (in which case the buyer
should get the good). So whatever allocation the mechanism specifies will be bounded
away from efficiency in one of the two cases.
Once again, the intuition requires some elaboration because of our restriction to
continuous distributions - misreports by just a single type, or by a finite set of types,
have zero effect on expected efficiency. The technical apparatus needed to make the
argument work is as follows.
We define a quasi-misreport for a buyer to be a triple (b,b, 6), where 6 c [0,1]
and b,b E [5, 1 - 6], and b # b. The interpretation of a quasi-misreport is not just
that buyers of type b are willing to misreport as b, but rather that a positive measure
of types b' within 6 of b are each incentivized to misreport by the amount b - b. A
quasi-misreport for a seller is analogously a triple (s, s, 6).
Formally: we say that the mechanism M is o--susceptible to the quasi-misreport
(b, b, 6) of a buyer under F, if the set
{b' c [b - J,b+6] | b' + (b- b) G Wb(b'; a)
has positive Lebesgue measure. We define o--susceptibility to quasi-misreports of a
seller analogously.
It is clear that if a mechanism is o--susceptible to any quasi-misreport, then it has
susceptibility at least o-. Thus we can think of susceptibility to a particular set of
quasi-misreports as a strengthening of susceptibility. This strengthening ties in with
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consequentialist inefficiency via the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1 Assume N > 2. Let F be a set of distribution pairs with .F1 C .F.
If M is --susceptible to the buyer's quasi-misreport (b,b, 6), and
b - b - 46
64< (4.1)64
then M has a (o-, ,) cons equentialist tradeoff over .F. Similarly, if M is o--susceptible
to the seller's quasi-misreport (s, S,), and
< , (4.2)64
then M has a (o-, q) consequentialist tradeoff over F.
Proof: We give the proof for (4.1); the argument for (4.2) is essentially identical.
Note (4.1) implies b - b> 4J.
Let R be the set of values r E [-6,6] such that a buyer of type b + r can benefit
by at least o- from misreporting as b + r, for some distribution pair in F. Thus, for
every r E R, the manipulation set Wb(b + r; o-) contains b + r, and R has Lebesgue
measure y > 0.
Define density functions f, g as follows:
2/6, 6+ u-J<x< -+ 6 ;
0 otherwise;
g(z) = 1/p, x=b+rforsomerCR;
0 otherwise.
Define the density h(x) = (1 - 1) f(x) + (1) g(x). Let F, G, H be the associated
distributions.
Drawing an agent's value from H is equivalent to designating the agent as "F-
type" or "G-type" with probabilities 1 - 1/N or 1/N, respectively, then drawing a
valuation from F or G accordingly.
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Certainly (H, H) c F. Suppose all agents' values are drawn independently from
H, and that the agents report as follows: any G-type buyer misreports by b - b (so
if his true value is b + r, he reports b + r); all other agents report truthfully.
Let E denote the event that there is exactly one G-type buyer, and the 2N - 1
other agents are all F-type. As in (3.4), we have
1
Pr (E) 2 -.* (4.3)16
Conditional on E, let 7r be the probability that the G-type buyer ends up with a
good under the mechanism. Notice that in event E, the first-best always requires this
buyer to receive a good; when he does not, the resulting efficiency loss is at least as
large as the difference between his value and the next-highest value, which is at least
(b(- J) - +b - 26.2 2
Therefore, the consequentialist inefficiency of the mechanism (with minimum manip-
ulation cost o) satisfies the lower bound
b -b 25
r' > Pr(E) - (1 - 7r) - -2 6  2 (1 - r). (4.4)2 16
On the other hand, let ' be the density defined by
x) = y 1/=, = + r for some r E R;
0 otherwise.
and h(x) = (1 - y) f(x) + (k) g(x). Define G, H the distributions associated with
', h. Note that G represents the distribution of reports by a C-type buyer in the
previous scenario who misreports his value.
Suppose now that all agents' values are drawn from H, instead of H, and that
all agents report truthfully. We can label agents as F-type or C-type, as before.
Let E denote the event that there is one C-type buyer and all other agents are
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F-type. We then have Pr(E) 2 1/16 once again. Moreover, the distribution of
profiles conditional on Z, when values are drawn from H, is exactly the same as the
distribution of reported profiles conditional on E, when values were drawn from H
and when G-type buyers were misreporting. Consequently, conditional on E, the
probability that the C-type buyer receives a good is again ir.
However, conditional on E, the first-best requires that the C-type buyer never re-
ceive a good; and when he does receive one, the efficiency loss is at least the difference
between his value and the next higher value, which is at least
b__ b-bb+b- 6 - b + J) = - 2J.
2 2
So we have
_ _ Pr(_) -7r - 2J > 2 6- r. (4.5)
Adding (4.4) and (4.5), and dividing by 2 gives q' > (b- b - 4J)/64. Combining with
(4.1), we see that the mechanism has a (o-, ,) consequentialist tradeoff, as claimed.
D
We can now use Lemma 4.1 to restate our main results from Section 3 in terms
of consequentialist tradeoffs. The following theorem extends Theorem 3.3:
Theorem 4.2 There exists a positive constant c such that every possible mechanism
has a (c/(VN log N),c/(fNlogN)) consequentialist tradeoff on.F1.
Proof: Suppose not: some mechanism M has consequentialist inefficiency qC less
than c/(VN log N) for manipulation cost o- < c/(VV log N). We repeat exactly the
steps of the proof of Theorem 3.3. Since 7 < rf, the only assumption from that
theorem that is no longer present was the assumption that each agent can gain at
most o- by misreporting. That assumption was used only once in the original proof
- in Step 2, in the line "a buyer of type by + r (for any j) cannot benefit by more
than a from misreporting as type bjai + r" (and the analogous argument for sellers).
This line now requires elaboration. In particular, it must be reformulated in terms of
quasi-misreports.
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We claim that for each j, the mechanism M cannot be o--susceptible to the quasi-
misreport (bj, bj+1, 2). For suppose otherwise. Then by Lemma 4.1, we have
77bj - bj+1 -- y bj - bj+1
- 64 70
Now, the ratio p satisfies the lower bound
3 __IK>p > (20vN)1/K 1/ log N= e1/2 6 (4.6)
-4 4 4 5
which gives us
bj - bj+1 = (P - 1)bj+1 bj+1 15 IOOvNW
and therefore
1 /100v/NI_ 1
70 7000 N
Since y < c/(vN log N), we obtain c > 1/7000 (as long as N > 3), contradicting our
assumption at the beginning of the proof.
Thus, M is not susceptible to the quasi-misreport (bj, bj+ 1, 2). So it remains true
that for almost all r C [--y/2, 'y/2], a buyer of type bj + r (for any given j) cannot
benefit by more than o- from misreporting as type bj+1 + r. Hence, for almost all r,
this holds for all j simultaneously.
For each such r, the argument leading to (3.7) remains valid. Then (3.8) continues
to hold as well, since that inequality is derived by integrating over r E [--y/2, -y/2]
(and the integrand is bounded). Thus, the conclusion of Step 2 on the average utility
of each buyer still applies. An entirely analogous argument shows that we also still
have the same lower bound on average utility for the sellers.
From there, the rest of the argument for Theorem 3.3 leads to the same contra-
diction as before. l
Similarly, the following result extends Proposition 3.4 to the consequentialist
framework:
Proposition 4.3 There exists a positive constant c such that every mechanism has
274
a (c, c) consequentialist tradeoff on Fo.
Proof: We prove the proposition with c = 1/128. Thus suppose for contradiction
that some mechanism has consequentialist inefficiency if < 1/128 with o- < 1/128.
Again, we repeat line-for-line the proof of Proposition 3.4, making a change analogous
to the one we applied to prove Theorem 4.2.
Specifically, the only line in the proof of Proposition 3.4 that needs to be changed
is the assertion "for any r E [0, -y], a buyer of value 1 - r cannot benefit by more than
o by misreporting as value 1/4 - r." Instead, this line now only holds for almost
all r E [0, 7]; that is, the mechanism is not o--susceptible to the quasi-misreport
(1- , 1- 2, -). Proof: if it were u-susceptible, then by Lemma 4.1, we would have
3/4 -2> 1
64 128'
contrary to assumption. (An analogous change would be made in the argument for
sellers.)
Again, the fact that misreports are prevented for almost all r C [0, -y] rather than
all r is immaterial, since the proof of Proposition 3.4 then proceeds by integrating over
r. The rest of that proof then carries through, and we reach the same contradiction.
To summarize this section: although our main results were originally expressed
in terms of the tradeoff between incentives for strategic manipulation and efficiency
under truth-telling, they can be easily rephrased in terms of the tradeoff between
costs of strategic behavior and efficiency under manipulation. The proofs carry over
with only minor enhancements needed.
Before closing, we should mention that all of the above discussion has used only
the allocation of goods as the relevant welfare criterion. In fact, with our assumption
that agents face a cost to behaving strategically, it would arguably be appropriate to
count this cost as a welfare loss whenever it is incurred. Of course, doing so would
only strengthen our lower bounds on consequentialist inefficiency.
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5 Onwards
In this paper, we have looked at the tradeoff between efficiency and incentives for
strategic manipulation in large double auction mechanisms. In so doing, we have
begun to fill a gap between two earlier literatures on large double auctions - one
looking only at incentives for manipulation, and one looking at inefficiency in perfectly
incentive-compatible mechanisms. By looking at the tradeoff, we have addressed the
question of whether it would be possible to achieve much-improved convergence to
full efficiency by making a small sacrifice in terms of incentives for truthful behavior.
Our main result, Theorem 3.3, gives a negative answer to this question, by providing
a near-optimal bound for the rate at which either the inefficiency or the susceptibility
to manipulation of any mechanism can converge to zero as the size of the market
becomes large. We have also reinterpreted the bound in terms of the severity of
inefficiency that may result when agents actually do manipulate (Theorem 4.2).
There are several clear technical directions in which to extend this paper. One di-
rection would be to strengthen Theorem 3.3 to give a sharp bound on the inefficiency-
susceptibility tradeoff. Ideally, it should be possible to parameterize the curve to
which the inefficiency-susceptibility frontier (depicted in Figure 3.1) converges as N
becomes large, analogously to the deficit-inefficiency frontier parameterized by Tatur
[30].
One might also wish to give analogous bounds for other classes of distribution
pairs F, besides those we have looked at. For example, one might consider the family
of all pairs (Fb, FS) given by continuous densities taking values in some interval [p, P],
where 0 < p < p are fixed; this would be more comparable with previous literature
[12, 22, 27, 30].
The present paper fits into the program advanced in the previous chapter of this
dissertation, which argues that it can be useful to quantify incentives for strategic
behavior in mechanisms, and that a natural approach to doing so - defining a mech-
anism's susceptibility to manipulation as the maximum expected utility an agent
could gain by manipulating - is analytically tractable. By looking at incentives in
276
this way, rather than treating incentive constraints as rigid, we open up a new quanti-
tative dimension to mechanism design. Understanding this dimension may be useful
in designing and evaluating mechanisms for practical use.
A Omitted proofs
We begin by introducing some asymptotic notation used in the proofs. We follow the
conventions of the previous chapter and keep explicit track of constant factors. Specifi-
cally, for functions F(N), G(N), we write F(N) - G(N) to mean that F(N)/G(N)
1 as N --+ oo, and F(N) ,< G(N) to mean limsupN-, F(N)/G(N) < 1.
Now, we prove a technical result, Lemma A.2, that is used in the proofs of Propo-
sitions 3.1 and 3.2. It provides a central-limit-theorem-style approximation on the
probability of a given split between the number of high-value and the number of
low-value agents.
We first need the following preliminary calculation:
Lemma A.1 Fix 0 < , < 1. Then
max N'V) KJ K)N-J<
0<J<N 27_rK(1- K)N
Proof: The maximum of the left-hand side over J is attained at J = [(N + 1)uj
(this can be proven by computing the ratio of its values over successive J). Now
expand explicitly, use Stirling's approximation [1, eq. 6.1.38] for the factorials, and
simplify. D
Lemma A.2 Let 0 < r < 1 and A > 1 be given. There exist a constant c and an
integer No with the following property: For all N > No, all K < (1 - K)N, and all
a, b G [0,1] such that
b < Aa, 1-b< A(1-a),
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we have the inequality
N -
J_ KaN-JbJ-K A -+)-j -(1- a)j(1 - b)N-J+K < cF
Proof: We consider three cases, depending on the values of a and b.
(i) Suppose that a < K/4A. Then b < r/4. For every J we have either
K N - J
-K<
2A N
or
K J-K
2 N
since otherwise adding would give -K< 1+1/A < K, a contradiction.N 2
If (A.2) holds then consider
(N)
(A.1)
(A.2)
(A.3)
aN-J -
which is log-concave in a, maximized at a = (N - J)/N. The constraint a <
K/4A then implies
N NaN- ) N-J K )J
4AJ 4A
1
V27rN () (1a - 4K)
using Lemma A.1.
If (A.3) holds then consider
( bJ-K(1_ b)N-J+K
which is log-concave in b, maximized at b = (J - K)/N. The constraint b < K/4
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N
E iJ=K (N)
implies
N K)bJ-K
K) N-J+K
4/
- b)N-J+K
K
2rN (t4)1
again by Lemma A.1.
So there is an absolute constant c such that, for every J, one of the two factors
aNJ(I - a)J, ( J NK)bJK(I - b)N-J+K
is at most c/A/sI'N (as long as N is large enough). Then the sum in (A.1) is
at most
S A
N
-a))N]=<c [(b+ (1 - b)
) N-J
2cl -
(ii) Suppose that 1- a < K/4A. Then 1 - b < K/4. Here the analysis is quite similar
to case (i): For every J we have either
1 J
2 N (A.4)
1 -N-J+K
If (A.4) holds then
(N)
aN-J(1 - a)"
(N7)i
or
2 N
(A.5)
<(N ( )
2r (1 -n n
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( I -
a)J- )N-
- K N-J
-A
< jN (,J-K
J-K) \4
J -K bJ-K I
-J=K
and if (A.5) holds then
0 - K - b)N-J+K J (I - )JK ()NJ+K
J 27rN - ) ( )<1
This case is completed exactly as in the previous case.
(iii) The remaining possibility is K/4A < a < 1 - t,/4A. In this case, we hold a fixed
and let N and J vary. We use Lemma A. 1, which gives
N1A
max aNN-J1 Jma()a ( - a)  < < C
J J~y27rNa(1 - a) - N
for an appropriate constant c. Then the sum in (A.1) is at most
N 
_ 
_b-( )NJK<C)]C
c J - K N-J+K < [ (b + (1 - b))Nc)N K-J=K J N
Proof of Proposition 3.1: We will show the following stronger result: there is
an absolute constant c such that the expected value of the least valuable trade, under
any distribution pair (Fb, FS) E FA, is at most cA5/ 2N-1/2, as long as N is sufficiently
large relative to A. Denote this expected value by ((Fb, Fs).
First, fix any N and any (Fb, FS) C F. For each x E [0,1], let H(x) denote the
probability that s(k) < x < b(k), where S(k), b(k) denote the values involved in the
lowest-value trade as in Subsection 2.3. Conditional on the realized profile, the value
of this lowest-value trade, b(k) - s(k), equals the probability that s(k) < x < b(k) when
x is drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. Hence, the unconditional expected value of b(k) - S(k)
is just the expected value of H(x), over x - U[0, 1]. That is,
((Fb, Fs) = E[b(k) - 8(k)] = j H(x) dx.
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So it suffices to show that max[o,i1 H(x) is bounded above by cA5/ 2N-1/ 2.
Thus, fix x* E [0, 1]. Call a valuation high if it is in [x*, 1] and low if it is in [0, x*).
Notice that b(k) is the lowest buyer's value among the top N values, and s(k) is the
highest seller's value among the bottom N values. Therefore, S(k) < x* < b(k) if and
only if all buyers among the top N values are high and all sellers among the bottom
N values are low. Call this event E*. Thus, H(x*) = Pr(E*).
To bound the probability of E*, we define the following events:
" EK, for each integer K = -N, -N+1,... , N, is the event that there are exactly
N + K high values.
" E, for K = 0,.. ., N, is the event that EK happens and the (N+1)th, . .. , (N+
K)th highest values are all buyer values.
" E<, for K = -N,..., -1, is the event that EK happens and the Nth, (N- 1)th,
... , (N + K + 1)th highest values are all seller values.
Note that E* is contained in the union of the E<.
We claim that for |KI 5 N/2, Pr(EK) < cA 1 / 2N- 1/2 , where c is an absolute
constant (as long as N is large enough). Indeed, if we let J denote the number of
high buyer values, we can sum over possible realizations of J to obtain (when K > 0)
the equality
Pr(EK) N +K - J F'(_)N-JFs M J-K(1- FbYJ(1-Fs _N+K-J.
J=
(A.6)
A direct application of Lemma A.2, with n = 1/2, then implies that Pr(EK) <
cA1/2N-1/2 as claimed. The argument for the case K < 0 is identical.
Next, we claim that
Pr(EkJEK) 1 + 2 2), for |Kj < . (A.7)
To show this, we argue in terms of the joint density of the 2N values (bi, si). We will
again assume K > 0; the argument for K < 0 is identical.
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For any weakly decreasing sequence of values v = (v(1) - - - >v-(2N)) and any
sequence of labels t = (t(),... ) t(2N)) with each t(i) C {b, s}, let
Q(v,t) = J fb(~) sJ fv)
i: t)=b i: tw=s
If the buyers' and sellers' values are drawn independently from F6 and F', then
the probability density of a given profile P of values is exactly Q(v, t), where v
consists of the values in P sorted in decreasing order, and t(i) = b if the value
v(i) belongs to a buyer and s if a seller. For any set T of label sequences t, let
Q(V, T) = EtCTQ(v,t). For J = 0,...,K, let Tj be the set of label sequences
consisting of N b's and N s's, such that exactly J of the labels t(N+1),- - ,t(N+K) are
equal to s; and let Tu j=U0 Tj, the set of all label sequences consisting of N b's
and N s's.
Let VK be the set of value sequences consisting of N + K high values and N - K
low values. Then
Pr(EK) = (N!)2 j Q(v, Tu) dv. (A.8)
(The (N!)2 factor comes from the fact that each sequence v of distinct values and label
sequence t distinguishing the buyer values from the seller values should be counted
multiple times, once for each of the N! possible assignments of buyer identities to
buyer values and N! assignments of seller identities to seller values.) Similarly
Pr(E1) = (N!)2  Q(v, TO) dv. (A.9)
K~ fVK
On the other hand, for any fixed v and any fixed J E {o,... , K - 1}, we can
relate Q(v, TJ) with Q(v, TJ+ 1 ) as follows. Call an element tj E Ty and tJ+1 E
connected if tj+1 is obtained from tj by switching some t(i) from b to s, where i E
{N+1, ... , N+K}, and switching some t(j) from s to b, where j V {N+1,... , N+K}.
Each element of Tj is connected to exactly (K - J)(N - J) elements of Tj+1, and
each element of TJ+1 is connected to exactly (J + 1)(N - K + J + 1) elements of
Tj. Moreover, if tj+1 is connected to tj, then Q(v, tj) <; A2Q(V, tj+1), since the ratio
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between fb and fS is always bounded by A. Summing over all connected pairs, we
have
(K - J)(N - J) ZQ(v,j) <; (J+ 1)(N - K + J+ 1)
tjcTj EtJ 1 6ETJ+1
from which
Q(v, TJ+1) (J+
Since N > 2K and J < K - 1 this gives
Q(v, Tj+1) K-JJ + 1
1 (K
1AQ(v,Tj)= (i
I
2A2Q(V, TJ).
Now by induction we have
Q(v, TO)
for all J. Summing gives
Q(v, Tu) =
K
ZQ(vl Tj) >(I
J=O
+ QV, TO).
Combining with (A.8) and (A.9) gives
Pr(EK) 1 + 1 K2A2 Pr(E().
This is exactly (A.7) for K > 0. The K < 0 case is identical.
In addition, if K > N/2, then any draw in Ek requires the (N+1)th,..., L3N/2]th
highest values all to be buyer values; so an identical argument gives
Pr(EIEK) I + 1 ) -[N/21
2A2
for K > N/2. And by the same argument, this conclusion also holds when K < -N/2.
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(K - J)(N - J)
1)(N - K + J+
A2Q(V, tJ+1)
1)A 2Q (V, Tj).
Q(V, Tj) 2! -K _
We conclude that
N
Pr(E*) < ( Pr(EK)
K=-N
[N/2]
< E/cA1/2
K=-LN/2)
N -1/2 - + 2
00 /-K
S2E (I + 2A2
K=O
< 7cA5/ 2 N 1 /2
- ci/2 N-1/2 + (NP
-LN/2)
+ 1 (i+-)
-N<K<N
|K|>N/2
+-N/2]
2 A2
The last inequality holds because E 0 (1 + 1/2A2)-K - 2A2 +1 < 3A 2 , and the final
term (N+2)(1 + 1/2A2)-LN/2] is exponentially decreasing in N, so is certainly at most
cA 5/ 2 N-11 2 when N is large enough.
Thus we have shown that there is an absolute constant c for which H(x*) =
Pr(E*) < cA/ 2N- 1/ 2 when N is large enough. Moreover, at no step in the proof
did we use the specific value of x* or the distribution (Fb, Fs) C F; therefore the
constant c and the threshold for N are independent of these choices. We conclude
that sup(Fb,Fs)EF ((F, FS) < cA 5/ 2 N-1/2, which is what we wanted.
Finally, we prove a simple central-limit-theorem approximation used in the proof
of Theorem 3.3.
Lemma A.3 If N is sufficiently large, then
N- [VN/4) 2N
K(K)
(1 2N
2 -4
Proof: From Stirling's approximation, we have
(1)2N 2
2 ~~ xN
2N) 
1)2N 
2NK 2 -IN
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and in particular
2 N) (1) 2 NK 2
for all K, as long as N is large enough. Then, we have
2N) (1)2N
K2N
N
K=O
K)2N
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1
N-[V/N|4]
K=O
VN|4] 4
286
Bibliography
[1] Milton Abramowitz and Irene A. Stegun (1972), Handbook of Mathematical Func-
tions (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), tenth printing.
[2] George A. Akerlof (1970), "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3), 488-500.
[3] Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, and Avinatan Hassidim (2011), "Matching with
Couples Revisited," extended abstract in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Confer-
ence on Electronic Commerce (EC-11), 335.
[4] Eduardo Azevedo and Eric Budish, "Strategyproofness in the Large as a Desider-
atum for Market Design," unpublished paper, Harvard University.
[5] Salvador Barbera (2001), "An Introduction to Strategy-Proof Social Choice
Functions," Social Choice and Welfare 18 (4), 619-653.
[6] Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris (2005), "Robust Mechanism Design,"
Econometrica 73 (6), 1771-1813.
[7] Eleanor Birrell and Rafael Pass (2011), "Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting,"
in Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, 67-72.
[8] Kim-Sau Chung and J. C. Ely (2007), "Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mech-
anisms," Review of Economic Studies 74 (2), 447-476.
[9] Edward H. Clarke (1971), "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods," Public Choice
11 (1), 17-33.
[10] Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel (2009), "Veto Constraint in Mechanism De-
sign: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," American Economic Journal: Microe-
conomics 1 (1), 182-206.
[11] Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, and Ton Storcken (2004), "Threshold Strategy-
Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems," Cames and Economic
Behavior 49 (1), 103-116.
287
[12] Thomas A. Gresik and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1989), "The Rate at Which a
Simple Market Converges to Efficiency as the Number of Traders Increases: An
Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms," Journal of Economic The-
ory 48 (1), 304-332.
[13] Theodore Groves (1973), "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica 41 (4), 617-631.
[14] Nicole Immorlica and Mohammed Mahdian (2005), "Marriage, Honesty, and
Stability," in Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on
Discrete Algorithms (SODA-05), 53-62.
[15] Matthew 0. Jackson (1992), "Incentive Compatibility and Competitive Alloca-
tions," Economics Letters 40 (3), 299-302.
[16] Matthew 0. Jackson and Alejandro M. Manelli (1997), "Approximately Com-
petitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory 77
(2), 354-376.
[17] Fuhito Kojima and Mihai Manea (2010), "Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial
Mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), 106-123.
[18] Fuhito Kojima and Parag A. Pathak (2009), "Incentives and Stability in Large
Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review 99 (3), 608-627.
[19] Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri (2005), "Approximately-
Strategyproof and Tractable Multiunit Auctions," Decision Support Systems 39
(1), 105-121.
[20] Hitoshi Matsushima (2008), "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory,"
Economics Letters 100 (1), 161-164.
[21] Hitoshi Matsushima (2008), "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," Journal
of Economic Theory 139 (1), 353-359.
[22] R. Preston McAfee (1992), "A Dominant Strategy Double Auction," Journal of
Economic Theory 56 (2), 434-450.
[23] Frank McSherry and Kunal Talwar (2007), "Mechanism Design via Differential
Privacy," in Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS-07), 94-103.
[24] Roger B. Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite (1983), "Efficient Mechanisms for
Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory 29 (2), 265-281.
[25] Philip J. Reny and Motty Perry (2006), "Toward a Strategic Foundation for
Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Econometrica 74 (5), 1231-1269.
[26] Donald John Roberts and Andrew Postlewaite (1976), "The Incentives for Price-
Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica 44 (1), 115-127.
288
[27] Aldo Rustichini, Mark A. Satterthwaite, and Steven R. Williams (1994), "Con-
vergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econo-
metrica 62 (5), 1041-1063.
[28] Mark A. Satterthwaite and Steven R. Williams (2002), "The Optimality of a
Simple Market Mechanism," Econometrica 70 (5), 1841-1863.
[29] James Schummer (2004), "Almost-Dominant Strategy Implementation: Ex-
change Economies," Games and Economic Behavior 48 (1), 154-170.
[30] Tymon Tatur (2005), "On the Tradeoff between Deficit and Inefficiency and the
Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee," Econometrica 73 (2), 517-570.
[31] Steven R. Williams (1999), "A Characterization of Efficient, Bayesian Incentive
Compatible Mechanisms," Economic Theory 14 (1), 155-180.
289
